• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.