• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.17-34
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• 2001

This paper is to analyze how firms in a large firm-led industrial city have carried out the restructuring in the face of radical shifts, with focus on the strategy and the restructuring of firms in Ulsan, a typical industrial district in Korea that is specialized in heavy & chemical industry. It has been well known that the local economy has been led by a small number of large firms, including affiliates of chaebol, and its industrial structure has also been characterised as a clear dichotomy between large firms as a customer and small and medium-size firms as a supplier, which can be called not horizontal but vertical relations. It can identify some tendencies, however, that local companies have been rather dynamically changing in response to increasingly turbulent environment since the Asian crisis. Some are radical, but some incremental. These can be summarized in four distinctive but interlinked ways. First, more than half of local companies surveyed have attempted to change their production systems, mainly from the fordist mass production towards the flexible mass production, seeking both economies of scale and scope. Second, local firms have vigorously continued to reorganize the boundary of the production and the organization, by specializing products and focusing on the core competence in order to save costs and cope with radically changing customer demands in a flexible way. Third, there have been various strategies for the organizational innovation such as the introduction of team organization, the boundary blurring between the managerial and production workers and the intra-firm spin-offs, so as to improve managerial efficiency and competence in the use of internal labour market. Finally, they have tried to be more sensitive to the market and customers. These tendencies seem to be increasingly critical to sustain their competitiveness. To do so, they tend to focus increasingly not only on the competing via the product quality rather than through price, but also to seek to diversify the market and customer firms beyond national boundary.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.55-83
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• 2022

For humankind, the ocean is a treasure trove of natural resources and an important area that provides major transportation routes. However, marine ecosystems are under threat amidst the global climate change crisis. This is partly due to various sources of pollution emitted from ships, shore facilities, and other sources. In response, the navies of advanced countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe have assessed such a climate change crisis as a new maritime security threat. These countries have made early efforts to prevent marine pollution from warships. These efforts have been legally embodied. This was legislation for technical and organizational structures to be practically applied in the field. Among these navies of developed countries, France has established parliamentary and intergovernmental plans to become a leader in environmental protection at the defense level, not only in the European region but throughout the world. Within this framework, the French Navy, through its internal instruction, has inclined its legal efforts to prevent marine pollution from warships. Therefore, this study examines the legislation for the prevention of marine pollution from warships within the French Navy and compares it with the marine environmental legislation applicable to the ROK Navy. It then deduces the implications for the ROK navy, which is advancing toward a Blue-Water navy.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.3-27
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• 2018

This paper analyzes Cuba's market-oriented reforms to alleviate essential problems with socialist countries such as soft budget constraints and incentive problems. It also discuss about effectiveness of industrial policy as a development strategy. The soft budget constraints and incentive problems resulted in the collapse of Soviet bloc and COMECON in early 1990s. After the collapse, Cuban economy suffered a steep dive, and national income tumbling down rapidly. Cuban faced serious shortages of food, gasoline, and other basic necessities of life. To halt and partially reverse economic downturn and dire austerity in the 1990's, the Cuban government made some partial reforms to the inherited Soviet system of cental planningand faced severe shortage in food, energy, and daily necessities. In response to the economic crisis. Cuba introduced economic reforms and implemented industrial policy as a development strategy as long as Cuba maintained a strong socialist country. Cuban government established the economic free zone law and attempted to induce foreign direct investment by implementing export-led industrial policy. Fiedel Castro approved the Law No. 165 "Free Zones and Industrial Parks", in 1996. However, Cuba's ESZ strategy seems to have failed because of the U.S. sanctions, but also because of Cuba's own policies, which do not allow foreign investors to hire workers directly and impose a high implicit tax on wages. By limiting advanced techniques of personnel and organization management, indirect employment can result in lowering work efforts and productivity of workers, and aggravating production efficiency in the ESZs. Another reason to fail comes from the double wage structure due to the double monetary-exchange rate system. Most of the high non-wage costs result from the double exchange rate system. Due to Cuba's imbalanced industry and production structures, concentrated labor force, and urbanization and centralization of agriculture production, the industrial transformation development model suggested by Lewis has not been successful unlike other Asian agriculture-led development model. Cuba has to overcome many difficulties in implementing industrial policy as a development strategy.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.42 no.6
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• pp.546-554
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• 2018

The Bulk market, unlike the line market, is characterized by stiff competition where certain ship or freight owners have no influence on freight rates. However, freights are subject to macroeconomic variables and economic external shock which should be considered in determining management or chartering decisions. According to the results analyzed by use of ARIMA Inventiom model, the impact of the financial crisis was found to have a very strong bearing on the BDI index. First, according to the results of the VEC model, the libor rate affects the BDI index negatively (-) while exchange rate affects the BDI index by positively (+). Secondly, according to the results of the VEC model's J ohanson test, the order ship volume affects the BDI index by negatively (-) while China's economic growth rate affects the BDI index by positively (+). This shows that the shipping company has moved away from the simple carrier and responded appropriately to changes in macroeconomic variables (economic fluctuations, interest rates and exchange rates). It is believed that the shipping companies should be more aggressive in its "trading" management strategy in order to prevent any unfortunate situation such as the Hanjin Shipping incident.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.26
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• pp.29-58
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• 2011

Since 11 September 2001, warnings of risk in the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons and materials which poses one of the gravest threats to the international community have continued. The purpose of this study is to analyze the aim, principles, characteristics, activities, impediments to progress and developmental recommendation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT). In addition, it suggests implications of the GICNT for the ROK policy. International community will need a comprehensive strategy with four key elements to accomplish the GICNT: (1) securing and reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, (2) countering terrorist nuclear plots, (3) preventing and deterring state transfers of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, (4) interdicting nuclear smuggling. Moreover, other steps should be taken to build the needed sense of urgency, including: (1) analysis and assessment through joint threat briefing for real nuclear threat possibility, (2) nuclear terrorism exercises, (3) fast-paced nuclear security reviews, (4) realistic testing of nuclear security performance to defeat insider or outsider threats, (5) preparing shared database of threats and incidents. As for the ROK, main concerns are transfer of North Korea's nuclear weapons, materials and technology to international terror groups and attacks on nuclear facilities and uses of nuclear devices. As the 5th nuclear country, the ROK has strengthened systems of physical protection and nuclear counterterrorism based on the international conventions. In order to comprehensive and effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, the ROK has to strengthen nuclear detection instruments and mobile radiation monitoring system in airports, ports, road networks, and national critical infrastructures. Furthermore, it has to draw up effective crisis management manual and prepare nuclear counterterrorism exercises and operational postures. The fundamental key to the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism which leads to catastrophic impacts is to establish not only domestic law, institution and systems, but also strengthen international cooperation.