• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.7
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• pp.1157-1166
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• 2008

This paper presents a new approach for the evaluation of location marginal prices (LMPs) considering demand-side bidding (DSB) in a competitive electricity market. The stabilization of the electric power supply and demand balance is one of the major important activities in electric power industry. In this paper, we present an analytical method for calculation of LMPs considering DSB, which has opportunity to compete with generating units, as England & Wales Pool's DSB scheme[1]. Also, we propose a new approach that LMP considering DSB is divided into three components. The proposed approach can be used for the evaluation of demand-side bidding into the electricity market and the assessment of the influence of DSB on total production costs and LMPs as well as three components.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.648-661
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• 1996

The traditional von Thunen model has various shortcomings. Perhaps the greatest dificiency is the model's sole emphasis on the production side of the economy;that is, the agricultural markets are rarely closed for demand. In thes paoer a closed model for a three-activity, two-dimensional economy is developed. Equillibrium solutions are generated for prices, land areas, and outputs. Comparative static analysis then follows. Attention is next given to a maximum expected-return model under environmental uncertainty. Land uses for the traditional model and the closed model are then compared.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.817-838
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• 2005

In this paper, the resource adequacy as well as the optimum fuel mix is obtained by the following procedures. First, the regulation body, the government agency, determine the reliability index as well as the optimum portfolio of the fuel mix during the planning horizon. Here, the resources with the characteristics of public goods such as demand-side management, renewable resources are assigned in advance. Also, the optimum portfolio is determined by reflecting the economics, environmental characteristics, public acceptance, regional supply and demand, etc. Second, the government announces the required amount of each fuel-type new resources during the planning horizon and the market participants bid to the government based on their own estimated fixed cost. Here, the government announces the winners of the each auction by plant type and the guaranteed fixed cost is determined by the marginal auction price by plant type. Third, the energy market is run and the surplus of each plant except their cost (guaranteed fixed cost and operating cost) is withdrew by the regulatory body. Here, to induce the generators to reduce their operating cost some incentives for each generator is given based on their performance. The performance is determined by the mechanism of the performance-based regulation (PBR). Here the free-riding performance should be subtracted to guarantee the transparent competition. Although the suggested mechanism looks like very regulated one, it provides two mechanism of the competition. That is, one is in the resource construction auction and the other is in the energy spot market. Also the advantages of the proposed method are it guarantee the proper resource adequacy as well as the desired fuel mix. However, this mechanism should be sustained during the transient period of the deregulation only. Therefore, generation resource planning procedure and market mechanisms are suggested to minimize possible stranded costs.