• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.65-86
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• 2012

The $20^{th}$ century was the era of manufacturer brands which built higher brand equity for consumers. Consumers moved from generic products of inconsistent quality produced by local factories in the $19^{th}$ century to branded products from global manufacturers and manufacturer brands reached consumers through distributors and retailers. Retailers were relatively small compared to their largest suppliers. However, sometime in the 1970s, things began to slowly change as retailers started to develop their own national chains and began international expansion, and consolidation of the retail industry from mom-and-pop stores to global players was well under way (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007, p.2) In South Korea, since the middle of the 1990s, the bulking up of retailers that started then has changed the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. Retailer private labels, generally referred to as own labels, store brands, distributors own private-label, home brand or own label brand have also been performing strongly in every single local market (Bushman 1993; De Wulf et al. 2005). Private labels now account for one out of every five items sold every day in U.S. supermarkets, drug chains, and mass merchandisers (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), and the market share in Western Europe is even larger (Euromonitor 2007). In the UK, grocery market share of private labels grew from 39% of sales in 2008 to 41% in 2010 (Marian 2010). Planet Retail (2007, p.1) recently concluded that "[PLs] are set for accelerated growth, with the majority of the world's leading grocers increasing their own label penetration." Private labels have gained wide attention both in the academic literature and popular business press and there is a glowing academic research to the perspective of manufacturers and retailers. Empirical research on private labels has mainly studies the factors explaining private labels market shares across product categories and/or retail chains (Dahr and Hoch 1997; Hoch and Banerji, 1993), factors influencing the private labels proneness of consumers (Baltas and Doyle 1998; Burton et al. 1998; Richardson et al. 1996) and factors how to react brand manufacturers towards PLs (Dunne and Narasimhan 1999; Hoch 1996; Quelch and Harding 1996; Verhoef et al. 2000). Nevertheless, empirical research on factors influencing the production in terms of a manufacturer-retailer is rather anecdotal than theory-based. The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap in these two types of research and explore the factors which influence on manufacturer's private label production based on two competing theories: S-C-P (Structure - Conduct - Performance) paradigm and resource-based theory. In order to do so, the authors used in-depth interview with marketing managers, reviewed retail press and research and presents the conceptual framework that integrates the major determinants of private labels production. From a manufacturer's perspective, supplying private labels often starts on a strategic basis. When a manufacturer engages in private labels, the manufacturer does not have to spend on advertising, retailer promotions or maintain a dedicated sales force. Moreover, if a manufacturer has weak marketing capabilities, the manufacturer can make use of retailer's marketing capability to produce private labels and lessen its marketing cost and increases its profit margin. Figure 1. is the theoretical framework based on a strategic market management perspective, integrated concept of both S-C-P paradigm and resource-based theory. The model includes one mediate variable, marketing capabilities, and the other moderate variable, competitive intensity. Manufacturer's national brand reputation, firm's marketing investment, and product portfolio, which are hypothesized to positively affected manufacturer's marketing capabilities. Then, marketing capabilities has negatively effected on private label production. Moderating effects of competitive intensity are hypothesized on the relationship between marketing capabilities and private label production. To verify the proposed research model and hypotheses, data were collected from 192 manufacturers (212 responses) who are producing private labels in South Korea. Cronbach's alpha test, explanatory / comfirmatory factor analysis, and correlation analysis were employed to validate hypotheses. The following results were drawing using structural equation modeling and all hypotheses are supported. Findings indicate that manufacturer's private label production is strongly related to its marketing capabilities. Consumer marketing capabilities, in turn, is directly connected with the 3 strategic factors (e.g., marketing investment, manufacturer's national brand reputation, and product portfolio). It is moderated by competitive intensity between marketing capabilities and private label production. In conclusion, this research may be the first study to investigate the reasons manufacturers engage in private labels based on two competing theoretic views, S-C-P paradigm and resource-based theory. The private label phenomenon has received growing attention by marketing scholars. In many industries, private labels represent formidable competition to manufacturer brands and manufacturers have a dilemma with selling to as well as competing with their retailers. The current study suggests key factors when manufacturers consider engaging in private label production.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.105 no.3
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• pp.366-376
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• 2016

The "Forest Partnership" mechanism in Indonesia allows those with authority to manage forests, including Forest Management Units (KPH) and concession holders, to partner with local communities for forest management and profit sharing. The objective of this study is to identify the challenges that this new mechanism is facing and develop practical policy recommendations for its successful implementation. "Lombok Forest Partnership" is the first of its kind in Indonesia between Forest Management Unit (KPH) and a local community. The local community members participating in this partnership were surveyed for their expected outcomes, degree of their satisfaction about the process and profits sharing, as well as other factors affecting their participation. Respondents reported that they have obtained the information on Forest Partnership completely from KPH and NGO. Local peoples participated in Lombok Forest Partnership to improve their incomes, and recognized timber production as the most important income source with high possibility of success. However, timber production will require sizable initial capital investment for establishing nursery and other supporting activities, which cannot come from local communities lacking economic means. Thus, Forest Partnership would be difficult to succeed if KPH does not take the initiative to permit and promote local community to use special area and generate profits in their jurisdiction. KPH, in turn, can share the profits with local peoples. In this regard, KPH's leadership is the key factor in the success of Forest Partnership. However, KPH will need to cultivate their capacity to develop and implement income-generating business with local community. Although profit sharing ratio of timber and non-timber forest products among local community who participated in Lombok Forest Partnership was very high at 75%, and 90%, the level of satisfaction on profit sharing ratio was only average. The cooperative organized by the local community is also dealing with sensitive nature of allocating forest area internally among their members. Thus, keeping the principle of fairness, equity and transparency is the key for successful implementation of Forest Partnership mechanism. This first case of Forest Partnership can serve as a model for the future cases and provide the early lessons.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.45-70
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• 2009

This article investigates which types of the strategies announced by the listed firms contribute to enhancing the long-term performance of the companies. Since 2002, Korean Exchange adopted the "faire disclosure policy" which mandates that all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same time. Thanks to the policy, Korean investors can, now, easily access the board's decision on management strategies on the same day the decision is made. If the companies trustfully carry out their announced strategies, we can decide which types of strategies actually enhance or deteriorate the long-term performance, simply by comparing the announced strategies and the firm's performance. The sample companies are confined to 60 firms that became listed in the KOSDAQ market through back-door listing from 2003 to 2005. Using only the newly listed companies, we can avoid the interference on the long-term performance of the strategies pursued before the event date. This often holds true, for many companies radically modify their strategies after the listing. Furthermore, the back-door listing companies serve our purpose better than IPO companies do, because the former tend to have a variety of announcement within a given period of time beginning the listing date. Using these sample companies, this article analyzes the effect on one year buy-and-hold returns and abnormal buy-and-hold returns after the listing of the various types of strategies announced during the same period of time. The results show that those evidences of restructuring such as 'reduction of capital' and 'resignation of incumbent board members', actually contribute to the increase in adjusted long-term stock returns. Those strategies which can be view as evidence of new investment such as 'increase in tangible assets', 'acquisition of other companies', do also helps the stockholders better off. On the contrary, 'increase in bank loans', 'changes of CEO' and 'merger' deteriorate the equity value. The last findings let us to presume that the back-door listing companies appear to use the bank loans for value-reducing activities; the change in CEO is not a sign of restructuring, but rather a sign of failure of the restructuring; another merger carried out after back-door listing itself is also value-reducing activity. This article's findings on reduction of capital, merger and bank loans oppose the results of the former empirical studies which analyze only the short-term effect on stock price. Therefore, more long-term performance studies on public disclosures are in order.

• Proceedings of the Safety Management and Science Conference
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.355-380
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• 2004

I test the hypothesis that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability in Korea. Using thirty-six industry portfolios and the broad market index as our test assets, I establish several key results. First, a number of industries such as semiconductor, electronics, metal, and petroleum lead the stock market by up to one month. In contrast, the market, which is widely followed, only leads a few industries. Importantly, an industry's ability to lead the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity such as industrial production growth. Consistent with our hypothesis, these findings indicate that the market reacts with a delay to information in industry returns about its fundamentals because information diffuses only gradually across asset markets. Traditional theories of asset pricing assume that investors have unlimited information-processing capacity. However, this assumption does not hold for many traders, even the most sophisticated ones. Many economists recognize that investors are better characterized as being only boundedly rational(see Shiller(2000), Sims(2201)). Even from casual observation, few traders can pay attention to all sources of information much less understand their impact on the prices of assets that they trade. Indeed, a large literature in psychology documents the extent to which even attention is a precious cognitive resource(see, eg., Kahneman(1973), Nisbett and Ross(1980), Fiske and Taylor(1991)). A number of papers have explored the implications of limited information- processing capacity for asset prices. I will review this literature in Section II. For instance, Merton(1987) develops a static model of multiple stocks in which investors only have information about a limited number of stocks and only trade those that they have information about. Related models of limited market participation include brennan(1975) and Allen and Gale(1994). As a result, stocks that are less recognized by investors have a smaller investor base(neglected stocks) and trade at a greater discount because of limited risk sharing. More recently, Hong and Stein(1999) develop a dynamic model of a single asset in which information gradually diffuses across the investment public and investors are unable to perform the rational expectations trick of extracting information from prices. Hong and Stein(1999). My hypothesis is that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability. This hypothesis relies on two key assumptions. The first is that valuable information that originates in one asset reaches investors in other markets only with a lag, i.e. news travels slowly across markets. The second assumption is that because of limited information-processing capacity, many (though not necessarily all) investors may not pay attention or be able to extract the information from the asset prices of markets that they do not participate in. These two assumptions taken together leads to cross-asset return predictability. My hypothesis would appear to be a very plausible one for a few reasons. To begin with, as pointed out by Merton(1987) and the subsequent literature on segmented markets and limited market participation, few investors trade all assets. Put another way, limited participation is a pervasive feature of financial markets. Indeed, even among equity money managers, there is specialization along industries such as sector or market timing funds. Some reasons for this limited market participation include tax, regulatory or liquidity constraints. More plausibly, investors have to specialize because they have their hands full trying to understand the markets that they do participate in