• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.113-130
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• 2021

This study aims to analyze the WTO-inconsistent aspects of the single rate presumption of the United States in establishing and imposing anti-dumping duties for non-market economy exporters. By examining the drafting history in the GATT/WTO negotiations and the practice of the single rate presumption for non-market economies by the United States from a comparative perspective, it critically addresses the inherent lack of pertinent disciplines under the framework of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in establishing dumping margins for exporters of non-market economies. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body leaves open the possibility of allowing the investigating authority to consider multiple exporters and the exporting country as a single entity. However, the study argues that it is difficult in practice for the investigating authority to make a single-entity decision in a WTO-consistent manner. The study also finds an incompatibility in the notion between establishing dumping margins for 'individual' exporters and 'non-market economies.' A proper discipline for non-market economies under the multilateral anti-dumping norm needs to be reconsidered in the era of persistent trade conflicts between the United States and China.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.38
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• pp.265-302
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• 2008

This paper intends to analyse some legal issues on "Zeroing" which is based on the article 2.4.2 under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. "Zeroing" stands for a specific methodology in calculating a general dumping margin for a product in question under which negative individual dumping margins are treated as zero (thus "zeroed") before aggregating all individual dumping margins. The article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement regulates three types of calculating methodology on dumping margin as first symmetrical method(average-to-average: A-A), second symmetrical method(individual-to-individual: I-I) and asymmetrical method(average-to-individual: A-I). However, this article does not have any provisions about the "Zeroing" practice. In their anti-dumping practices, the EC and the United-States calculated dumping margin based on the "Zeroing", but this methodology has been disputed in the Dispute Settlement Body(DSB) of the WTO. This paper analysed their legal problems with some WTO cases in particular concerning EC-Bed Linen, U.S.-Softwood Lumber Zeroing, U.S.-Zeroing(EC) and U.S.-Sunset Review(Japan) cases. On the basis of theses analysis, we can therefore ask some questions as follows; To begin with, although the article 2.4.2 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement does not clearly refer to the "Zeroing", how do some developing countries, as the U.S.A and the E.U. calculate dumping margin as the "Zeroing"? Secondly, what is the relationship between the symmetrical method and asymmetrical method to the dumping margin? And if we adopt the zeroing method, what is the different rate to anti-dumping margin? Thirdly, although the Panel decided that the zeroing methodology of dumping margin used by th U.S.A in administrative review between the U.S.A and the E.U, why does the Appellate Body made the decision that the american methodology is incompatible with the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement? Lastly, what will be affected the upper decision taken by the Appellate Body to the DDA negotiation of anti-dumping matters? Even though the WTO Appellate made a decision that the zeroing method is incompatible with the principles of the WTO law, this methodology contains a lot of problems. Some members of the WTO as the U.S.A and the E.U did not officially declare this methodology to abandon, and the debate concerned is arguing. Therefore this paper tried to present the adequate solution in order to promote the zeroing methodology in the international anti-dumping system and practices.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.323-349
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• 2011

As China is one of WTO member nations, It has an obligation to have to certainly keep a standard regarding anti-dumping systems deciding in WTO agreements. Nonetheless the Chinese anti-dumping laws is causing legal uncertainty because of insufficient details regulations about the account of dumping margins, the termination of an investigation in case of negligible imports, and sunset review And a part of regulations are disagreed with WTO anti-dumping agreement about price undertakings. Therefore, South Korea should indicate them and urge the Chinese government to revise them so that its anti-dumping Law is agreed with WTO agreement. Aside from this, if the anti-dumping investigation is initiated, South Korea government must observe how the Chinese authorities operates its anti-dumping law that do not agree with WTO agreement, and should prepare the countermeasure accordingly. The analysis of this study is concentrated on the compatibility of the WTO anti-dumping agreement with China's interpretation of the antidumping policy and public law. Also, Including our export company, government agencies, academic circles being related, and international trade advisory agencies must expand opportunity of information sharing.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.89-111
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• 2021

Purpose - The U.S. Trade Preference Expansion Act (TPEA) of 2015 enables the US Department of Commerce (DOC) to inflate dumping margin when the particular market situation (PMS) exists in the exporter's home market. DOC applied PMS provisions to the steel products from Korea. This paper analyzes whether DOC's calculation by using the regression analysis is consistent with WTO rules. Design/methodology - This paper analyzes the PMS application in law and regression analysis that extends the data period from 10 years to 18 years using the same economic model with DOC, and changes the country group according to the quantities of steelmaking capacity. Findings - Results show that DOC's argument conflating the sales-based with cost-based PMS designed to inflate dumping margins might not be consistent with WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 in which costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter, providing generally accepted accounting principles and reasonably reflection of the costs and PMS that exists in the Korean steel product markets. Even if it will be consistent, DOC's calculated margin by the regression analysis using a 10-year data is a big gap (5 times) compared with an 18-year data projection and different countries' data through the same methodology, which is a huge gap of regression coefficient. It means that dumping margin would be very wide range from 7.8% to 38.54% and unstable to calculate. Inflating dumping margin by DOC using regression analysis would not only be inconsistent with WTO rules, but also projection result is unreliable. Originality/value - Literature papers have mainly analyzed WTO law itself. This paper however, would be the first attempt to analyze the DOC's new way of dumping margin calculation in both manners of law and an empirical methodology perspective at the same time.