• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.10a
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• pp.197-199
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• 2016

In this paper, we investigate a market equilibrium in multi-channel sharing cognitive radio networks (CRNs): it is assumed that every subchannel is orthogonally licensed to a single primary user (PU), and can be shared with multiple secondary users (SUs). We model this sharing as a spectrum market where PUs offer SUs their subchannels with limiting the interference from SUs; the SUs purchase the right to transmit over the subchannels while observing the interference limits set by the PUs and their budget constraints. The utility function of SU is defined as least achievable transmission rate, and that of PU is given by the net profit. We define a market equilibrium in the context of extended Fisher model, and show that the equilibrium is yielded by solving an optimization problem, Eisenberg-Gale convex program.