• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2011.02a
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• pp.399-406
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• 2011

Various construction bonds and warranties critically burden the general contractor. Also, sporadic or cumulative delays of progress payment by the owner can further trap the contractor in a financial quagmire. Facing the possibility of cash flow deficiency and callous response from the banks, most construction firms may become financially incapable of market competition, and attractive project tenders become a bidding game among few deep-pocket players. The downside of such market environment is that the depth of pocket, rather than that of professional competency dictates the choice of market winners. In Taiwan, this has been a potential crisis to the construction industry after the financial crisis which started out since 2008. To encounter this problem, this research will examine the means to better manage the construction industry. Essentially, a credit guarantee system (CGS) is the prime solution to strengthen a bank's confidence in any particular construction firm. Thus establishing a national platform which evaluates and rewards a construction firm's overall credibility is pivotal, and this third-party rated credit can help a bank to render a loan more wisely. Finally, this paper will propose the ideal operating schemes of construction-specific CGS in Taiwan and a credit scoring prototype model for construction industry, as reference for the government and banks, respectively.

• The Journal of Small Business Innovation
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.1-16
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• 2016

Korean government had used public 'credit guarantee schemes' (CGS) as a counter-cyclical measure. However, it is still controversial about the effectiveness of policy financing on the SMEs. Criticism on policy financing involves the argument that supporting enterprises hampers competition and innovation of SMEs by increasing their dependence on the government and delays the exit of marginal firms. In this paper, we investigate how to effectively build up the rationale of running public CGSs. At the same time, we propose the ways to coexist of public credit guarantee and market-based private finance system for SMEs. First, CGS, as a counter-cyclical function, must coexist with the private financial system by compensating the market failure caused by pro-cyclical behavior of the private financial market. Second, CGS has the comparative advantages, compared to both the interest rate policy of the central bank and fiscal policy of the government. The credit guarantee is the symptomatic treatment that could revitalize the economy shortly by providing liquidity. Also, knowing that CGS is provided based on the leverage ratio defined by outstanding guarantee divided by capital fund, public 'credit guarantee' (CG) has an advantage that is free from the risk of government deficit. Third, the reason for existence of the CGS should be founded in supporting services for SMEs, available only in a public sector that is difficult to expect from private banks. In this regard, it is desirable to strengthen the publicness of credit guarantee over the support for start-ups, growing companies, the improvement of productivity, increase of exports, a long-term investment in facilities, the employment-creating businesses, and innovative enterprises.