• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.8
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• pp.1496-1503
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• 2009

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. In order to fulfil the commitments of the countries in an economically efficient way, the UNFCCC adapted the emission trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol. If the UNFCCC's scheme is enforced in the country, considerable changes in electric power industry are expected due to the imposed greenhouse gas emission reduction. This paper proposes a game theoretic model of the case when generation companies participate in both competitive electricity market and emission market simultaneously. The model is designed such that generation companies select strategically between power quantity and greenhouse gas reduction to maximize their profits in both markets. Demand function and Environmental Welfare of emission trading market is proposed in this model. From the simulation results using the proposed model the impact of the emission trading on generation companies seems very severe in case that the emission prices are significantly high.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.973-997
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• 2000

The carbon tax is one of several measures to reduce the green-house gases emitted from burning the fossil fuels, which has been much discussed internationally. The analyses of the effects of a carbon tax on individual countries have been carried out by applying the computable general equilibrium(CGE) models, especially models with the assumption of non-existence of scale economies. However, the introduction of scale economies to CGE models changes the simulation results drastically. In this paper, two CGE models are used to compute and compare the economic and $CO_2$ reduction effects of a carbon tax, one of with is the model with scale economies and the other is without scale economies. One of main results is that the analysis using the CGE model without scale economies may underestimate the effects of a carbon tax on GDP and reducing the emission of $CO_2$.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.10
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

Traditionally, tariffs have been used to protect domestic industries. In particular, a country with more bargaining power makes a punitive threat to maintain a certain level of market share in the market of other country. In this paper, we study the effect of punitive tariffs on an irrelevant industry. In particular, when a country tries to achieve a market share or quantity target in an industry, we examine the effect of threats to impose tariffs on the major export of another industries which are irrelevant to the targeted industry. Using a simple duopoly model, we show that there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which supports that a country has an incentive to resolve a trade dispute voluntarily to protect its major export industry under the credible treat of punitive tariffs. This result is mainly due to the fact that the trade policy of a country concerns the aggregate benefits from trade over all its export industries. To obtain this result, this paper employs the linkage between the targeted and irrelevant industries by using the lobby of the irrelevant industry to curb the targeted industry. A lot of recent bilateral trade agreements can be applied to our results.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.1-18
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• 2019

The competition between port authorities (PAs) and terminal operating companies (TOCs) in providing port logistics services has gained importance. The PAs enter into leasing contracts with TOCs in various ways. This study aims to model a contract method that maximizes the joint profit between a PA and a TOC. Particularly, this study aims to model the equilibrium by comparing four types of contract schemes in the non-coordination, cooperation, Cournot, and collusion models. The results of the analysis show that the two-part tariff scheme generates a higher joint profit than the fixed and fee contracts. It is understood that risk- and profit-sharing between the PAs and TOCs helps the latter to maximize the throughput and the joint profit. These results are expected to provide an important theoretical basis for decision-making about port rent and freight between the PAs and TOCs.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.413-431
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• 2001

Previous analyses of deposit-refund systems (hereafter DRS) mosty concerned consumer-paid DRS. While there has been a trend to put more emphasis on the producers' responsibility in recycling, especilly in Europe, and the supplier-paid DRS has been enforced in Korea during the past decade, little attempt has been made to analyse rigorously the nature of the supplier-paid DRS. This paper looks into the effects of the supplier-paid DRS on firm behaviors and profits under the oligopolistic market structure. It is shown that, in the cournot model where firms strategically interact each other, when the deposit rate is high enough, firms' profit increase as the deposit rate rises. Furthermore, where the number of firms are sufficiently large, it can happen that, as the deposit rate increases, both social welfare and firms' profit improve.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.