• Korean Security Journal
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• no.49
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• pp.157-183
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• 2016

Countries across the globe, including those in Europe, are waging a "war against terrorism" as international terrorist groups such as ISIS and lone-wolf terrorists have unleashed various large-scale attacks on rail infrastructure. Anti-South Korean sentiment exists in Muslim-majority countries because the nation has cooperated with the US for its military interventions in the Middle East, and ISIS has threatened to target South Korea four times since September 9, 2015. In addition, North Korea has been left isolated in the international community with its missile and nuclear tests, while further escalating inter-Korean tension and threatening to strike major facilities and attack important figures in the South. These situations imply that South Korea is no longer immune to terrorist attacks. If the nation fails to prevent or deter such terrorist attacks against rail networks, massive casualties, property damage and social confusion would be unavoidable, deteriorating national and international trust in its counter-terrorism policies. This may lead to a national crisis involving decreases in the number of tourists, dampened interest of foreign investors, and capital flight. This study aims to propose policy measures to enhance railroad security checks, based on the work of railroad police officers, for the sake of protecting citizens and public safety. The suggestions include an incremental expansion of railroad security checks; growth of the railroad police force and adjustment of their policing distribution with other police officers; enhancement of security systems across important rail networks; improvement of the Railroad Safety Act; Southeast Asia, including the corresponding strengthening of the national crackdown illegal immigrants, and plans for pre-emptive and regular cooperation among organizations related to the promotion of security checks and the prevention of terrorist attacks.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.47
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• pp.7-36
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• 2016

The security providers industry, often referred to as an industry with unconfined growth ceiling, has entered a remarkable mass-growth phase since the 1980. In the modern era, private-sector security increasingly cover functions relating to general security awareness (including counter-terrorism) in partnership with State bodies, and the scale of operations continue to accelerate, relative to the expanding roles. In the era of pluralisation of policing, there has been widening efforts pursued to develop a range of regulatory strategies internationally in order to manage such growth and development. To date, in South Korea, a diverse set of industry review studies have been conducted. However, the analyses have been conventionally confined to North America, Britain, Germany and Japan, while developments in other world regions remain unassessed. This article is intended to inform the drivers and determinants of regulatory reforms in Australia, and examine the effectiveness of the main pillars of licensing innovations. Over the past decades, the Australian regime has undergone a wave of reforms in response to emerging issues, and in recognition of the industry as a 'public good' due to underpopulation density and the resulting security challenges. The focus of review in this study was on providing a detailed review of the regulatory approach taken by Australia that has expanded police-private security co-operation since the 1980s. The emphasis was on examining the core pillars of risk management strategies and oversight practices progressed to date and evaluating areas of possible improvement in regulation relative to South Korea. Overall, this study has identified three key features of Australian regime: (1) close checks on questionable close associates (including fingerprinting), (2) power of inspection and seizure without search warrant, (3) the 'three strikes' scheme. The rise of the private security presence in day-to-day policing operations means that industry warrant some intervening government-sponsored initiative. The overall lessons learnt from the Australian case was taken into account in determining the following checks and balances that would provide the ideal setting for the best-practice arrangement: (1) regulatory measure should be evaluated against a set of well-defined indicators, such as the merits of different enforcement tools for each given risk, (2) information about regulatory impacts should be analysed by a specialist research institute, (3) regulators should be innovative in applying a range of strategies available to them by employing a mixture of compliance promotional strategies, and adjust the mix as required.