• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.37 no.3 s.72
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• pp.45-63
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• 2006

A number of public loans with lower interests and other tax benefits have been provided for farmers and fishermen. However, much of those loans have been accumulated as non-performing. The result is that a large part of fisheries debts are now on the verge of default, Those loans, that fail to pay interests, keep rapidly growing like a time bomb. Now something has to be done before it burst. Firstly, the government must clean up the debts caused by government's mismanagement in the past. The past debt must be repaid or written off by the government since its guarantee was committed several times in guidelines regarding public loans. As such a measure, the government can greatly enlarge its capital contribution to the Credit Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Fishermen and Loss Guarantee fund for Policy Loan. It would greatly help to compensate local branches of fisheries cooperatives for their loss incurred from carrying public loans. In the past, the government used to roll over old debts of fishermen with new debts whenever maturity came. It ends up growing the size of non - performing loans. For this reason, it is not delay of the debt payment, but its write - off that fishery society needs a lot. Secondly, the loan authorities must lower overall risk in providing public loans for fishermen in the future. The whole process must be thoroughly reviewed and changed to provide and manage government loans. To facilitate this, fisheries cooperative must stop being just a public agent, rather take a bigger responsibility in selecting, and checking loan beneficiaries, and securing debt repayment. Incentives must be arranged properly enough to induce fisheries cooperatives to treat public loans just like their own business. Finally, the so - called 'special account of policy loan in fisheries industry' must be set up to enhance the transparency and to check the performance of public loans programs.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.43-61
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• 2008

Excessive public loan with low interest and other tax benefits have been provided for fishermen, but much of them turned out to be little performed. There were the moral hazards of Suhyup in the process of executing the public loans. As the government gave the reimbursement on the financial loss of Suhyup resulting from the public loans, Suhyup had no responsibility of the bad debt loss. Therefore, Suhyup gave little efforts to reduce the non-performing. The government perceived this problem and tried to reduce the under-performing loans. Thus, the government decided to take limited responsibilities. Suhyup made the progress to reduce the under-performing public loans. Suhyup dealt with these situation and made the credit evaluation model of the fisherman's public loan. This paper is for the credit evaluation model in the fisherman's public loan, which explains the model development methodology and the model characteristics in detail. This evaluation model is composed of two sub-component model. the one is the quantitative model and the other is the qualitative model. The quantitative sub-model is for the identification of fishermen financial status and is based on the financial transaction information. Its development methodology is the CSS modeling for the consumer market. The qualitative sub-model is for the evaluation the business prospect and is based on the business information such as fisherman's management skills, technology, equipment. Its development methodology is the AHP. It provides the detailed information in the model development methodology, which is the ideal example such as the public loan. In addition it gives the information to the interest parties such as policy makers, suhyup and fishermen.