• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권5호
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권10호
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권7호
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권11호
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• 무역학회지
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• 제41권2호
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• pp.29-60
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• 2016

본 연구에서는 두 나라의 대표적인 두 기업이 R&D 경쟁과 쿠르노 경쟁을 하는 상황을 전제로 외국기업의 R&D 외부효과가 국내 주요 경제변수에 어떤 영향을 미치며 나아가 국내정부의 보호수준과 어떤 관계를 갖는지에 대한 무역정책의 문제를 규명한다. 국제적 과점의 2단계 모형을 통해 우리는 자유무역과 보호무역 정책에서 존재하는 유일한 해를 구하고, 나아가 시뮬레이션 분석을 통해 R&D 투자의 외부효과에 따른 주요 경제변수들의 변화 패턴과 일국의 최적관세 패턴을 추적한다. 이론적인 주요 예측으로 기업들이 R&D 경쟁을 하고 있는 상황에서 자유무역과 보호무역 두 경우에 모두 R&D 외부효과가 클수록 R&D 투자율과 수준이 감소하고, 사회후생은 유사한 패턴을 보이지만 그 수준은 보호무역에서 상대적으로 큰 것으로 드러난다. 또 이 연구의 가장 관심사항인 R&D 투자의 외부효과와 최적관세율 간의 관계에서는 두 변수 간에 부(-)의 관계가 나타난다. 이는 정책적으로 R&D 투자의 외부효과가 커짐에 따라 최적관세율을 낮출 필요가 있음을 시사한다.

• 한국멀티미디어학회논문지
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• 제14권12호
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• pp.1549-1558
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• 2011

In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. In cognitive radio networks, effective spectrum assignment for primary and secondary users is a challenge due to the available broad range of radio frequency spectrum as well as the requisition of harmonious coexistence of both users. To handle this problem, firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which multiple primary users emulate with each other to acquire maximal profit. After that, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users to obtain optimal profit for each user also. Simulation results show that our scheme obtains optimal solution at Nash equilibrium.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

전통적으로 자국 산업의 이익보호를 위해 관세는 널리 사용되어 왔다. 개발도상의 단계에 있는 나라들은 자국의 유치산업을 보호할 목적으로 관세를 사용하는 반면, 선진국들은 자국의 상품이 타국의 시장에 진출할 수 있도록 타국을 압박하는 수단으로 사용되는 경우가 많다. 본 논문에서는 선진국이 자국의 특정 수출품을 개발도상국 시장에 일정한 비율 이상 진출시키기 위해 개발도상국의 제3의 생산품에 관세를 부과하겠다는 위협을 하는 경우 그 경제적 효과를 간단한 게임이론 모형을 통해 살펴본다. 만약 관세가 부과된 제3의 생산품이 주력 수출품인 경우 개발도상국 정부는-주력 수출품 생산자들의 로비 등을 통해-문제가 된 상품에 일정한 제재를 부과함으로써 선진국과의 마찰을 자발적으로 해소하려는 유인을 갖게 됨을 보인다. 이러한 결과는 최근 FTA로 대변되는 양자 간 무역협정의 체결에서 나타나는 산업 간 이해득실의 차이를 개별 산업의 협상력 차이로 설명할 수 있다는 의미를 지닌다.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.