• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.115-147
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• 2003

This paper scrutinizes the robustness of the profit-sharing findings first employing an original panel data on the Employee Welfare Fund over the period from 1992 to 2000. In examining the effects of profit-sharing schemes on labor productivity, it controls for simultaneity among profit-sharing, production factors, and productivity using both the two-stage least squares procedure and the lagged variable method. The empirical results show that an increase in firm's contribution to the Employee Welfare Fund is associated with capital-embodied and disembodied productivity enhancement, which is both statistically and economically highly significant. The empirical results are in contrast with predictions of both agency and transaction cost theories, and they imply that more tax benefits and financial incentives for expansion of the Employee Welfare Fund should be required to get productivity gains.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.95-109
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• 2020

The source of value-added creation in modern times has been transformed from material to man's value-added generating power, and ownership of the means of production has been converted from a particular landlord, capitalist to a person with value-added capacity, and a system of capital participation is needed beyond the profit-sharing system or performance incentive system in which workers of an enterprise participate in simple profits if they significantly increase the added value of the company. It is also necessary to introduce our private stock system as a means of addressing the problem of capital bias and for the stable development of capitalism. The purpose of Employee Stock Ownership Plans is to improve the economic and social status of workers and promote labor-management cooperation by allowing workers to acquire and hold shares of the stock company in which the employee ownership association is established through the employee ownership association, but the reality is that our stock ownership system has failed to achieve its purpose due to insufficient protection against the employee. In terms of welfare, the acquisition of our company shares should include active government support for the welfare of workers' ownership on a social welfare level rather than on the logic of the capital market, and in terms of investment, it would not be appropriate to apply the regulation for investor protection to see workers' acquisition of our company shares as 'investment' in the view of workers' willingness to own shares on the stock market. Therefore, as a way to support and deregulate employee's stock acquisition, 1. Expanding direct support, such as tax support, 2. As employee's stock ownership association is being discussed as a division's nature, it is less effective in terms of various management, not investment, and 3. Those who own stocks with 1% of the company's shares and 300 million won in face value will be classified as major shareholders. As a way to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, As a measure to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, only our employee shareholders' association shall manage the fund in a long-term deposit, and even though our employee's stock is managed by the association or company after the end of the deposit period, the management of each employee shall be allowed and In terms of improving the utilization of our company's stock and fund, 1. Employee's stockholders are prohibited from lending during the deposit period, but it is necessary to improve profitability by allowing them to borrow under strict restrictions, 2. It is necessary to make the use of the employee's welfare funds available for the preservation of losses, and to stipulate the redemption obligations of unlisted companies in order to improve the redemption system of our company.