• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.5
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• pp.848-853
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• 2007

This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.11
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• pp.492-497
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• 2006

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The competition among multi-participants is modeled by a two-level hierarchical optimization problem. A mathematical programming approach is widely used in finding this equilibrium. However, there are difficulties to solving a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents two propositions to add heuristics to the mathematical programming method. The propositions are based on empirical studies on mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Based on the propositions a new formulation is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the prepositions and the newly-formulated equations.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.615-617
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• 2003

In electricity market with a imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are determined by bidding systems and market demands. Practically the characteristics of power demand have rather two forms; elastic region and inelastic region, than constant slope elasticity. Furthermore the price cap in the market can be modelled as a region of perfect elasticity in the demand function. This paper analyses supplier's bidding strategies which are reflected the characteristics of practical demand. Equilibrium strategies are solved by using the Bertrand model and payoff matrices.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2008.07a
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• pp.560-561
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• 2008

본 연구는 우리나라의 전력시장 운영규칙을 근간으로 경제학적 모형을 수립한다. SMP를 평균비용으로 고려하였으며 용량가격을 포함하여 발전사의 이득을 계산하였다. 그리고 제안한 모형에서 게임이론을 활용하여 경쟁의 균형인 내쉬균형을 계산하고 검증하였다. 또한, 경쟁의 균형에서 전력시장의 효율성을 최대로 하는 임계 용량가격을 계산하는 방법과 결과를 제시하였다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.572-574
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• 2003

The congestion management is a key task for enhancing the effectiveness of transmission pricing mechanism in a competitive electricity market. In this paper, the zonal method of congestion management is analyzed quantitatively using equilibrium concept, and compared with the nodal pricing method. It is shown that the generation firm uses different strategies in the two methods, and the overall performance of zonal congestion management depends on the determination of zones.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.519-547
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• 2005

The aim of this study is to analysis how economic welfare lost happens within the present korea seasonal and time period electricity pricing system and find out reasonable electricity price system acceptable during the transitional period of korea electricity industry restructuring To analyze economic welfare lost in the electricity industry, in advance seasonal and time periodic 9 demand curves(summer, spring ＆fall, winter/peak-load time, middle-load time, low-load time) and one market supply curve are made and then using these demand and supply curve, seasonal and time periodic market equilibrium prices is calculated. Finally, comparing these market equilibrium prices with present regulated classified seasonal and time periodic prices, the whole economic welfare lost in the electricity industry is calculated. The result of this study shows that in 2002, the total economic welfare lost in electricity industry is 137,770 million Won and under present price system, the worst welfare lost is happening seasonally in spring ＆ fall, time periodically in the middle-load time. Specifically analyzing the characteristics of welfare lost, especially on the industry customers and service customers which are applied in seasonal and time periodic pricing, for the industry customers, the welfare lost calculated in this class occupies 51% of the total welfare lost in the whole electricity industry and the worst welfare lost is happening seasonally in spring ＆ fall, time periodically in the middle-load time. For service customers, the welfare lost calculated in this class occupies 13% of the total welfare lost in the whole electricity industry and the worst welfare lost is happening seasonally in summer, time periodically in the peak time Finally, this study was made based on the year of 2002 and KEPCO has practiced two times of rate change until now. The result of rate change was positively analyzed in the direction of economic welfare improvement(welfare improvement achieved by 16.3% compared to 2002 result).

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.1480-1491
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• 2015

In new deregulated electricity market, short-term price forecasting is key information for all market players. A better forecast of market-clearing price (MCP) helps market participants to strategically set up their bidding strategies for energy markets in the short-term. This paper presents a new prediction strategy to improve the need for more accurate short-term price forecasting tool at spot market using an artificial neural networks (ANNs). To build the forecasting ANN model, a three-layered feedforward neural network trained by the improved Levenberg-marquardt (LM) algorithm is used to forecast the locational marginal prices (LMPs). To accurately predict LMPs, actual power generation and load are considered as the input sets, and then the difference is used to predict price differences in the spot market. The proposed ANN model generalizes the relationship between the LMP in each area and the unconstrained MCP during the same period of time. The LMP calculation is iterated so that the capacity between the areas is maximized and the mechanism itself helps to relieve grid congestion. The addition of flow between the areas gives the LMPs a new equilibrium point, which is balanced when taking the transfer capacity into account, LMP forecasting is then possible. The proposed forecasting strategy is tested on the spot market of the Nord Pool. The validity, the efficiency, and effectiveness of the proposed approach are shown by comparing with time-series models

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.51-59
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• 2018

Despite the advantages of energy arbitrage using energy storage systems (ESSs), the high cost of ESSs has not attracted storage owners for the arbitrage. However, as the costs of ESS have decreased and the price volatility of the electricity market has increased, many studies have been conducted on energy arbitrage using ESSs. In this study, the existing two-period model is modified in consideration of the ESS cost and risk-free contracts. Optimal investment strategies that maximize the sum of external effects caused by price changes and arbitrage profits are formulated by market participants. The optimal amounts of ESS investment for three types of investors in three different market structures are determined with game theory, and strategies in the form of the mixed-complementarity problem are solved by using the PATH solver of GAMS. Results show that when all market participants can participate in investment simultaneously, only customers invest in ESSs, which means that customers can obtain market power by operating their ESSs. Attracting other types of ESS investors, such as merchant storage owners and producers, to mitigate market power can be achieved by increasing risk-free contracts.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.1
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• pp.34-39
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• 2008

Nash Equilibrium(NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. Congestion on a transmission line makes it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy. In order to compute the NE of a multi-player game, some heuristics are proposed with concepts of a key player and power transfer distribution factor in other studies. However, generation capacity constraints are not considered and make it more difficult to compute the NE in the heuristics approach. This paper addresses an effect of generation capacity limits on the NE, and suggest a solution technique for the mixed strategy NE including generation capacity constraints as two heuristic rules. It is reported in this paper that a role of the key player who controls congestion in a NE can be transferred to other player depending on the generation capacity of the key player. The suggested heuristic rules are verified to compute the mixed strategy NE with a consideration of generation capacity constraints, and the effect of the generation constraints on the mixed strategy NE is analyzed in simulations of IEEE 30 bus systems.