• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.12
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• pp.1705-1711
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• 2017

This paper analyzes the impact of DRA (Demand Response Aggregator) on market power when competing with power generation companies (Gencos) in the electricity market. If congestion occurs in the transmission line, the strategic choice of the power generation company increases exercise of market power. DRA's strategic reduction of power load impacts the strategy of Gencos, which in turn affects the outcome of the load reduction. As the strategy of Gencos changes according to the location of the congested transmission line, the impact on the market depends on the relative location of the congested line and the DRA.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.713-715
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• 2004

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a model of the combined market , energy market and operating teserve market. The Nash equilibrium is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization , maximization of Social welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.8
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• pp.484-489
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• 2004

When the energy resource available to a particular plant (be it coal, oil, gas, water, or nuclear fuel) is a limiting factor in the operation of the plant, the entire economic dispatch calculation must be done differently. Each economic dispatch calculation must account for what happened before and what will happen in the future. This paper presents a formulation and a solution method for the optimization problem with a fuel constraint in a competitive electricity market. Take-or- Pay (TOP) contract for an energy resource is the typical constraint as a limiting factor. Two approaches are proposed in this paper for modeling the dispatch calculation in a market mechanism. The approaches differ in the subject who considers and inserts the fuel-constraint into its optimization problem. Market operator and each power producer having a TOP contract are assumed as such subjects. The two approaches are compared from the viewpoint of profits. surplus. and social welfare on the basis of Nash Equilibrium.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.670-672
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• 2003

The market participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits in competitive electricity market. Also, It is concerned with transmission congestion in power market. Two methods are generally used for congestion management;nodal pricing and uplift. The participants will have different strategies for their profits in the two methods. This paper analyzes their equilibrium strategies by using the supply function model and congestion methods.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.11b
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• pp.168-170
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• 2005

At present Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in oligopoly market. But there exist several problems to apply this model to electricity market. The representative one is to obtain the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to accomplish maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears on the long-term basis through the statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.8
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• pp.1496-1503
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• 2009

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. In order to fulfil the commitments of the countries in an economically efficient way, the UNFCCC adapted the emission trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol. If the UNFCCC's scheme is enforced in the country, considerable changes in electric power industry are expected due to the imposed greenhouse gas emission reduction. This paper proposes a game theoretic model of the case when generation companies participate in both competitive electricity market and emission market simultaneously. The model is designed such that generation companies select strategically between power quantity and greenhouse gas reduction to maximize their profits in both markets. Demand function and Environmental Welfare of emission trading market is proposed in this model. From the simulation results using the proposed model the impact of the emission trading on generation companies seems very severe in case that the emission prices are significantly high.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.379-384
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• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.9
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.