• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.25-44
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• 2017

In 2017, the EU-Japan FTA talks were resumed ahead of the G20 summit in Brussels, Belgium, and agreed to abolish tariffs on 95% of all trade items. These figures are highly liberalized agreements that are equivalent to the Pacific Rim Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). Particularly, Japanese automobiles were aggressively negotiating the abolition of tariffs with 7-year grace period and the gradual elimination of European cheese in 15 years. If the agreement is concluded, the tariffs of 1 billion euros (about 1.3 trillion won) will disappear, and Korea, which has similar industrial structure with Japan, will be hit by the processed food, chemical products, medical equipment, dairy products and automobile industries. do. The purpose of this study is to examine the mutual recognition agreement (MRA) that can directly affect the Korean companies in the content of the Japan-EU FTA and to suggest the implications for the Korean export companies.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.81-110
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• 2018

In this paper, we examined the regional economic integration, the trade negotiation strategy and bargaining power of the European Union through the logical structure of the three - dimensional game theory. In the three - dimensional game theory, the negotiator emphasized that the negotiation strategy of the triple side existed while simultaneously operating the game standing on the boundary of each side game, constrained from each direction or occasionally using the constraint as an opportunity. The study of three-dimensional game theory is aimed at organizing the process of coordinating opinions and meditating interests at the international level, regional level and member level by the regional union as a subject of negotiation. This study would compare and analyze the recently concluded EU-Japan EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) negotiation process with the case of the EU FTA, and summarize the logic of the three-dimensional game theory applicable to the FTA of the regional economic partnership. Furthermore, the study would illustrate the strategies of the regional economic cooperatives to respond to negotiations. The area of trade policy at the EU level has already been completed by the exclusive power of the Union on areas where it is difficult to politicize with technical features. Moreover, the fact that the policy process at the Union level has not been revealed as a political issue, and that the public opinion process is a double-step approach. In conclusion, the EU's trade policy process constitutes a complicated and sophisticated process with the allocation of authority by various central organizations. The mechanism of negotiation is paradoxically simplified because of the common policy decision process and the structural characteristics of the trade zone, and the bargaining power at the community level is enhanced. As a result, the European Commission would function as a very strong negotiator in bilateral trade negotiations at the international level.