• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.1-48
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• 2009

Recently we have found some symptoms that R&D fiscal incentives might not work well what it has intended through the analysis of current statistics of firm's R&D data. Firstly, we found that the growth rate of R&D investment in private sector during the recent decade has been slowdown. The average of growth rate (real value) of R&D investment is 7.1% from 1998 to 2005, while it was 13.9% from 1980 to 1997. Secondly, the relative share of R&D investment of SME has been decreased to 21%('05) from 29%('01), even though the tax credit for SME has been more beneficial than large size firm, Thirdly, The R&D expenditure of large size firms (besides 3 leading firms) has not been increased since late of 1990s. We need to find some evidence whether fiscal incentives are effective in increasing firm's R&D investment. To analyse econometric model we use firm level unbalanced panel data for 4 years (from 2002 to 2005) derived from MOST database compiled from the annual survey, "Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology". Also we use fixed effect model (Hausman test results accept fixed effect model with 1% of significant level) and estimate the model for all firms, large firms and SME respectively. We have following results from the analysis of econometric model. For large firm: i ) R&D investment responds elastically (1.20) to sales volume. ii) government R&D subsidy induces R&D investment (0.03) not so effectively. iii) Tax price elasticity is almost unity (-0.99). iv) For large firm tax incentive is more effective than R&D subsidy For SME: i ) Sales volume increase R&D investment of SME (0.043) not so effectively. ii ) government R&D subsidy is crowding out R&D investment of SME not seriously (-0.0079) iii) Tax price elasticity is very inelastic (-0.054) To compare with other studies, Koga(2003) has a similar result of tax price elasticity for Japanese firm (-1.0036), Hall((l992) has a unit tax price elasticity, Bloom et al. (2002) has $-0.354{\sim}-0.124$ in the short run. From the results of our analysis we recommend that government R&D subsidy has to focus on such an areas like basic research and public sector (defense, energy, health etc.) not overlapped private R&D sector. For SME government has to focus on establishing R&D infrastructure. To promote tax incentive policy, we need to strengthen the tax incentive scheme for large size firm's R&D investment. We recommend tax credit for large size film be extended to total volume of R&D investment.

• Fire Science and Engineering
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.8-21
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• 2011

This study surveyed historical records on outbreak and features of forest fires during Chosun Dynasty's 518 years in being and analyzed the Annals of the Chosun Dynasty; The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat, archives from Records of the Border Defense Council, The Compilation of Ministry Proposals, Posthumous Records of King Cholchong etc. Forest fires were most prevalent and extreme during King Hyunjong (14 cases) and King Sunjo (13 cases) due to strong wind, and the biggest-ever forest fire broke out in the fourth year of King Soonjo (1804) in the east coast of Korea in Kangwon province. The fire had resulted in 61 fatalities and 2,600 destroyed houses. Forest fire in the east coast of Korea, Kangwon province, in the $13^{th}$ year of King Hyeonjong (1672) is recorded to have caused the highest number of deaths, 65people. The most frequent cause of forest fires during Chosun Dynasty was unidentified (42 cases), followed by accidental fire (10 cases), arson or lightning (3 cases), fire during hunting (2 cases), play with fire by children, destruction of patty fields and dry fields by fire and house fire (1 case respectively). By region, 56 % of forest fires erupted in the east coast (39 cases) and this was followed by the west sea (9 cases), Seoul and central region (8 cases) and the southern part of Korea (7 cases). By season, spring was found to be most vulnerable to forest fire as it accounted for 73 % of the total amounting to 46 cases. Behind were summer (11 cases), winter (6 cases) and autumn (0 case). Specifically, most forest fire broke out on April and May, which is the same as today. Archives and literature indicate that the person who involved in forest fire by accidental as well as arson had to be punished by banishment, expulsion from government office and public hanging. Also, officials in charge of the region that suffered forest fire were subject to reprimand. In conclusion, risk and gravity of forest fires were evident during the Chosun Dynasty as specified in historical archives and share many similarities with today's forest fires in terms of the duration and regional patterns.