• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.12 no.5_spc
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• pp.81-98
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• 2006

The objective of this research is to do a cultural comparison on the daily lives of the children of Korea, Japan and China. To achieve this objective, the questionnares were distributed to the 2940 mothers of children from the ages of 3 to 6 in the countries of Korea, Japan and China. The target audience consisted of 941 mothers living in Seoul and Kyunggi area for Korea, 1007 mothers living in Tokyo for Japan, and 992 mothers living in Beijing for China. As a result of the research, we found out that firstly, although children in general got up anytime between 7:00am to 9:00am and went to bed between 8:00pm and 11:00pm, 61.5% of the Korean children went to bed after 10pm and 16.8% after 11pm. Besides that, we found that compared to 3.51% of Korean children who got up before 6am, 13.41% of Japanese children and 17.24% of Chinese children got up before 6:00am. So we could see that the Korean children got up later and went to bed later than their Japanese and Chinese counterpart. This pattern could also be seen in the average rising time and bed time. Korean children went to bed at 10:00pm and woke up at 7:75am whereas the Japanese children went to bed at 9:28pm and woke up at 7:39am, and the Chinese children went to bed at 9:05pm and woke up at 7:05am. The average sleeping hours for Japanese children was 10.12 hours, 9.50 hours for the Chinese and 9.75 hours for the Korean. As a result, we could see that the Korean children went to bed later, got up later and slept fewer hours than their Japanese and Chinese counterparts. Also, since the rising time and bedtime of the Korean children was later than those of the Chinese and Japanese counterparts, the former s' breakfast and dinner time was also much later. Secondly, we looked at the time children went off to and came back from institutes such as kindergarten and child care centers. The Chinese were earliest at going with average attendance at 7:83am, the Japanese came next at 8:59am and the Korean children were last at 8:90am, whereas the Japanese came first in coming back home at 3:36pm, Korean next at 3:91pm and the Chinese last at 5:46pm. Next when we looked at the hours spent at the kindergartens and child care centers, Japan spent 6.76 hours, Korea 7.01 hours and China spent the longest hours with 9.63 hours. Excluding China where all preschool institutes are centralized into kindergartens, we nest looked at time children went to and came back from the institutes as well as the time spent there. In the case of kindergarten, there was not much difference but in the case of child care centers, the Japanese children went to the child care centers mach earlier and came home later than the Korean children. Also, the time spent at the child care center was much longer for the Japanese than the Korean children. This fact coincides with the Korean mothers' number one wish to the kindergartens and child care centers i.e. for the institutes to prolong their school hours. Thus, the time spent at child care centers for Korea was 7.75 hours, 9.39 hours for Japan and 9.63 hours for China. The time for Korea was comparatively much shorter than that of Japan and China but if we consider the fact that 50% of the target audience was working mothers, we could easily presume that the working parents who usually use the child care centers would want the child care centers to prolong the hours looked after their children. Besides this, the next most wanted wish mothers have towards the child care centers and kindergartens was for those institutes to "look after their children when sick". This item showed high marks in all three countries, and the marks in Korea was especially higher when compared to Japan and China. Thirdly, we looked at the private extracurricular activities of the children. We found that 72.6% of the Korean children, 61.7% of the Japanese children, and 64.6% of the Chinese children were doing private extracurricular activities after attending kindergarten or day care centers. Amongst the private extracurricular activities done by Korean children, the most popular one was worksheet with 51.9% of the children doing it. Drawing (15.20%) and English (11.6%) came next. Swimming (21.95%) was the most popular activity for Japan, with English (17.48%), music (15,79%) and sports (14.70%) coming next. For China, art (30.95%) was first with English (22.08%) and music (19.96%) following next. All three countries had English as the most popular activity related to art and physical activities after school hours, but the rate for worksheet studies was much higher for Korea compared to Japan China. The reason Koreans universally use worksheet in because the parents who buy the worksheet are mothers who have easy access to advertisement or salespeople selling those products. The price is also relatively cheap, the worksheet helps the children to grow the basic learning ability in preparation for elementary school, and it is thought to help the children to build the habit of studying everyday. Not only that but it is estimated that the worksheet education is being conducted because parents can share the responsibility of the children's learning with the worksheet-teacher who make home visits. Looking at the expenses spent on private extracurricular activities as compared to income, we found that China spent 5% of income for activities outside of regular education, Korea 3% and Japan 2%. Fourthly, we looked at the amount of time children spent on using multimedia. The majority of the children in Korea, Japan and China watch television almost every day. In terms of video games, the Japanese children played the games the most, with Korea and China following next. The Korean children used the computer the most, with Japan and China next. The Korean children used about 21.17% of their daily time on computers which is much more than the Japanese who used 20.62% of their time 3 or 4 times a week, or the Chinese. The Chinese children were found to use considerably less time on multimedia compared to the Korean of Japanese.