• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.45-73
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• 2007

The empirical results are summarized as follows : First, In relation to effects of ownership structure on firm value, there is the non-linear relationship between major(and foreign) shareholder's holdings and firm value. So the results(the compromise hypothesis) by prior researches(Morck et al. 1988 and so forth) is supported. However Institutional shareholder's holdings do not show the significant results. Second, In relation to effects of outside directors on firm value, equally the results of prior researches(Vafeas 2000, Choi et al. 2004), the higher the ratio of outside directors in the board, the higher firm value. Also there is the non-linear relationship between outside directors ratio and firm value. Furthermore, the higher the possibility of outside directors election in the board, the higher the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. As the economic importance of KOSDAQ is more increase, the researches of KOSDAQ should be more realized.

• Journal of Environmental Science International
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• v.27 no.8
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• pp.701-709
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• 2018

Few prior studies investigated the correlation between corporate ownership structure and environmental information disclosure. Using environmental index disclosure in GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) reports of the Korean companies, the study examines the effects of ownership structure on the magnitude of environmental information disclosure. A total of 220 firm-years during 2013-2016 period are analyzed. The empirical results of the study indicate that the institutional and foreign investors' ownership have positive correlations with environmental information disclosure, while the executives' within board of directors has a negative correlation. The ownership by largest shareholders including those with special interests shows no significant relationship with the environmental information disclosure.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.861-872
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• 2021

This study examines the relationship between board characteristics and capital structure. Data was collected from the annual reports of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, from 2015 to 2017, which totaled 1,264 firm-year observations. The study uses multiple regression analysis to analyses the data by using independent variables, including board size, outside directors, managerial ownership, CEO duality, frequency of board meetings, board experience, and gender to measure board characteristics and the total debt ratio for capital structure. Research findings show that the more independent the directors are, the lower the cost of debt financing is, as they control the management team more strictly about debt financing than directors with less independence do. Additionally, the results reveal that the higher the percentage of managerial ownership, the higher the level of leverage and debt financing, whereas board size and board meetings have a negative relationship to capital structure. Further research showed that firm size, growth opportunities and corporate governance rating all had a positive significant impact on capital structure. The findings of this study suggest that the presence of proper corporate governance leads to better funding mechanisms as it ensures that the company is in a better position to obtain external funding.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.5-13
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• 2017

Purpose - This research analyzes the effects of Korean family ownership characteristics on firm value. The positive and negative effects of family ownership on Korean firm value were analyzed. If negative effects are evident, this research explores the factors that cause a decrease in firm value. Research design, data, and methodology - The study examined a total of 5,743 companies listed on the Korea Exchange from the period 2002 to 2012 using a panel data regression analysis. Result - An empirical analysis suggests that Korean family ownership diminishes firm value. Korean family firm value has been reduced when controlling shareholders are participated in management and pursue excessive wages, or make the management entrenchment effects associated with ownership-control disparity. When the controlling shareholders of family firms have increasing control rights over the shareholders' general meeting and the directors' board, the agency costs associated with seeking increasing executive wages or private benefits reduce firm value. Conclusions - This study has significance because it reveals the negative effect of family ownership in Korea on firm value. These negative effects can be the result of agency problems from controlling family shareholders seeking excessive wages or ownership-control disparity.

• Korean small business review
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.43-73
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the collective psychological ownership (CPO) of the board of directors of cooperatives on organizational performance, and to find out the mediator effect of shared leadership between CPO and organizational performance. In this study, we collected a data set of the survey of 453 directors from 78 local consumer cooperatives of iCOOP Korea. The study found that the CPO of the board of directors of consumer cooperatives had a positive impact on the social performance and activity performance of the organization. More importantly, the mediator effect of shared leadership between CPO and performance was statistically significant. These results suggest that strengthening CPO on the board is necessary for the performance of co-operatives, and that shared leadership is an important medium for linking CPO to performance.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.99-125
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• 2002

Fisheries cooperative requires dual characteristics in performing its original function. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise and democratic characteristic as cooperative entity need to complete its objectives and survive in the complex rapidly-changing environment. After IMF crisis, fisheries cooperative received enormous government's financial support and credit-business department is perfectly under government's control. Regional fisheries cooperative also faces business failure, therefore pure cooperative movement can't save the fisheries cooperative. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise is more emphasized than democratic characteristic as cooperative entity in recent years. The theory of corporate ownership and governance can be applied to explain the ownership and governance of fisheries cooperative because fisheries cooperative is now similar to an business enterprise. During the IMF crisis the board, the auditors and the minority shareholders in business enterprise were revealed to be powerless against the mighty influence of controlling shareholders. Unconstrained discretion exercised by those controlling shareholders not only led to the firms'insolvency, but also brought down the country's financial system. During the past few years, Korea has experienced many institutional changes regarding its corporate governance structure. The introduction of outside directors, the strengthening of minority shareholders' rights, and enhanced accounting transparency are achieved to improve the efficiency of economic system. Investors, including institutional and individual, also seem to be more aware of governance issues now. Credit-business department of fisheries cooperative is recommended to introduce the institutions same as the case of the corporate governance structure. Fisheries cooperative except economic and credit-business department requires other prescriptions because it is emphasized as democratic cooperative entity. But we should be careful to interpret the ownership and governance structure because they are products of nations, eras and organizations.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.67-79
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• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.697-706
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• 2021

This quantitative study aims to examine the effect of family ownership on company performance empirically. Specifically, this study examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between family ownership and company performance which has never been explored in the previous studies. This study's main target population was all listed companies in the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) for 2008-2018. The study used criteria, namely data completeness, to measure research variables and obtained 2996 data or firm-year observations. The research contingency model to test the proposed hypothesis was the General Moment Method (GMM). The study presents the results of data descriptions shows the average, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation values for each variable. The descriptive data shows that family ownership is common in Indonesia: 64% of 244 companies in the sample. The inferential analysis results using a multiple regression model test show that family ownership significantly reduces company performance. However, corporate governance proxied by the board of directors, managerial risk profile, and independent commissioners significantly moderate the relationship between family ownership and company performance. Besides, the managerial risk profile and independent commissioners strengthened while the board of commissioners' presence weakened the effect of family ownership on performance.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.97-112
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• 2009

The amendment of regulation affecting the Governing Body of NFFC (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives) has been known to the public in May 2008. Its essential points are as follow: 1) the President of NFFC shall be a non-standing officer. 2) the Full-Time Directors shall have the authority to deal with all subjects except for those especially reserved for the General Meeting or Board of Directors, while minimizing the authority of NFFC President. By providing this amendment, the government seeks to make the Governing body becomes professionalized and the management functions carried out by full-time professional board members. However, the amendment seems to pay no attention to the co-operative's identity and principles. In this context, five issues will be discussed: 1) Strengthening the separation between ownership and control of NFFC. 2) Weakening the authority of General Meeting. 3) The bounds of Audit Committee. 4) Consolidating the management control of the Full-Time Directors. 5) The loss of NFFC's Identity, followed by a summary and conclusion.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.9
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• pp.401-407
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• 2020

Earnings management behavior is the use of accounting procedures, through accounting policies, to intentionally purposeful control in the provision of information to users. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between ownership structure factors and earnings management behavior of 30 Vietnamese commercial banks. The paper uses the ordinary least square method to examine this relationship and employs time series data of 15 years from 2005 to 2019. The study also uses agency theory an asymmetric information theory. The authors examined six independent variables related to the ownership structure and these variables are typical of Vietnamese commercial banks. The results of the study show that the foreign ownership ratio is an opposite effect, while the ownership concentration variable has a positive effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese commercial banks. Based on that, the article proposes a number of policy suggestions for the State bank of Vietnam and Board of directors of commercial banks as well as investors to identify and to limit the earnings management behaviors of Vietnamese commercial banks. This contributes to ensuring information transparency as well as improving the quality of accounting information of Vietnamese commercial banks in the coming years.