지능 제어, 통신, 컴퓨터 및 센서 기술, 영상 처리, 메카트로닉스 등과 같은 다양한 분야에서 로봇 축구 시스템에 대한 연구가 진행되고 있다. 그중 전략 연구는 대부분 공격 전략 연구에 치중하고 있으며, 점차 지능적인 공격 전략을 구현하는 방향으로 흘러가고 있다. 이에 따라 과거의 단순한 수비 전략으로는 완전한 수비가 불가능하게 되었다. 따라서, 지능적인 공격을 효율적으로 수비할 수 있는 수비 전략이 필요하며, 효율적인 수비를 위하여 공격자 로봇의 의도 추출이 필요하다. 본 논문에서는, 퍼지 최대 최소 신경망을 이용한 축구 로봇의 공격 의도 추출기를 설계하였다. 첫째로 축구 로봇 시스템에서의 의도를 정의하고 의도 추출에 대하여 설명한다. 다음으로 설계한 퍼지 최대 최소 신경망을 이용하여 설계한 축구 로봇의 의도 추출기에 대하여 설명한다. 퍼지 최대 최소 신경망은 패턴분류 방법 중의 하나로 온라인 적용, 짧은 학습 시간, 소프트 결정(soft decision) 등의 많은 장점을 갖고 있다. 따라서, 다이나믹한 환경을 가진 축구 로봇 시스템의 의도 추출에 적합하다. 이 의도 추출기는 상대 팀 로봇이 공격시 어떠한 상황에서 어떠한 행동을 할 것인가를 미리 알아내어 수비 시 이용할 수 있도록 하며, 학습을 통하여 의도 추출을 함으로써 상대 팀 경기를 보고 팀의 전략을 파악하는 전략 분석기로도 사용이 가능하다. 자체 제작한 3대3 로봇 축구 시뮬레이터를 이용하여 시뮬레이션을 하였으며, 학습을 함에 따라서 의도 추출률이 증가함을 확인할 수 있었다.
본 논문은 다이아몬드 인터체인지에서의 유고감지모형 개발을 위해 퍼지이론을 응용한 연구를 문서화 한 것이다. 지금까지의 교차로와 일반도로(고속도로가 아닌)에서의 유고감지에 관한 연구는 초기에 불과하다. 기존의 알고리즘들은 필요한 데이터 보존의 어 려움과 유고감지의 특성과 관련된 기술적 어려움을 효과적으로 극복하지 못하고 있다. 본 연구의 목적은 다이아몬드 인터체인지에서의 유고감지를 위한 새로운 모형을 개발하는데 있다. 이 연구를 통하여 개발된 유고감지 모형은 차량차단 유고(lane-blocking incidents) 를 감지하는데, 감지의 범위는 차량차단 유고의 경향이 교통 장황에 특정한 패턴을 형성 하고 그에 따른 신호제어전략의 조정이 요구될 때에 국한된다. 이 모형은 전통적인 통계 치를 이용한 유고감지감 고유의 문제를 해결하며, 보다 정확하고 신뢰성 있는 유고감지를 위해 다양한 교통변수를 이용하여 전체적인 유고의 경향을 포착한다. 또한 이 모형은 실 시간 교통대응 다이아몬드 인터체인지 신호제어 시스템 (real-time traffic adaptive diamond interchange control system)의 구성요소로써 사용되며, 그리고 더 큰 교차로 시스템에의 상용을 위하여 확장이 용역하도록 설계되었다. 본 연구를 통해 개발된 프로 토타입(prototype) 유고감지 모형은 실제의 다이아몬드 인터체인지에 적용되어, 감지율, 오보율, 평감지시간의 세 달로써 성능이 평가되었다. 모형의 성능평가 결과는 무적이었으 며, 퍼지이론은 유고감지에 효과적인 접근방법임을 확인할 수 있었다.투자의 타당성을 실증적으로 보여 주고 있다.산정 절차 정립에 엇갈림 알고리즘을 활용하는 방안을 제시하였다.자함수를 추정한 뒤 이를 이용해 업종, 기업규모, 상품유형별로 적합한 모델(Fixed Effects Model)을 결정하고, 각각에 해당하는 통계모형을 구축하였다. 이 결과 (1) 업종 및 기업규모별로 그룹간에 유의한 특성이 발견되었으며, (2) R&D 및 광고투자는 기업의 시장성과를 설명하는 중요한 변수이나, (3) R&D 투자의 경우는 광고에 비해 불확실성이 존재하는 것으로 나타났고, (4) 수리모형에서 도출된 한계원리가 통계모형에서도 유효한 것으로 드러났다.등을 토대로 한 10대 산업을 육성하기 위하여 과학기술부는 기술수요조사를 바탕으로 49개 주요기술을 도출하여, 과학기술 일류 국가 실현, 국민소득 2만불 달성이라는 국가적 슬로건을 내걸고 “차세대 성장동력” 창출을 위한 범정부차원의 기획과 연구비의 집중투자를 추진하고 있다.달성하기 위해서는 종합류류 전산망의 시급한 구축과 함께 화물차의 적재율을 높이고 공차율을 낮출 수 있는 운송체계의 수립이 필요한 것으로 판단된다. 그라나 이러한 화물전용차선의 효과는 단기적인 치유책일 수밖에 없기 때문에 물류유통 시설의 확충을 위한 사회간접자본의 구축을 서둘러 시행하여야 할 것이다.으로 처리한 Machine oil, Phenthoate EC 및 Trichlorfon WP는 비교적 약효가 낮았다.>$^{\circ}$E/
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70