• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.48 no.5
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• pp.1071-1082
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• 2016

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing a pool-type sodium-cooled fast reactor of the Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (PGSFR). To assess the effectiveness of the inherent safety features of the PGSFR, the system transients during design basis accidents and design extended conditions are analyzed with MARS-LMR and the subchannel blockage events are analyzed with MATRA-LMR-FB. In addition, the invessel source term is calculated based on the super-safe, small, and simple reactor methodology. The results show that the PGSFR meets safety acceptance criteria with a sufficient margin during the events and keeps accidents from deteriorating into more severe accidents.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.61-72
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• 2022

This study aims to propose a conceptual design of information displays for supporting responsive actions under severe accidents in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Severe accidents in NPPs can be defined as accident conditions that are more severe than a design basis accident and involving significant core degradation. Since the Fukushima accident in 2011, the management of severe accidents is increasing important in nuclear industry. Dealing with severe accidents involves several cognitively complex activities, such as situation assessment; accordingly, it is significant to provide human operators with appropriate knowledge support in their cognitive activities. Currently, severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) have been developed for this purpose. However, it is also inevitable to develop information displays for supporting the management of severe accidents, with which human operators can monitor, control, and diagnose the states of NPPs under severe accident situations. It has been reported that Ecological Interface Design (EID) framework can be a viable approach for developing information displays used in complex socio-technical systems such as NPPs. Considering the design principles underlying the EID, we can say that EID-based information displays can be useful for dealing with severe accidents effectively. This study developed a conceptual design of information displays to be used in severe accidents, following the stipulated design process and principles of the EID framework. We particularly attempted to develop a conceptual design to make visible the principle knowledge to be used for coping with dynamically changing situations of NPPs under severe accidents.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.5
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• pp.535-542
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• 2012

A sodium-cooled demonstration fast reactor with the KALIMER-600 as a reference plant is under design by KAERI. The safety grade decay heat removal system (DHRS), which is important to mitigate design basis accidents, was changed in the reactor design. A loss of heat sink and a vessel leak in design basis accidents were simulated using the MARS-LMR system transient analysis code on two plant systems. In the analyses, the DHRS of KALIMER-600 had a weakness due to elevation of the overflow path for the DHRS operation, while it was proved that the DHRS of the demonstration reactor had superior heat transfer characteristics due to the simplified heat transfer mechanism.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.249-260
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• 2012

Main focus of the combined nuclear research activities at Aachen University (RWTH) and the Research Center J$\ddot{u}$lich (J$\ddot{U}$LICH) is the experimental and analytical investigation of containment phenomena and processes. We are deeply convinced that reliable simulations for operation, design basis and beyond-design basis accidents of nuclear power plants need the application of so-called lumped-parameter (LP) based codes as well as computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes in an indispensable manner. The LP code being used at our institutions is the GRS code COCOSYS and the CFD tool is ANSYS CFX mostly used in German nuclear research. Both codes are applied for safety analyses especially of beyond design accidents. Focal point of the work is containment thermal-hydraulics, but source term relevant investigations for aerosol and iodine behavior are performed as well. To increase the capability of COCOSYS and CFX detailed models for specific features, e.g. recombiner behavior including chimney effect, building condenser, and wall condensation are developed and validated against facilities at different scales. The close connection between analytical and experimental activities is notable and identifying feature of the RWTH/J$\ddot{U}$LICH activities.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.4
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• pp.742-754
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• 2020

Zircaloy cladding oxidation is an important phenomenon for both design basis accident and severe accidents, because it results in cladding embrittlement and rapid fuel temperature escalation. For this reason during the last decade, many experts have been conducting experiments to identify the oxidation phenomena that occur under design basis accidents and to develop mathematical analysis models. However, since the study of design extension conditions (DEC) is relatively insufficient, it is essential to develop and validate a physical and mathematical model simulating the oxidation of the cladding material at high temperatures. In this study, the QUENCH-05 and -06 experiments were utilized to develop the best-fitted oxidation model and to validate the SPACE code modified with it under the design extension condition. It is found out that the cladding temperature and oxidation thickness predicted by the Cathcart-Pawel oxidation model at low temperature (T < 1853 K) and Urbanic-Heidrick at high temperature (T > 1853 K) were in excellent agreement with the data of the QUENCH experiments. For 'LOCA without SI' (Safety Injection) accidents, which should be considered in design extension conditions, it has been performed the evaluation of the operator action time to prevent core melting for the APR1400 plant using the modified SPACE. For the 'LBLOCA without SI' and 'SBLOCA without SI' accidents, it has been performed that sensitivity analysis for the operator action time in terms of the number of SIT (Safety Injection Tank), the recovery number of the SIP (Safety Injection Pump), and the break sizes for the SBLOCA. Also, with the extended acceptance criteria, it has been evaluated the available operator action time margin and the power margin. It is confirmed that the power can be enabled to uprate about 12% through best-estimate calculations.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.90-95
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• 2012

To prevent similar accidents with the basis of industrial accidents already occurred in industrial plants, it would be possible only after true causes are grasped. Unfortunately, however, most accident investigation carried out with the basis of legal regulation failed to grasp them so that similar accidents have been repeated without cease. This research aimed to find out differences between results from conventional accident investigation and those from human error analysis, and to draw out effective and practical counter-plans against industrial accidents occurred repeatedly in an autoglass manufacturing company. As for analysis, about 110 accident cases that occurred for last 7 years were collected, and by adopting the Comprehensive Human Error Analysis Technique developed by the previous researchers, not direct causes but basic fundamental causes that might induce workers to human errors were sought. In consequence, the result showed that facility factors or environmental factors such as improper layout, mistakes in engineering design, and malfunction of interlock system were authentic major accident causes as opposed to managerial factors such as personal carelessness or failure to wearing personal protective equipments, and/or improper work methods.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.53-67
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• 1985

The severe core meltdown accident, which is not included as a design basis accident, has high consequence and low probability of occurrence and turns out to be a major risk factor in the overall risk assessment. The physical mechanisms of containment failure in core meltdown accidents are identified as steam explosion, debris bed coolability, hydrogen burning, steam spike and concrete interaction. The state of technology review is made for each subtopic about the previous and current researches for better understanding of the phenomenon.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.05a
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• pp.412.1-412
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• 2001

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.38 no.8
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• pp.697-732
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• 2006

In this paper, a historical review of the developments in the safety of LWR power plants is presented. The paper reviews the developments prior to the TMI-2 accident, i.e. the concept of the defense in depth, the design basis, the large LOCA technical controversies and the LWR safety research programs. The TMI-2 accident, which became a turning point in the history of the development of nuclear power is described briefly. The Chernobyl accident, which terrified the world and almost completely curtailed the development of nuclear power is also described briefly. The great international effort of research in the LWR design-base and severe accidents, which was, respectively, conducted prior to and following the TMI-2 and Chernobyl accidents is described next. We conclude that with the knowledge gained and the improvements in plant organisation/management and in the training of the staff at the presently-installed nuclear power stations, the LWR plants have achieved very high standards of safety and performance. The Generation 3+LWR power plants, next to be installed, may claim to have reached the goal of assuring the safety of the public to a very large extent. This review is based on the historical developments in LWR safety that occurred primarily in USA, however, they are valid for the rest of the Western World. This review can not do justice to the many fine contributions that have been made over the last fifty years to the cause of LWR safety. We apologize if we have not mentioned them. We also apologize for not providing references to many of the fine investigations, which have contributed towards LWR safety earning the conclusions that we describe just above.