• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.65-70
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• 2003

In this article, I show that the cognitive suicide argument does not succeed in refuting eliminativism. The argument misses an important aspect of eliminativism. In Sec. 3, the last section, I will suggest the aspect of eliminativism and, on the basis of it, will develop my criticism against eliminativism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.133-154
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• 2010

Eliminativist about mentality want to throw out propositional attitude. In this respect, according to R. G. Swinburne, Lynne R. Baker, this theory seems to be self refuting. But it is not so clear enough in what sense eliminativism is self refuting. There are several construals of self-refutation argument against eliminativism. Among them, Patricia Churchland's simple version is defended here. For doing this, we need to analyze William Ramsey's reconstruction of self- refutation argument and J. L. Mackie's famous concept of self-refutation. As a result of this analysis, we can understand most self-refutation arguments against eliminativism don't succeed to defeat eliminativism with this argument.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.32
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• pp.215-244
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• 2008

This article's aim is to criticise ontological physicallism, supervenience, and eliminativism on theory of mind-body relation, and to present Confucian theory of mind-body relation as an alternative. Confucianism on theory of mind-body relation. Ontological physicallism reduce 'the psycho' to 'the physical'. Therefore, Physicallism as theory of mind-body relation reduce mind to physical body. Mind-Body supervenience theory insists property co-variation and dependency of mind-body. Eliminative materialism is to eliminate 'the psycho'. But confucianists believe in reality of the human mind-heart & it's nature. Confucianism is to establish the mina-heart & it's nature as real. Confucianism can be an alternative of physicallism, supervenience, and eliminativism on theory of mind-body relation. And Confucian's opinion differs from theory of the substance and phenomenalism.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.7-36
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• 1997

Beginning with the historical background under the light of which the program of naturalization proves to presuppose the mechanistic mechanistic materilalism, this paper first exposes what is the problem about intentionality, and then explains and examines the approaches to the program of naturalization of intentionality. Churchland's eliminativism and Dennett's instrumentalism are examined critically. Intentional realism is argued for;however, Dretaske's theory is preferred to than Foder's because the former but not the latter reveals least one of the various possible mechanisms of misrepresentations.