• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.438-457
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• 2019

The main purpose of this paper is to identify the entry types and locational determinants of North Korean workers in cross-border regions between North Korea and China. More specifically, the paper has attempted to divide the entry type of them in the regions into two; 1) entry via transactions between Chinese traders with North Korea and North Korea trade companies, and 2) entry via transactions between Korean-Chinese middlemen and North Korean trade companies. Also, it has analyzed main factors of their locational determinants in the spatial contexts of the regions. There have been changes in two perspectives in terms of the entry paths and types of them in accordance with the transformation of characteristics of United Nations sanction against North Korea from 'call-upon' to 'decide' after UN Security Council Resolution 2094 in 2013. Firstly, main agents who have dealing with North Korean trade companies which have right to dispatch North Korean workers have been changed from Chinese traders into Korean-Chinese brokers who are specialized in the introduction of North Korean workers with one-stop service from visa administrative to labor managements. Secondly, there has been a transfer of North Korean workers in the regions from formal to informal workers who has been admitted into China with a short stay or a tourist visa, and then remained illegally to be employed in China. Therefore, as demands on service which is able to guarantee the security of North Korean informal workers and their managements have increased, Korean-Chinese brokers have been stimulated in the regions after the operation of real international sanctions against overseas North Korean workers. In addition, the main factors of their locational determinants in cross-border regions between North Korea and China are could be analyzed in three perspectives; 1) an increase in real wages in accordance with the reform of the Chinese social insurance system after 2011, 2) the structural vulnerability of labor markets in the regions, 3) the utilization of stable and manageable workers.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2021

This study aims to face common threats from the depletion of fish resources, the decline of production and employment as well as the increase of life risk in East Sea Rim countries, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia due to the Chinese fishing fleets entering East Sea. The recent competition in fishing among fishing vessels and fleets of national origin operating in the East Sea has induced a significant change in the ecological landscape of the fishing fleets cluster while having influenced production and employment in the fishing industries of South Korea and Japan as well as life threat on the fishermen in North Korea. It seems that the population organizational ecological theory can be applied to this change. It can be seen as the isomorphism of the selection process over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to avoid the environment in which these North Korean fishing vessels are pushed against the Chinese fleet in the North Korean part of the East Sea. To resolve the fishery disputes or conflict in the common waters in East Sea, first of all, Chinese fishing fleets will be required to put international pressure so as to solve the unfairness of the illegal fishing and overfishing by the International Fishery Organization or the UN violations of the sanctions against North Korea selling fishing rights to China. Although it is not easy for South Korea to cooperate with North Korea in the short term, South Korea will be able to support the fishery infrastructure in North Korea in the mid- to the long-term to prevent the loss of innocent lives for their fishermen and to raise their incomes.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.91-120
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• 2020

The Scope of Application of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and Foreign Investment Act This article examines whether the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and the Foreign Investment Act of North Korea apply to South Korean parties or companies. This article analyzes laws and agreements related to economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea. Furthermore, this article compares and evaluates laws related to foreign investment and enacted in North Korea. Now, North Korea's door is closed due to economic sanctions against it, but it will be opened soon. Thus, this article prepares for the future opening of North Korea's markets. Is there a rule of laws in North Korea or just a ruler? Are there laws in North Korea? North Korea has enacted a number of legislation to attract foreign investors, referring to those Chinese laws. For example, North Korea enacted the Foreigner Investment Act, the Foreigner Company Act, the Foreign Investment Bank Act, the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, the Foreign Economic Contract Act, the International Trade Act, and the Free Economy and Trade Zone Act, among others. Article 2 (2) of the Foreign Investment Law of North Korea states, "Foreign investors are corporations and individuals from other countries investing in our country." It is interpreted that South Korea is not included in the "other countries" of this definition. According to many mutual agreements signed by South Korea and North Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas is a special relation inside the Korean ethnic group. An arbitration between a South Korean party and a North Korean party has the characteristics of both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. If the South Korea and North Korea Commercial Arbitration Commission or the Kaesong Industrial Complex Arbitration Commission is not established, the possibility of arbitration by the Chosun International Trade Arbitration Commission, established under North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, should be examined. There have been no cases where the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act is applied to disputes between parties of South Korea and North Korea. It might be possible to apply the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act by recognizing the "foreign factor" of a dispute between the South Korean party and North Korean party. It is necessary to raise legislative clarifications by revising the North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act as to whether Korean parties or companies are included in the scope of this Act's application. Even if it is interpreted that South Korean parties or companies are not included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, disputes between South Korean companies and North Korean companies can be resolved by foreign arbitration institutes such as CIETAC in China, HKIAC in Hong Kong, or SIAC in Singapore. Such arbitration awards could be enforced in North Korea pursuant to Article 64 of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. This is because the arbitration awards of foreign arbitration institutes are included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. The matter is how to enforce the North Korean laws when a North Korean party or North Korean government does not abide by the laws or their contracts. It is essential for North Korea to join the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) and the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States).

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.129-138
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• 2014

After global economic crisis, China has become one of the two pillars in the global economies and the country contributing to the Korean economy. Nevertheless, the research on Chinese financial market, particularly capital market, is rare to date. This study examined the growth enterprise market that emergedat the Shenzhen stock exchange and made comparative analysis on before and after listing for the Chinese small and medium sized firms and venture firms. The listing requirements at the Chinese growth enterprise market for the technologically innovative venture firms and fast-growing small and medium sized firms with financing purpose were more alleviated than the main board of Shenzhen stock exchange. Moreover, the listing procedures are simplified as well. Accordingly, many Chinese enterprises tend to list and the competition for listing is also intense. In particular, with the 36 initially listed firms at growth enterprise market as the research target, the investigation for the business performance before and after listing reveals that the three indexes including return on common equity, debt ratio and operating profit growth rate dropped dramatically for most all the firms. That is, the profitability and growth for the venture firms and small and medium sized firms listed on the Chinese growth enterprise market decreased rapidly after going public, only the stability improved due to the great financing. Taking a step forward, this phenomenon may result from the exaggerated reporting for the business performance before listing with the purpose of going public by the venture firms and small and medium sized firms. Thus, Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission should strengthen the accounting evaluation standard and regulation for the listing firms before going public. In addition, strict sanctions should be imposed on the firms with fraudulent accounting to establish healthy capital market.