• Title/Summary/Keyword: Economic Sanctions against Russia

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A Study on the Effectiveness of Sanctions against Russian Energy Sector-Focusing on the Oil and Gas Sector (대러 에너지 제재의 효과성에 대한 연구 -석유가스 부문을 중심으로)

  • Won-Soon Kwon;Ju-young Ko
    • Korea Trade Review
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    • v.48 no.1
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    • pp.165-191
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    • 2023
  • The US and EU have imposed energy sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sector in response to the Ukraine crisis. One of the key measures is to cut oil and gas imports from Russia. The US and EU are both the senders of sanctions against Russia. However, there is a fundamental difference between them. While the US is the net oil and gas exporter, most EU member states are heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas. If the US and other major oil and gas exporting countries can replace Russia in the EU energy market, the effectiveness of energy sanctions against Russia can be guaranteed. Our result shows that it is difficult for the major oil and gas exporters to fully replace Russia in the short run because of the lack of additional production capacity and infrastructure. We conclude that the US and EU's energy sanctions against Russia can not guarantee its effectiveness. We argue that other measures, such as diplomacy, should be taken to settle the conflicts in Ukraine.

Arbitration awards against public policy; in regards to economic sanctions (공서양속에 반하는 중재판결: 경제제재에 대한 분석을 중심으로)

  • Han, Soomin;Kim, Jinbi;Lee, Jaehyuk
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.34 no.1
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    • pp.27-50
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    • 2024
  • This paper examines issues concerning conflicts between arbitral awards and public interests, particularly with respect to economic sanctions. Sanctions have been widely used by political entities, such as States and organizations, as means to promote public interests and to resolve cross-border disputes. In particular, economic sanctions have been increasingly more visible in recent years due to the accelerating fragmentation of the international communities, and their magnitude and range of the impacts have grown accordingly. For example, the U.S. and the EU have imposed economic sanctions on Russia and related persons in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. recently re-introduced a comprehensive economic sanction on Iran. One of the notable impacts of the sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, is that on international arbitration. Sanctions are essentially built on the notion of the protection of public interests, and public interests are some of the few grounds upon which recognition and enforceability or arbitral awards may be rejected. However, jurisprudence on such conflict between sanctions and arbitral awards have not been sufficiently addressed in Korea because court case and administrative decision records on this conflict have not been sufficiently accumulated. In this regard, this paper begins with offering a survey of the concept of public interests, economic and trade sanctions, arbitral awards and their enforceability, and the relationships between them. It then examines the mechanism upon which public interests, trade and economic sanctions may lead certain arbitral awards unenforceable. Next, the paper suggests judiciaries' balanced approach toward the public interests protected by trade and economic sanctions and the predictability and fairness in the enforcement of arbitral awards. Finally, this paper concludes with the methods of the implementation of such balanced approach.

New Normality in the Asia-Pacific Region: Beijing between Moscow and Washington (Новая нормальность в АТР: Пекин между Москвой и Вашингтоном)

  • Sergey A. Lukonin;Sung Hoon Jeh
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.7 no.1
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    • pp.229-258
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    • 2023
  • For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

The Terrain Transformation of the Fishing Industry in East Sea Rim: Impact of Entering Chinese Fishing Fleets into East Sea on the Fishery Production, Employment and Life Threat (환동해 어업의 지형 변화: 중국어선의 동해 진출이 어업생산과 고용 및 생존 위협에 미치는 영향)

  • Choi, Young-Jin
    • The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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    • v.52 no.1
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    • pp.1-22
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    • 2021
  • This study aims to face common threats from the depletion of fish resources, the decline of production and employment as well as the increase of life risk in East Sea Rim countries, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia due to the Chinese fishing fleets entering East Sea. The recent competition in fishing among fishing vessels and fleets of national origin operating in the East Sea has induced a significant change in the ecological landscape of the fishing fleets cluster while having influenced production and employment in the fishing industries of South Korea and Japan as well as life threat on the fishermen in North Korea. It seems that the population organizational ecological theory can be applied to this change. It can be seen as the isomorphism of the selection process over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to avoid the environment in which these North Korean fishing vessels are pushed against the Chinese fleet in the North Korean part of the East Sea. To resolve the fishery disputes or conflict in the common waters in East Sea, first of all, Chinese fishing fleets will be required to put international pressure so as to solve the unfairness of the illegal fishing and overfishing by the International Fishery Organization or the UN violations of the sanctions against North Korea selling fishing rights to China. Although it is not easy for South Korea to cooperate with North Korea in the short term, South Korea will be able to support the fishery infrastructure in North Korea in the mid- to the long-term to prevent the loss of innocent lives for their fishermen and to raise their incomes.