• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.53-70
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• 1999

본 논문은 기업의 자본구조가 결정되어 있고 경영자에게 특정한 형태의 보상이 주어진 상태에서 경영자의 생산량 결정에 대하여 분석하였다. 생산물 시장이 쿠르노 경쟁상태에 있음을 가정할 때 스톡옵션과 상여금을 경영자 보상으로 갖는 경우 주식 가치 극대화를 위한 생산량과 다른 생산량을 선택하게 됨을 보여 주고 있다. 스톡옵션의 경우에는 옵션행사의 한계 경제상태와 기업 부실화의 한계 경제상태가 일치하지 않기 때문에 경영자는 주식 가치 극대화를 위한 생산량과는 다른 선택을 하게 되며 상여금의 경우에도 상여금 지급의 한계 경제상태에 따라서 주식 가치 극대화를 위한 생산량과는 다른 선택을 하게 된다. 또한 스톡옵션 행사가격과 상여금 지급의 목표이익이 증가하면 경영자의 최적 생산량은 증가한다. 반면에 스톡옵션 행사가격과 상여금 지급의 목표이익이 증가하면 경쟁기업 경영자의 최적 생산량은 감소한다. 그러나 상여금의 경우에는 경영자가 주주의 이해와 일치하는 의사결정을 내리도록 하여 주는 목표이익이 존재하지만 스톡옵션의 경우에는 이와 같은 보상체계가 존재하지 않는다.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.1-14
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• 2019

We compared and analyzed the effects of establishing multilateral FTA and bilateral FTA on the R&D investment of exporting firms when they compete in Cournot fashion and when the government of the importing country acts strategically. In the short run, we found that the importing country prefers to enter into a bilateral FTA with each exporting country separately for maximizing its welfare. However, we also found that, in the long run, it is more welfare-enhancing policy for importing country that entering into a multilateral FTA with all of the exporting countries simultaneously because it helps facilitate the R&D investment of exporting firms. But once entering into a multilateral FTA, the exporting firms would be faced with more intensive R&D investment competition and hence they would suffer severe welfare loss.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.1-18
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• 2019

The competition between port authorities (PAs) and terminal operating companies (TOCs) in providing port logistics services has gained importance. The PAs enter into leasing contracts with TOCs in various ways. This study aims to model a contract method that maximizes the joint profit between a PA and a TOC. Particularly, this study aims to model the equilibrium by comparing four types of contract schemes in the non-coordination, cooperation, Cournot, and collusion models. The results of the analysis show that the two-part tariff scheme generates a higher joint profit than the fixed and fee contracts. It is understood that risk- and profit-sharing between the PAs and TOCs helps the latter to maximize the throughput and the joint profit. These results are expected to provide an important theoretical basis for decision-making about port rent and freight between the PAs and TOCs.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.47-66
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• 2014

A noticeable aspect of Korean firms' outward sequential FDIs to China is that they occur sequentially, which means that they implement the outward FDIs to China with a long-term perspective. To analyze the strategic advantages of sequential investment, we introduce Cournot type quantity competition model. According to the model, three important implications are derived. First, sequential FDIs enhances the Korean parents' production capabilities. Second, the parents are more likely to establish new Chinese subsidiaries as they stay longer in China. Third, the production effect of sequential investments incurs more sequential investments. Some regression models are tested for verifying the predictions. According to empirical results, three important results are found. First, initial entry mode affects the size expansion of the Korean parents. Second, the longer the duration of intial subsidiary in China, the more the sequential investment will be. Third, sequential investments are positively associated with the productivity of the Korean parents.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.153-172
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• 1990

The present paper investigates the potential value of strategic antitrust policy in an oligopolistic international market. The market is characterized by a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium and by asymmetry in costs among firms in the world market. The model is useful for two reasons. First, it is important in the context of policy-making to examine the conditions under which it may be beneficial to relax antitrust law to enhance competitiveness. Second, the explicit derivation of the level of cost-saving required for a gain in total domestic surplus provides an empirical rule for excluding industries that do not satisfy the requirements for a socially beneficial antitrust exemption. Results of the analysis include a criterion that tells how the cost-saving and concentration effects of a merger offset each other. The criterion is derived from fairly general assumptions on demand functions and is simple enough to be applied as a part of the merger guidelines. Another interesting policy implication of our analysis is that promoting mergers would not be a beneficial strategy in a net importing industry where cost-saving opportunities are thin. Cost-saving domestic mergers are more likely to increase national welfare in exporting industries. The best candidate industries for application of strategic antitrust policy are those with the following characteristics: (i) a large potential for efficiency enhancement; (ii) high market concentration at the world but not the domestic level; (iii) a high ratio of exports to imports. Recently, many policymakers and economists in Korea have also come to believe that the appropriate antitrust policy in an era of increased foreign competition may actually be to encourage rather than to prohibit domestic mergers. The Industry Development Act of 1986 and the proposed bill for Mergers and Conversions in the Financial Industry of 1990 reflect this changing perspective on antitrust policy. Antitrust laws may burden domestic firms in the sense that they have a more constrained strategy set. Expenditures to avoid antitrust attacks could also increase costs for domestic firms. But there is no clear evidence that the impact of antitrust policy is significant enough to harm the competitiveness of domestic firms. As a matter of fact, it is necessary for domestic financial institutions to become large in scale in this era of globalization. However, the absence of empirical evidence for efficiency enhancement from mergers suggests caution in the relaxation of antitrust standards.