• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.14C no.3 s.113
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• pp.229-238
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• 2007

Sensor networks consist of many tiny sensor nodes that collaborate among themselves to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate data. In sensor networks, sensor nodes are typically powered by batteries, and have limited computing resources. Moreover, the redeployment of nodes by energy exhaustion or their movement makes network topology change dynamically. These features incur problems that do not appear in traditional, wired networks. Security in sensor networks is challenging problem due to the nature of wireless communication and the lack of resources. Several efforts are underway to provide security services in sensor networks, but most of them are preventive approaches based on cryptography. However, sensor nodes are extremely vulnerable to capture or key compromise. To ensure the security of the network, it is critical to develop suity mechanisms that can survive malicious attacks from "insiders" who have access to the keying materials or the full control of some nodes. In order to protect against insider attacks, it is necessary to understand how an insider can attack a sensor network. Several attacks have been discussed in the literature. However, insider attacks in general have not been thoroughly studied and verified. In this paper, we study the insider attacks against routing protocols in sensor networks using the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol. We identify the goals of attack, and then study how to achieve these goals by modifying of the routing messages. Finally, with the simulation we study how an attacker affects the sensor networks. After we understand the features of inside attacker, we propose a detect mechanism using hop count information.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.474-483
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• 2003

The secret sharing is the basic concept of the threshold cryptosystem and has an important position in the modern cryptography. At 1995, Jarecki proposed the proactive secret sharing to be a solution of existing the mobile adversary and also proposed the share renewal scheme for (k, n) threshold scheme. For n participants in the protocol, his method needs O($n^2$) modular exponentiation per one participant. It is very high computational cost and is not fit for the scalable cryptosystem. In this paper, we propose the efficient share renewal scheme that need only O(n) modular exponentiation per participant. And we prove our scheme is secure if less that ${\frac}\frac{1}{2}n-1$ adversaries exist and they static adversary.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.8C no.6
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• pp.775-782
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• 2001

Recently the use of Linux OS is increasing to tremendous figures. But due to the fact that Linux is distributed on an open-source policy, the need of security is an upcoming question which leads to widespread development of security on a Linux based environment. Cryptography, however, can cause various problems because of difficulty of key management. A lot of researchers have been concentrating on the key recovery technique to eliminate the reverse effect of using these kinds of security and to promote positive aspects of using it. In this thesis I am suggesting an mechanism based on the key recovery technique, as a method to save time in recovery and resetting a disconnection between two end-users through IPSec (IP Security) protocols in a VPN (Virtual Private Network) environment. The main idea of the newly suggested mechanism, KRFSH (Key Recovery Field Storage Header), is to store the information of the session in advance for the case of losing the session information essential to establish a tunnel connection between a SG and a host in the VPN environment, and so if necessary to use the pre-stored information for recovery. This mechanism is loaded on the IPSec based FreeS/WAN program (Linux environment), and so the VPN problem mentioned above is resolved.