• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.24
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• pp.25-49
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• 2004

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the duty of disclosure in insurance law. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the scope or extent of the duty of disclosure and the remedy for breach of the duty in English marine insurance law. The main purpose of this article is also to seek the alternative remedy for the breach. The results of analysis are as following : First, the scope of the duty of disclosure is closely related to the test of materiality and the concept of a hypothetical prudent insurer. The assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Secondly, an actual insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure of the assured. But this subjective test of actual inducement is somewhat meaningless in sense that English court takes the test of materiality as a starting point and assumes the presumption of inducement even in case of no clear proof on the inducement. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 18 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of disclosure. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. The remedy of rescission is too draconian from the point of view of the assured, because he can be deprived of all cover despite he is innocent perfectly. An inadvertent breach from an innocent mistake is as fatal as wilful concealment. What is, therefore, needed in English marine insurance law with respect to remedy for the breach is to introduce a more sophisticated or proportionate remedy ascertaining degrees of fault.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.36
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• pp.173-194
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• 2007

The purpose of this article is primarily to give prominence to the importance of International Business English education. Although English is one of the most crucial parts in international business transaction it has not been treated as one of academical sciences. As English is a main language when the international business transaction is done International Business English should be studied by scholars who majored in international business area. It is true that there has been no study at all regarding International Business English(in this article, it does not mean General International Business English) so far. Anyone who does and learn the international business should have some opportunities to have a contact towards international business correspondence and other documents before they do in reality. However, in Korea, most English education has been focused on general English and English certificate tests at universities. At universities' level, it is certainly a scholars' task to study International Business English education in order to provide decent education to the students. For doing so, this article examine, focusing only on reading part, how International Business English should be taught and especially, how reading skills should be activated and integrated with other language skills. This objective will be fulfilled by asking, what reading means in International Business English, as well as what role reading plays in International Business English education.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.28
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• pp.3-36
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• 2005

Most legal systems provides the aggrieved buyer with a right to put an end to the contract. Unlike Civil Law systems, the right is rather complicated and uncertain in Common Law systems because they do not sharply distinguish between a refusal which amounts merely to a defence in the nature of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, and one which is intended to abrogate the aggrieved party's obligations completely and to seek restitution of what he has already performed. That is, they do not draw any sharp distinction between the right of rejection or revocation and the right to put an end to the contract. This explains why the right to put an end to the contract under Civil Law systems are often compared with the right of rejection or revocation under Common Law systems in most academic papers. Having said that, this article describes and analyzes in detail the relevant UCC rules to the buyer's right of rejection and revocation, particularly the rules on the requirements for the right of rejection or revocation. This is for the purpose of providing legal advice to our sellers residing either in U.S.A. or in Korea who plan to enter into U.S.A markets and take academics' interest in the buyer's right which is deemed to be unique compared to the Civil Law systems. In addition, the study attempts to compare the rules as to the right of rejection and revocation under the UCC with those of English law which are stipulated mainly in the Sale of Goods Act (1979) in a statutory form. This may help one better to understand the rules of the UCC which are mostly originated with English law and to find in what way the rules of the UCC depart from those of English law.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.26 no.7
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• pp.93-108
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• 2022

Purpose - This paper examines the admissibility of restitution as the legal consequence where a contract is frustrated under the Law of Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 in comparison with Korean Civil Code (KCC). In order to provide practical guidelines and advice regarding choice of and application of law for contracting parties in international trade, the paper comparatively evaluates requirements and the scope of restitution under the Act 1943 and KCC. Design/methodology - This paper executes a comparative study to analyze whether the parties may claim restitution of money paid or non-money benefit obtained before or after the time of discharge under English law and KCC. To achieve the purpose, it focuses on the identifying characteristics of each statute, thereby providing guidelines to overcome difficulties in legal application and interpretation as to restitution as the consequence of frustration. Findings - Under English law, the benefit may be restituted according to Art 1943 or the common law rule, mistake of fact or law. Under the KCC, restitution is considered based on the principle of the obligation to recover the original obtained regardless of the time when the benefit is conferred. Whilst Act 1943 does not require careful analysis of the grounds of restitution, requirements to justify restitution according to the principle of unjust enrichment, mistake of fact or law, and the KCC should be met. Meanwhile, the KCC may provide more opportunities to award restitution because it does not require the burden of proof related to the defendant's good faith, unlike the principle of unjust enrichment. Originality/value - Where the contract is frustrated by the effect of COVID-19, one legal issue is a consequence of frustration. Therefore, this paper analyzes requirements and the scope of restitution under English law as compared with the KCC in a timely manner. It provides contracting parties with practical guidelines and advice to reduce unpredictability when they choose the governing law in a contract.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.14
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.55
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• pp.209-240
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• 2012

Since the age of Lord Mansfield, who laid the foundation of the modern English insurance contract law in the second part of the 18th century, English insurance law has developed a unique rule of warranty. Lord Mansfield adopted very different approach and afforded such a strict legal character to insurance warranty, because the promise, given by the insured, played an important role for the insurer to assess the scope of the risk insured at that time. It is still important that the insured keep his promises strictly to the insurer under the insurance contract, but legal environments have changed dramatically since the times of Lord Mansfield. English Law Commission proposed some proposals for reforming the warranty regime to reflect the changes of legal environment in CP 2007. This article is, therefore, designed to examine the proposals and consider their legal and practical implications. The proposals of Law Commission is summarized as following. First, in CP 2007, Law Commission made two principal proposals for reform of the law on warranty. The first is that the insurer should not be entitled to rely on a breach of warranty unless the insured has been provided with a witten statement of what they have undertaken under warranty. The second is that the insurer should not be entitled to reject a claim on the ground that the insured has breached a warranty unless there was a causal connection between the breach and the loss. Secondly, for consumer insurance, the rule requiring a causal connection would be mandatory, whereas for business insurance, it would be possible for the parties to agree on the effect a breach of warranty should have, provided they use clear language to express their intentions. Thirdly, where the insured contracted on the insurer's written standard terms of business, some statutory controls would be afforded to the contract to ensure that the cover was not substantially different from what the insured reasonably expected. Finally, Law Commission propose that a breach of warranty give the insurer the right to terminate the contract, rather than automatically discharging it from liability, but (unless otherwise agreed) only if the breach has sufficiently serious consequences to justify termination under the general law of contract. Having evaluated the proposals of the Law Commission and considered their legal and practical implications, it is quite clear that the proposed rule interfere with freedom of contract and create legal uncertainty. But change can not made without any victims, so Law Commission's attempt to change severe and injust aspects of the warranty regime would be very welcomed and respected.

• Journal of English Language & Literature
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.1103-1122
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• 2009

In this essay, I compare the ways in which the mid-thirteenth century English romance, Floris and Blancheflour, represents relationships of the Spanish pagan queen to her adoptive Christian daughter who becomes her daughter-in-law, with the ways in which Chaucer's Man of Law's Tale and other so-called Constance romances delineate relationships between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. What draws me into these romances is the fact that they both convey the intergenerational relationships of women. However, the texts become distinct from each other in the way in which each depicts women characters and their relationships with one another. In this paper, I argue that the level of intimacy that the mother-in-law figure has with the daughter-in-law figure plays a defining role in making the former perform her agency for or against the latter. In the Man of Law's Tale and other Constance romances, the daughter-in-law figure is in every sense an alien or 'outsider' to the mother-in-law figure. To the contrary, Blancheflour in Floris is a sort of 'insider' to the queen because they lived in the same household for fourteen years-ever since the girl's birth. The queen, therefore, should have a high degree of intimacy with Blancheflour. I argue that the pagan queen's intimacy to the daughter of a Christian-European captive has enabled the queen to protect the girl as her adoptive daughter first and as a daughter-in-law second, namely contributing to her unreserved endorsement of the inter-racial-religious-class union between her only son, Floris, and Blancheflour. This is one major factor that distinguishes the relationship of the queen and Blancheflour in Floris from the dysfunctional relationships of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law in the late medieval Constance romances, where women of different generations are strangers to each other, and no way is imagined for women of different races and religions to get along with each other.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.67
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• pp.119-142
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• 2015

Many insurers have traditionally incorporated "fraud clauses" into insurance policies, setting out the consequences of making a fraudulent claim. Even in the absence of an express terms, English courts provide insurers with a remedy for a fraudulent claim. However, the law in this area is complex, convoluted and confused. English Law Commission think that the law in this area needs to be reformed for three reasons; (1) the disjunctive between the common law rule and section 17 generates unnecessary disputes and litigation, (2) increasingly, UK commercial law must be justified to an international insurance society, and (3) the rules on fraudulent claims are functioned as a deterrent if they are clear and well-understood. In order for these purposes, English Law Commission recommends a statutory regime to the effect that, when an insured commits fraud in relation to a claim, the insurer should (1) have no liability to pay the fraudulent claim and be able to recover any sums already paid in respect to the claim, and (2) have the option to treat the contract as having been terminated with from the time of the fraudulent act and, if chosen the option, be entitled to refuse all claims arising after the fraud, but (3) remain liable for legitimate losses before the fraudulent act. LC is not recommending a complete restatement of the law on insurance fraud generally. For example, LC does not seek to define fraud, instead, recommends the introduction of targeted provisions to confirm the remedies available to an insurer who discovers a fraud by a policyholder.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.3-30
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• 2022

On 27 October the Supreme Court of UK handed down its much anticipated decision in Kabab-Ji SAL (Lebanon) v Kout Food Group (Kuwait) [2021] UKSC 48. The issues for the Supreme Court to decide were as follows: (1) which law governed the validity of the arbitration agreement; (2) if English law applied, whether, as a matter of English law, there was any real prospect that a court might find that KFG became a party to the arbitration agreement, and (3) whether, procedurally, the Court of Appeal was correct in giving summary judgment refusing recognition and enforcement the award, or whether there should have been a full rehearing of whether there was a valid and binding arbitration agreement for the purposes of the New York Convention and the AA 1996 (the 'procedural' issue) The decision in Kabab-Ji provides further reassuring clarity on how the governing law of the arbitration agreement is to be determined under English law where the governing law is not expressly stated in the arbitration agreement itself. The Supreme Court's reasoning is consistent with its earlier decision on the same issue, albeit in the context of enforcement pursuant to the New York Convention, rather than considering the arbitration agreement before an award is rendered. This paper presents some implications of Kabab-Ji case. Also, it seeks to provide a meaningful discussion and theories on the arbitration system in Korea.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.9
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• pp.111-136
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• 1996