• Title/Summary/Keyword: Dumping Margin

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Legal Issues of "Zeroing" Practice Based on the Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (WTO 반덤핑협정 제2.4.2조에 의거한 네거티브 덤핑마진 산정 방식("제로잉")의 법적 문제)

  • Chae, Hyung-Bok
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.38
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    • pp.265-302
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    • 2008
  • This paper intends to analyse some legal issues on "Zeroing" which is based on the article 2.4.2 under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. "Zeroing" stands for a specific methodology in calculating a general dumping margin for a product in question under which negative individual dumping margins are treated as zero (thus "zeroed") before aggregating all individual dumping margins. The article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement regulates three types of calculating methodology on dumping margin as first symmetrical method(average-to-average: A-A), second symmetrical method(individual-to-individual: I-I) and asymmetrical method(average-to-individual: A-I). However, this article does not have any provisions about the "Zeroing" practice. In their anti-dumping practices, the EC and the United-States calculated dumping margin based on the "Zeroing", but this methodology has been disputed in the Dispute Settlement Body(DSB) of the WTO. This paper analysed their legal problems with some WTO cases in particular concerning EC-Bed Linen, U.S.-Softwood Lumber Zeroing, U.S.-Zeroing(EC) and U.S.-Sunset Review(Japan) cases. On the basis of theses analysis, we can therefore ask some questions as follows; To begin with, although the article 2.4.2 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement does not clearly refer to the "Zeroing", how do some developing countries, as the U.S.A and the E.U. calculate dumping margin as the "Zeroing"? Secondly, what is the relationship between the symmetrical method and asymmetrical method to the dumping margin? And if we adopt the zeroing method, what is the different rate to anti-dumping margin? Thirdly, although the Panel decided that the zeroing methodology of dumping margin used by th U.S.A in administrative review between the U.S.A and the E.U, why does the Appellate Body made the decision that the american methodology is incompatible with the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement? Lastly, what will be affected the upper decision taken by the Appellate Body to the DDA negotiation of anti-dumping matters? Even though the WTO Appellate made a decision that the zeroing method is incompatible with the principles of the WTO law, this methodology contains a lot of problems. Some members of the WTO as the U.S.A and the E.U did not officially declare this methodology to abandon, and the debate concerned is arguing. Therefore this paper tried to present the adequate solution in order to promote the zeroing methodology in the international anti-dumping system and practices.

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A Study on Effects of Zeroing on the Anti-Dumping Margin of Korean Stainless Steel (미국 제로잉 철폐가 한국 철창제품의 덤핑마진 하락에 미치는 영향)

  • Kim, Hong-Youl
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.13 no.3
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    • pp.301-323
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    • 2011
  • There have been 20 cases of trade disputes related to zeroing in WTO. In these day, it was judged that the use of zeroing in the calculation of dumping margin is against ADA. Recently, WTO decided in favor of Korea in regards to Korea's stainless steel products on January, 2011. There finally was a high possibility of zeroing being changed. In December 2010, the American government announced it would revise zeroing system through an federal register. Many researchers, such as Linsey and Ikenson(2000), William W. Nye(2009) already clarified through empirical analysis that no use of zeroing leads to a large decline in the margin of dumping. If zeroing is abolished in the future, the margin of dumping imposed on Korea's stainless steel will drop sharply. According to this empirical study, the margin of dumping in 6 stainless steel among 12 products commodities subject to Anti Dumping regulation from US reduced below de-minimis or 3%. These stainless steel is likely to be excluded from the Anti Dumping regulation through review investigation and Korea's export of steel to America is expected to be increased steeply in the future.

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Issues on Particular Market Situation to Calculate Dumping Margin of Korean Steel Products by the USA

  • Wang, Jingjing;Choi, Chang Hwan
    • Journal of Korea Trade
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.89-111
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    • 2021
  • Purpose - The U.S. Trade Preference Expansion Act (TPEA) of 2015 enables the US Department of Commerce (DOC) to inflate dumping margin when the particular market situation (PMS) exists in the exporter's home market. DOC applied PMS provisions to the steel products from Korea. This paper analyzes whether DOC's calculation by using the regression analysis is consistent with WTO rules. Design/methodology - This paper analyzes the PMS application in law and regression analysis that extends the data period from 10 years to 18 years using the same economic model with DOC, and changes the country group according to the quantities of steelmaking capacity. Findings - Results show that DOC's argument conflating the sales-based with cost-based PMS designed to inflate dumping margins might not be consistent with WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 in which costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter, providing generally accepted accounting principles and reasonably reflection of the costs and PMS that exists in the Korean steel product markets. Even if it will be consistent, DOC's calculated margin by the regression analysis using a 10-year data is a big gap (5 times) compared with an 18-year data projection and different countries' data through the same methodology, which is a huge gap of regression coefficient. It means that dumping margin would be very wide range from 7.8% to 38.54% and unstable to calculate. Inflating dumping margin by DOC using regression analysis would not only be inconsistent with WTO rules, but also projection result is unreliable. Originality/value - Literature papers have mainly analyzed WTO law itself. This paper however, would be the first attempt to analyze the DOC's new way of dumping margin calculation in both manners of law and an empirical methodology perspective at the same time.

Did Anti-dumping Duties Really Restrict Import?: Empirical Evidence from the US, the EU, China, and India

  • Choi, Nakgyoon
    • East Asian Economic Review
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.3-27
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    • 2017
  • This paper studied the effects of anti-dumping measures on the imports to investigate whether the trade restriction effect of an anti-dumping duty is dominant. Our results indicate that a 1% increase in the anti-dumping duties decreases the import of the targeted product by about 0.43~0.51%. The actual statistics, however, show that the total import of the targeted products increased by about 30 percent while an anti-dumping duty was in force. That indicates that an anti-dumping duty is just a temporary import relief. This paper also investigated whether an anti-dumping duty is terminated in the case that the injury would not be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed. The hazards model estimates show that increase in market share, MFN tariff rate, and dumping margin decrease the hazard of termination of an anti-dumping duty, but the increase in value added increases the hazard of termination. Generally speaking, this result indicates that the WTO member countries have regulated the overuse of an anti-dumping measure. The findings of this paper show that there is a country- and industry-wise heterogeneous characteristic in the effect as well as termination of an anti-dumping duty.

Study concerning the Scope of the Interpretation of Like Product and Domestic Industry in USITC's Antidumping Injury Determination (USITC의 반덤핑 피해판정에서의 동종상품과 국내산업의 해석범위에 관한 연구)

  • Ha, Choong-Lyong;Han, Na-Hee
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.9 no.4
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    • pp.159-175
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    • 2007
  • Under U.S. Antidumping law, dumping occurs when 'subject merchandise' is imported into the United States and sold at less than 'fair value'. The administration of U.S. antidumping law is shared between the U.S. Department of Commerce(USDOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission(USITC). USDOC's task is to determine whether imports are being dumped, and if so, to estimate the margin of dumping. In determining whether an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of the subject imports, the USITC must first define the 'like product' and the 'domestic industry'. One of the crucial factors on antidumping measures is the interpretation's scope of the 'like product' and the 'domestic industry', leading the most controversial issues in U.S. antidumping law. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the 'domestic industry' and 'like product' considering U.S. antidumping law. Most USITC's determinations regarding like product and industry as flexible conception have been supported by the U.S. Courts.

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Case analysis of trade dispute between Korea and India (한.인도간의 통상분쟁 현황과 사례 분석 -인도의 반덤핑 관세정책을 중심으로-)

  • Lee, Jong-Won
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.391-412
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    • 2010
  • As traditional import regulations have decreased all over the world in recent decades, the usage of "unconventional" trade protection measures has grown in the developing countries. In particular, antidumping investigations have risen rapidly and have growing in India and China. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide countermeasures to our government and Korean exporting companies by studying characteristics of antidumping. India is one of the most frequent initiators of antidumping cases by protecting their industries and impeding imports from FTA. This year, economic exchanges of Korea and India will be increasing by the conclusion of CEPA. This will lead to the increase of dispute by import regulations. Under such circumstances, to decrease Indian antidumping cases Korea will respond as follows. i)If antidumping laws, system and practice of India have injustice or are different from WTO rules, our government will have to indicate injustice and actively urge Indian government to make corrections. For example, they are continuous bilateral contact about the problems, fallacy of calculation of dumping margin, and intense investigations into cause and effect relationship and losses in dumping market, ect. ii)Our government should give more support to the small and medium exporting company which have difficulties in dealing with trade conflicts, counseling, arbitrating a lawyer. iii)Our government which is in control of domestic trade relief system should strengthen its investigation ability about new regulations and moniter import regulations of India. Over the long time, Korean companies need to export competitive advantage items of a higher value-added business and build solidarity by technology transfer. Accordingly, that will result in the decrease of trade dispute in India.

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