• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.36
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• pp.227-266
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• 2020

The purpose of this paper is to review the representative Buddhist policies enforced during the reign of Gwanghaegun (光海君), the 15th king of the Joseon Dynasty, and the aspects of the Buddhist community affected by them. Through this, the influence and dynamism of Buddhism during the reign of Gwanghaegun will be revealed. Some of the findings will run contrary to what is popularly known about Joseon Buddhism and the policy of Sungyueokbul (崇儒抑佛), 'Revering Confucianism and Supressing Buddhism.' During the Joseon Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism was taken as an ideological background, and consequently, Buddhism was ostracized by the ruling class who advocated the exclusion of heretical views. This also characterized King Gwanghaegun's reign during the Mid-Joseon Dynasty. In reality though, the ruling class held mixed opinions about Buddhism, and this influenced the Buddhist community in the Gwanghaegun Period. The military might of Japan demonstrated during the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, led the ruling class to recognize Buddhism, and as a result, the status of Buddhism rose to a certain extent. Based on its elevated status and the aftermath of the Japanese Invasion of Korea, the Buddhist community engaged in social welfare activities inspired by the notion of requiting favors, and the Buddhist community gained recognition for providing relief services. As a result, the number of monks increased, and the economic situation improved as land ownership was granted to temples and monks. This is the means by which the Japanese Invasion of Korea influenced the Buddhist policies of the Gwanghaegun Period and changed the religious topography of Buddhism. During the reign of King Gwanghaegun, the ruling class regarded Buddhism as heretical, but offered posthumous titles to monks who engaged in meritorious services during the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Favorable and/or preferential treatment was also granted to some Buddhist monks. In addition, monks began to perform labor projects that demanded organizational and physical strength, such as those which related to national defense and architecture. However, throughout the Gwanghaegun Period, the monks were paid a certain amount of compensation for their labor, and the monks' responsibility for labor increased. This can be understood as a partial reconciliation with Buddhism or an acceptance of Buddhism rather than the suppression of Buddhism often presented by historians. As for policies which affected Buddhism, the Buddhist community showed signs of cooperation with the ruling class, the creation and reconstruction of temples, and the production of Buddhist art. Through close ties with the ruling class, Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period saw the Buddhist community actively responded policies that impacted Buddhism, and this allowed their religious orders to be maintained. In this way, it was also confirmed that the monk, Buhyu Seonsu (浮休 善修) and his disciple Byeogam Gakseong (碧巖 覺性), took up leadership roles in their Buddhist community. The Buddhist-aimed policies of Gwanghaegun were implemented against the backdrop of the Buddhist community, wherein the ruling class held mixed opinions regarding Buddhism. As such, both improvements and set backs for Buddhism could be observed during that time period. The ruling class actively utilized the organizational power of Buddhism for national defense and civil engineering after the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Out of gratitude, they implemented appropriate compensation for the Buddhists involved. The Buddhist community also responded to policies that affected them through exchanges with the ruling class. They succeeded in securing funds and support to repair and produce Buddhist temples and artworks. A thoughtful inspection of the policies towards and responses to Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period, shows that Buddhism actually enjoyed considerable organizational power and influence. This flies in the face of the general description of Joseon Buddhism as "Sungyueokbul (revering Confucianism and supressing Buddhism)."

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.1-48
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• 2009

Recently we have found some symptoms that R&D fiscal incentives might not work well what it has intended through the analysis of current statistics of firm's R&D data. Firstly, we found that the growth rate of R&D investment in private sector during the recent decade has been slowdown. The average of growth rate (real value) of R&D investment is 7.1% from 1998 to 2005, while it was 13.9% from 1980 to 1997. Secondly, the relative share of R&D investment of SME has been decreased to 21%('05) from 29%('01), even though the tax credit for SME has been more beneficial than large size firm, Thirdly, The R&D expenditure of large size firms (besides 3 leading firms) has not been increased since late of 1990s. We need to find some evidence whether fiscal incentives are effective in increasing firm's R&D investment. To analyse econometric model we use firm level unbalanced panel data for 4 years (from 2002 to 2005) derived from MOST database compiled from the annual survey, "Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology". Also we use fixed effect model (Hausman test results accept fixed effect model with 1% of significant level) and estimate the model for all firms, large firms and SME respectively. We have following results from the analysis of econometric model. For large firm: i ) R&D investment responds elastically (1.20) to sales volume. ii) government R&D subsidy induces R&D investment (0.03) not so effectively. iii) Tax price elasticity is almost unity (-0.99). iv) For large firm tax incentive is more effective than R&D subsidy For SME: i ) Sales volume increase R&D investment of SME (0.043) not so effectively. ii ) government R&D subsidy is crowding out R&D investment of SME not seriously (-0.0079) iii) Tax price elasticity is very inelastic (-0.054) To compare with other studies, Koga(2003) has a similar result of tax price elasticity for Japanese firm (-1.0036), Hall((l992) has a unit tax price elasticity, Bloom et al. (2002) has $-0.354{\sim}-0.124$ in the short run. From the results of our analysis we recommend that government R&D subsidy has to focus on such an areas like basic research and public sector (defense, energy, health etc.) not overlapped private R&D sector. For SME government has to focus on establishing R&D infrastructure. To promote tax incentive policy, we need to strengthen the tax incentive scheme for large size firm's R&D investment. We recommend tax credit for large size film be extended to total volume of R&D investment.