• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.31-35
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• 2024

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale surprise attack against Israel and war broke out. On this day, in addition to supplying rockets, they directly invaded Israeli territory in multiple areas using parariders and motorcycles. Considering the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, it is meaningful to consider why Israel allowed Hamas to attack and why it failed to deter the war in advance. Deterrence can only be successful if it is supported by capability, will, communication, and credibility. Although the capability and will were sufficient, and the communication through punitive deterrence had been sufficiently communicated, the failure to deter this war was problematic in terms of credibility. In order to increase deterrence against North Korea's threat, we need to improve customized extended deterrence, convey the will of both Korea and the United States to deter, and increase credibility in deterrence capabilities and execution ability.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.123-134
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• 2020

This study analyses the Korean successive governments' nuclear strategies after the post-cold war and suggests the future countermeasures as analysing to reciprocally interconnect B. Clinton and G.W.Bush governments' policies and North Korea's nuclear strategy. As the conclusion, this study suggests that the most urgent domestic alternative measure to North Korea's nuclear dismantlement is to prepare the grand strategy with the united whole national consensus and to order the renewed stronger future role by the mutual cooperation of multilateral agreement system and international regimes and lastly to adopt the extended deterrence through the reinforcement of the 5 great joint statements between the South-North Koreas.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.89-100
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• 2017

Last January 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th president of the United States. He actively claimed a priority for the United States, which is referred as America First, during his presidential campaign. However, his political assertions turned out to be as Isolationist in terms of foreign policy. It becomes a serious problem for South Korea because South Korea is solely dependent on the U.S. "Extended Deterrence" of North Korea's nuclear threats. In other words, there will be a higher likelihood for North Korea to misinterpret the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. Due to his foreign policy, there is a possible provocation by North Korea. Therefore, ROK-U.S. Alliance, the model of Asymmetry Alliance in order to prepare for North Korea's nuclear provocation, will be evaluated through America's perspective based on "Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model". For this purpose, this research will evaluate ROK-U.S. Alliance with regards to a threat perception, policy coordination, and a value as an ally. Based on the evaluation, it will deduce tactical implications of South Korea's alliance.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.1-56
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• 2022

Why has India become a key actor in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region? There are some external factors, but for India, its geo-strategic frontier encompassing its geopolitical and maritime interests is expanding rapidly beyond its territorial space across both the Indian and Pacific oceans amidst an increasingly arduous geopolitical and security environment. India must, therefore, acquire the ability to influence events within this strategic arena using all facets of national power, including maritime-military power. Lately, therefore, New Delhi has invested much intellectual capital to review its maritime-security strategy. India's new strategy is premised on the concept of holistic security involving the 'softer' aspects of maritime-security, and a rekindling of maritime consciousness in India, a nation that has traditionally been beset by 'sea-blindness'. The strategy adopts a region-wide, inclusive, and a more proactive approach than hitherto, as is evident in its title 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy'. While it deals with the growing concern of new non-traditional threats in the Indian littoral and the need for military deterrence and preparedness, it also addresses the imperatives for India to seek a favorable and rules-based benign environment in its immediate and extended maritime periphery, including through multi-vectored strategic partnerships dictated by its enduring principle of strategic autonomy. For a more profound and comprehensive understanding of India's maritime-security strategy, this paper examines the key unstated and implicit factors that underpin the strategy. These include India's historical and cultural evolution as a nation; its strategic geography; its geopolitical and security perceptions; and the political directions to its security forces. The paper deals specifically with India's response to maritime threats ranging from natural disasters, crime and state-sponsored terrorism to those posed by Pakistan and China, as well as the Indian Navy's envisaged security role East of the Malacca Straits. It also analyzes the aspects of organizational restructuring and force planning of India's maritime-security forces.