This paper explains how the political elites limit peruvian politics after independence, through examining the historical origin of elites, the formation of the dominant elites and their politicization in Peru, 1824-1919. In detail, the first section of this paper examines theoretical concepts and the political economic conditions of elites. The next part explores the emergence of the dominant elite group and their politicization, which is focused on economic incentives and conditions in the Guano era. Finally, this paper suggests that peruvian elite group after independence is politically motivated by the direct control of economic resources and maximized privilege in distributions of economic benefits. Furthermore, these features provided the archetype of the Peruvian politics, such as the pre-modern oligarchy and the military intervention.
In this paper, I tried to clarify the background of the strengthening of centralization in the central-local relations during the Xi Jinping period in terms of the institutional structure of elite politics through a comparative study of the composition of the provincial sector of the Politburo, the highest power body, during the time of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Compared to the Hu Jintao period, it is judged that the strengthening of centralization in the Xi Jinping era is being implemented not through the neutralization of institutionalized formal construction norms, but through the expansion of control within the norms. In other words, the institutionalized frame itself was not broken in the composition of the provincial sector of the Politburo, and local compliance with the central government centered on the general secretary was increased by exercising the right to control personnel more strongly.
This paper argues that Thailand's internal colonial model is facing severe challenges: no longer is it so possible to suppress local and regional identities, or to submerge ethnic difference in an all-embracing but potentially suffocating blanket of "Thainess." In recent decades, Thailand's diverse localities have become increasingly assertive. This is most acutely the case in the insurgency-affected southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, but also applies in the "red' (pro-Thaksin) dominated North and Northeast. As the old ruling elite faces serious legitimacy challenges, Thailand's emerging post-colonial politics may require a radical rethinking of the relationship between center and periphery.
The 16 century Yulgok had lived have been evaluated as the golden age of Seonglihak(性理學) in Korea. However, on the contrary, excessively desperate was the real social and political situation which Yulgok had descirbed. Therefore, eventhhough the Seonglihak centered-reseach is meaningful, this research had the limitation in analyzing the politics in those times. In studying Yulgok's thought, the established researches had focused on philosophic theory centered-orientation. However escaping from that orientation, in this essay I try to restructure Yulgok's enlivened political experience that he had worldly seen, felt, heard and performed in 16th's real politics. While the established researches had absorbed in Kyeonghak(經學, the interpretaion of Confucian Cannon), I try to restore Kyeongse(經世, governing and managing the state) based on Yulgok's worldly political experience. The major concept on which I have focused is Pye(弊, the abnoxious custiom in political and official sphere). Yulgok's offical life had begun with the problematic of how to overcome Pye inherited by Kwongan(權奸, a politically villainous retainer). In the process, he had focused on the worldly performable issue, Minsaeng(民生, the livelihood of the people), not on the abstract and theoritical concept, Min(民, the people). He recognized the cause of desperate situation had resulted from Pyebeob(弊法, the obnoxious law, its system and its execution), and tried to reform Pyebeob in the various way. The next concern of Yulgok came to Pyejeong(弊政, the obnoxious politics, its system and its execution), which interrupted not to reform Pyebeob. According to Yulgok, Pyejeong resulted from the wrong fulfilment of official-scholar elite in government, and the distorted public opinion in governemt. This fact demonstrates two elements mentioned above had common root of the absence of communication of public opinion. Yulgok recognized the importance of Ui(議, the discussion) than of Ron(論, the dabate) and then reviving Ui, Yulgok had tried to arrange the foundation for the communication of public opinion in political sphere.
As for the matter of guardianship-benefit network which has been at the heart of the discussion of power elites and clan politics in Kazakhstan, it has been often maintained that it is basically formed by the framework of the regional and descent connection net called Zhuz or at least it has been heavily under Zhuz's influence. But it is pointed out that the controversy of Zhuz suffers from a lot of limitations in explaining the surface of power elites in the recent process of political changes and the rearrangement of power relations. Consequently, this paper tried to take a closer look at the matter focusing on the social backgrounds of elites from Junior zhuz, who have been estimated to be relatively pushed back in terms of the advancement into the central power. As a result, it was found that the backgrounds of clan and tribe origin within Zhuz couldn't have any foundation to be seen as a decisive element through which they could grow into power elites. The phenomenon of Kazakhstani elites is a legacy of concrete historic situations. The important consideration points for analyzing the emergence of elites which could be applied to a nomadic and traditional society can hardly be an invariable framework for analyzing modern elites since independence. Since 2000, Kazakhstan has experienced economic changes including privatization due to the absolute strengthening of presidential influence which turned into a foundation for a new authoritarian system, the rearrangement of the inner circle of power, and their decisions. These changes in situations have had profound effects on the character of power elites. The phenomenon that clandestine connections have shown their appearances as they have gotten intertwined with various factors, in particular, in the economic field which has been heavily under Junior zhuz makes us convinced that the elite organization in Kazakhstan has always been the product of political and economic changes. In reality, the behaviors of elites were the outcome continuously reflecting environmental situations surrounding them, and those situations lie in a complicated and multiple-layered connection net. Therefore, it is believed that having interests in elites' social backgrounds and maintaining many pieces of information on them will be able to be a more useful approach to analyzing the elite society in the future in that interests in their social backgrounds become an informant of various network formation nets which reflect real situations.
This study explores the political parody, which has become an active art form in order to express Korean Internet users' political practices, especially, during the politically turbulent periods from the presidential election of 2003 to the recent candlelight vigil protest of 2008. This study investigates the rise and fall of a parody culture by online users from the mid-2000s, and also examines aesthetical aspects of parodic artworks relying on amateurism culminated in 2004. Specifically, the current study questions an aesthetical lack shown in 'appropriation', by which most of the online users simply produce imitations of original image. This study rather notes 'photomontage' as an aesthetic prototype, the political aesthetics made by John Heartfield, through which this study intends to observe how his aesthetical legacy of political art could be realized in the contemporary form of political parodies produced by online users. The present paper concludes that online users' political participations in producing critical works of art could allow us to negate the dichotomy between the elite and the mass, professional artists and amateur parodists, and a radical politics and the politics of style.
The purpose of this study is to understand Zhuxi's Taoxuezhengzhi(道學政治) by reorganizing both his political opinion in each different political situation and his consistent political consciousness appeared in his whole political career. He concluded that the politics was the real problematic in Southern Sung, which made its structure distorted. This distorted structure of politics had widely rooted in whole sphere of society. In order to cure this political problematic, Zhuxi had focused on huangdi(皇帝) and chaoting(朝廷). That is why people is the basis of State and the result of politics, while huangdi and chaoting is the basis of politics and the beginnig of politics. According to Zhuxi, forming their political power group of their own will by using huangdi's power, the political elites close to only to huangdi made the function of chaoting unstable, with the result that the political decay produced. In chaoting, it resulted in the weakness of huangdi's power, the collapse of official discipline(紀綱), and the absence of public opinion(公論) and public aggreement(公議). Beyond chaoting, it resulted in the absence of political trust and the degeneration of public morals(風俗). In the Southern Sung were not altered the political orientation and culture based on the political decay, but only political orientation and characteristics of political elite only altered. This proves Zhuxi's approach that all problems in Southern Sung could resolve by the political approach. Zhuxi had suggested political issues in office. The alternatives for those political issues had basis of the theme, the one that saving people(恤民) is the purpose of politics. However his political ideas and the execution of them had been occsionally collapsed by the complex political structue, the mechanisms of political power, and the sameness and privatization of political geography in Southern Sung. Qingyuandanghuo(慶元黨禍) was the final stage of his political frustration, with the result that it led to the failure of Zhuxi's taoxuezhengzhi and interrupted the tradition of taoxue(道學) for the time being.
This study examined the constitutional engineering of the Philippine democracy in terms of power sharing and accountability, and the effectiveness and stability of the Philippine democracy as a result were assessed. Based on the analysis, the nature of the present Philippine democratic system since 1986 was brought to light. This study argues that the system of power sharing between the President and the congress in the Philippines tends to serve for negotiating political interests among the power elites rather than functioning in a constructive way. And the public accountability system is not functioning as it was designed to do. Due to the defects the Philippine democracy continuously suffers the lack of political effectiveness and stability. Despite of the problem, the reason not to break down the system would be the fact that the system served for the oligarchic power elites to circulate and recreate the political power exclusively. The direction of the Philippine constitutional engineering should be weakening the present traditional elite dominated political system, and strengthening the chances of political participation from the various classes. Some concerned people suggested the constitutional change to parliamentary system in order to strengthening party politics, and federal system to cope with the problems of regional conflicts, but such efforts failed repeatedly due to the conflict of political interests. Considering the present circumstance, it would be advisable to reform political party law and election system in the direction of strengthening political party system, and to expand the scope of local government system in the direction of devolving the centralized political power.
Media scholars take a lion stake in power circle. Not only do they take a part in media policies but seize prestigious positions like board members in Korea Communication Commission(KCC). Unfortunately, though, little has been known about who they are, what qualifications they have, and whether they meet public interests. This paper attempts to unveil the mechanism of those politicized intellectuals who are specialized on the media. Two categories divided into 'representative' and 'expertise' are employed for this purpose. On the one hand, the representative means the degree of committment into such public services as participation in conferences or non-profit organizations. On the other hand, the number of research articles, books and projects belong to the expertise. Evaluation levels consist of 'excellence, good and average' were allocated to those scholars who are(were) in 'Power Hole,' where decision makings come into being. Some interesting observations were made though this study. First of all, such criteria as representative and expertise vaguely suggested by the laws were hardly fit into those intellectuals, Rarely did they commit into public service let alone showing vigilance in academic activities. Secondly, both ideological loyalty and political activities in line with the government had much to do with taking such positions. Thirdly, not surprisingly, it showed that to graduate from Seoul National University and have Ph.D. degree from U.S.A. was one of the most essential factors. In final, most of them were very good at taking advantage of the press in way of boosting their publicity. To attend at policy making processes either in form of board members or advisers is inevitable for media experts. However, as shown in this study, such qualification of public service and academic eagerness shouldn't be underestimated. Academic integrity not selling intelligence solely for private interests needs to be protected as well. The authors hope this study to provide a valuable opportunity to establish a kind of ethical standards in participating into politics.
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