• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.26 no.5
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• pp.88-105
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• 2022

Purpose - This paper studies whether economic sanctions can be used as grounds for a party to an international sales contract to get an exemption if he fails to meet his contractual obligation. Because the answer can differ depending on the governing law of the contract, this study focuses on CISG, the most widely recognized international uniform legal instrument as the governing law of the international sale of goods. Design/methodology - This paper focuses on analyzing the conditions to meet before getting an exemption under CISG. For such analysis, this paper examined various scholarly writings, cases, and hypothetical examples reflecting a wide variety of economic sanction measures. Findings - The findings of this paper are as follows. The main provision for exemption under CISG is Article 79(1), which provides for an exemption for a party that failed to perform if such failure was caused by an impediment that was uncontrollable, unforeseeable, and unavoidable; either a seller or a buyer may rely on the Article for his non-performance, delay, or defective performance. The Article is applicable not only where the economic sanction caused impossibility of performance but also where it caused hardship. The economic sanction will likely be found to be an uncontrollable impediment; however, it will be relatively more difficult to prove it to be unforeseeable or unavoidable. Originality/value - The subject of this paper is whether a party can be exempted from liability under CISG when he fails to perform his contractual obligations due to economic sanctions. Given that this issue is now actually faced by many involved in international trade, it is expected to provide practical help to practitioners and companies alike.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.47 no.6
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• pp.229-246
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• 2022

In order to understand the economic damage of economic sanctions on trade between Korea and Russia, a trade structure analysis was conducted through statistics on import and export trade between Korea and Russia. Through the structural analysis of product trade, we tried to accurately analyze the current status of product trade between Korea and Russia. In the trade structure analysis, it was confirmed that the trade in goods between Korea and Russia decreased the most in market share and trade concentration. However, trade specialization, comparative advantage by market, and intra-industry trade index were not significantly affected despite strong economic sanctions. from Russia's point of view Smart measures are needed to address the current situation to avoid a greater economic downturn. The end of the war and the restoration of partnership with other countries are considered the most beneficial solutions for Russia and all countries, but it is difficult to predict how the war will go or what economic situation Russia will be in after the war.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.23-44
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• 2016

This study attempts to scrutinize the effectiveness of the international economic sanction on North Korea by analyzing the determinants of the North Korea-China trade with Chinese Customs House data classified under general, border, processing, bonded warehouse. The result shows that after international economic sanctions, North Korea-China trade was increased across types of trade. In particular, sanction-sensitive items were increased after sanctions and China also weakened the effectiveness of sanctions. To put it concretely, North Korea's food and fuel imports from china increased in processing and border trade. In the case of luxury good, it was increased in general trade. Strategy goods (weaponry) increased only in bonded warehouse trade. For China's import from North Korea, food and fuel were increased in total, border and bonded warehouse trade. Considering the features of each type of trade, these increase are presumed to have been playing a decisive role in weakening the effect of international sanction on North Korea.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.50 no.4
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• pp.11-28
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• 2019

In this study, the Inter-Korea Fisheries Cooperation Project was divided into four categories: North Korea's Fisheries Infrastructure Development Project, Fisheries Cooperation Project, Human Exchange Project, and North Korea Fisheries Investment Project. First, North Korea's fisheries infrastructure development projects include North Korea's fisheries resource research project, it's fisheries resource development project, and joint enforcement on illegal operation of Chinese ships. Second, fisheries cooperation projects include the operation of the North-South common fish area in the West Sea, the fishing project in North Korea's East sea, and the import of North Korean seafood. Third, human exchange projects include training of aquaculture technicians in North Korea, technology transfer and training of fishing vessels, and boarding of North Korea's fisherman in Korean fishing vessels. Fourth, North Korea's fisheries investment projects include aquaculture facilities and aquaculture feed support, aquatic product processing facilities and technology transfer, and fishery equipment support. However, as international sanctions are maintained in the international community to North Korea, Inter-Korea Fisheries cooperation, however, should be promoted according to the level of easing of international sanctions as international sanctions are maintained in the international community to North Korea. First, North Korea's fisheries resource research project, North Korea's fisheries resource creation project, joint enforcement on illegal operation of Chinese ships, and operation of the common fish area in the West Sea can be promoted if international sanctions are maintained at present, promote North Korea's fisheries resource research project. Second, boarding of North Korean's fisherman in Korean fishing vessels, conducting the fishing project in North Korea's East sea, and importing North Korean seafood can be aided if commercial transactions are possible with North Korea. Third, South Korea will support aquaculture facilities and aquatic feed, fisheries processing facilities and technology transfer, fishery equipment support, training of fisheries and aquaculture technicians, fishery fishing technology transfer, and training of fisherman when a comprehensive economic cooperation project is possible with North Korea.

• Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.102-122
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• 2022

From 2018 to 2020, the United States has repeatedly imposed sanctions on the Chinese company Huawei, which has triggered strong nationalist sentiments on the Chinese Internet. This paper is a qualitative content analysis of Zhihu netizens' views on US sanctions against Huawei to explore how anti-Western centrism influences young people's narratives. The results showed that they believe the Huawei matter is a deliberate hegemonic act by the United States because it fears the decline of its own technological status. Moreover, it is direct evidence that the United States is deliberately destroying China's economic development environment to slow down China's rise, as well as a typical manifestation of the injustice of the liberal international order. A further analysis revealed that their narrative logic is obviously influenced by the following aspects: 1) The mentality of national glory derived from comprehensive national strength leads them to believe that U.S. sanctions against Huawei are an obstacle to China's rise. 2) National humiliation leads them to view U.S. sanctions as a constant insult to China. 3) China's superiority created by China's comprehensive national strength and its scientific and technological achievements in recent years has boosted its confidence to challenge the West's absolute progress. This study examines the impact of anti-Western centrism on Chinese nationalist sentiment and offers a bottom-level perspective on the debate over the crisis of the liberal order.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.44 no.4
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• pp.43-78
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• 2022

The arena of strategic competition between the US and China is expandable from international politics, trade and commerce to finance. What would happen if financial sanctions against China are imposed by the US? Would US financial sanctions lead to a sudden outflow of foreign capital and a liquidity crisis in China? We try to address these questions by estimating China's capital flows-at-risk with the CDS premium on Chinese sovereign funds. We follow Gelos et al. (2019) in setting up a quantile regression model from which China's foreign capital flow-at-risks are estimated. Based on our analysis of China's monthly capital flow data, we find that a rise in the CDS premium has statistically significant negative impacts on China's foreign capital flows-at-risk, mainly in banking flows. However, the analysis also found that due to favorable global conditions, an increase in the CDS premium is unlikely to trigger a shift to a sudden outflow of foreign capital at the moment. Meanwhile, this study found no statistically significant correlation between Korea's capital flows-at-risk and the CDS premium, suggesting that the negative impact of US financial sanctions on China would not increase the probability of capital flight from Korea in a significant manner.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.48 no.1
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• pp.165-191
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• 2023

The US and EU have imposed energy sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sector in response to the Ukraine crisis. One of the key measures is to cut oil and gas imports from Russia. The US and EU are both the senders of sanctions against Russia. However, there is a fundamental difference between them. While the US is the net oil and gas exporter, most EU member states are heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas. If the US and other major oil and gas exporting countries can replace Russia in the EU energy market, the effectiveness of energy sanctions against Russia can be guaranteed. Our result shows that it is difficult for the major oil and gas exporters to fully replace Russia in the short run because of the lack of additional production capacity and infrastructure. We conclude that the US and EU's energy sanctions against Russia can not guarantee its effectiveness. We argue that other measures, such as diplomacy, should be taken to settle the conflicts in Ukraine.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.373-394
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• 2020

The strengthening of multilateral international sanctions against North Korea has raised questions as to how effective they are in exerting pressure on the country's economy. In this paper, we address this question by examining their impact on the country's integration into regional and global apparel production networks. North Korea has in the past decade become an increasingly competitive exporter of apparel on the basis of consignment-based processing arrangements. Official trade data shows a sharp drop in North Korean exports of clothing since the sectoral ban in 2017. There is evidence to suggest, however, that exports have continued on a more informal and clandestine basis. North Korea's integration into apparel production networks has also taken the form of the dispatch of workers to factories in China's northeastern border regions. Yet there is evidence that the recent sanctions imposed on such practices has similarly led to illicit practices such as working on visitors' visas, often with the help of Chinese enterprises and local government. The resilience of North Korea's integration into apparel production networks follows a capitalist logic and is result of the highly profitable nature of apparel production for all actors concerned and a correspondingly strong desire to evade sanctions. As such, the analysis contributes to the literature on sanctions that suggests that the measures may contribute to emergence of growing informal and illicit practices and to the role of the clandestine economy.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.405-421
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• 2019

International aid to North Korea remains far below the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people. This paper examines the trajectory of international humanitarian assistance to North Korea over the last two decades with the focus on its decline in the context of the country's nuclear standoff and corresponding stringent sanctions. In so doing, the paper addresses major problems associated with North Korea's reception of foreign aid and operational constraints placed on humanitarian activities in the country. It shows that humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been largely shaped by geopolitical dynamics. A survey of UN reports and statistics also suggests a shifting trend in recent international aid to North Korea. The decline of aid and multiple operational obstacles faced by humanitarian organizations, for instance, have led to a fall in agricultural support and a proportional rise in health and related services. While UN Security Council resolutions include an exemption provision, humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been constrained by stringent sanctions, which have led to adverse consequences for the civilian population. In this regard, the paper suggests some policy directions for international aid to North Korea amidst negotiations over denuclearization, while stressing an urgent need to address the negative impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups in the country.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.53-83
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• 2023

The investment agreement prepared at the beginning of inter-Korean economic cooperation in 2000 can be evaluated as very ineffective as a product of mutual political and diplomatic compromise rather than an effective protection for our investment assets. South Korean companies suffered a lot of losses due to the freezing of assets in the Geumgang mountain district and the closure of the Kaeseung Industrial Complex, but they did not receive practical damage relief due to institutional vulnerabilities. Currently, North Korea is under international economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, so it is true that the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation is far away, but North Korea's human resources and geographical location are still attractive investment destinations for us. Therefore, if strained relations between the two Koreas recover in the future and international economic sanctions on North Korea are eased, Korean companies' investment in North Korea will resume. However, the previous inter-Korean investment agreement system was a fictional systemthat was ineffective. Therefore, if these safety devices are not reorganized when economic cooperation resumes, unfair damage to Korean companies will be repeated again. The core of the improved investment guarantee system is not a bilateral system between the two Koreas, but the establishment of a multilateral system through North Korea's inclusion in the international economy. Specifically, it includes encouraging North Korea to join international agreements for the execution of arbitration decisions, securing subrogation rights through membership of international insurance groups such as MIGA, creating matching funds by international financial organizations. Through this new approach, it will be possible to improve the safety of Korean companies' investment in North Korea, and ultimately, it will be necessary to lay the foundation for mutual development through economic cooperation between the two Koreas.