• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.59-79
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• 2007

This paper is to identify whether the mechanism of the real market as an off-line market developed from the transaction cost theory from previous research is applied to on-line market, such as usiness to Business e-marketplaces. With three factors(parties, product, environments) selected from previous research, four cases picked up from all B2B e-marketplace sites as of April 2007, in the view of Business to Business Matrix which presented by Kaplan & Sawhney(2000), were studied. They were accompanied by interview with CEO and team manager, and they explained their business and revenue model of the company. From the interview, the relation between three factors and usiness to Business e-marketplace was observed by taking sub-factors into consideration; parties -asset specificity, information asymmetry, product factors - standardization, price stability, and environments factors - competition, market uncertainty. The implications of this study are to analyze the relation of the transaction theory in offline and online. Also, this is the first study that analyzed it. In the future, another research based on this research will be studied.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.1-36
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• 2005

In this study, we analyzed determinant factors of leverage ratio and debt maturity for Korean firms in the simultaneous equation system using 2SLS (two stage least square) method under assumption that two variables are jointly determined in the capital structure decision. As a result of the analysis, we found that leverage ratio and debt maturity are positively related. Also, as for determinant factors of debt maturity, agency cost hypothesis, asset maturity matching hypothesis, signalling and liquidity risk hypothesis are all generally supported, and further leverage ratio are significantly positively related with firm size, but negatively related with default risk. However, when we divided samples into groups according to bank debt level and Chaebul affiliation, with contrast to existing study which worked on similar issues with OLS, we found no evidence supporting the argument that the information asymmetry problem is less severe in firms with more bank debt, whereas information asymmetry and financial constraint problems are more severe in non-Chaebul affiliated firms.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.177-191
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• 2020

This study examines the effect of the self-overviewing attributes derived from agency problem on the cost behavior in franchise industry. To solve the research problem, we developed the proxies for self-overviewing attributes of domestic franchise CEO and used Anderson et al. (2003)'s cost behavior model to test hypothesis. Moreover, we grouped the self-overviewing variables for additional test. We find that operating costs are more sticky for firms which present higher CEO's self-overviewing attributes in franchise industry. Second, we find that the greater the self-overviewing tendency, more strengthened cost stickiness when sales decrease. This study is meaningful in that we developed proxies for self-overviewing propensity, such as the hypodermic behaviors of franchise CEO, which have not been performed in previous studies, to enhance future studies of franchise CEO. Futhermore, we empirically provide the effects of CEO's self-overviewing attributes on the operating costs behaviors, suggesting useful information to franchise stakeholders such as prospective start-ups, franchisee and investors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.5-17
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• 2017

This study extends research into whether disclosure of corporate and financial information is associated with firms' costs of equity capital. This study sets out to examine empirically the determinants of corporate disclosure in the annual reports of 37 largest and most liquid firms listed on Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) in Kazakhstan. It also reports the results of the association between company-specific characteristics and disclosure of the sample companies. Based on the analysis of existing empirical research, the disclosure index has been constructed and regression analysis of the influence of the disclosure index on the cost of equity capital has been conducted. The obtained results show that the received findings correlate with foreign empirical studies, and the disclosure index in this sample has a negative impact on the cost of equity capital. Using cost of equity capital estimates derived from capital asset pricing model, we find that firms with higher levels of financial transparency are associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. Economic theory assumes that by increasing the level of corporate reporting, firms not only increase their stock market liquidity, but also decrease the investors' estimation risk, arising from uncertainty about future returns and payout distributions. The results show that firms on the Kazakhstan market can reduce their cost of equity capital by increasing the level of their voluntary corporate disclosures.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.285-301
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• 2010

Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is an open marketplace for loans not from bank but from individuals online. Financial transactions are facilitated directly between individuals ("peers") without any intermediation of a traditional financial institution. A market study by renowned research company forecasts that P2P lending will grow very fast and a couple of P2P lending sites in Korea also are getting attentions by providing the alternative financial services. In P2P lending market, Lender will enjoy higher income generated from the loans in the form of interest than interest that can be earned by financial products provided by official financial institutions. Furthermore, lenders are able to decide who they would lend the money for themselves. Meanwhile, borrowers with low credit scores are able to finance their liquidity requirement with low cost and convenient access to the Internet. The objective of this paper is to introduce P2P lending and its issues of information asymmetry. We provide the insights from the case study of one of P2P lending sites in Korea and review the issues in P2P lending market as research topics. Specifically, information asymmetry issues in both traditional financial institutions and P2P lending are discussed.

• Tunnel and Underground Space
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• v.31 no.6
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• pp.520-533
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• 2021

It is necessary to increase the blasting efficiency in order to minimize the economic loss caused when the excavation cross section is reduced due to the stability problem of underground mining development, and for this, a new blasting design is proposed. In this study, the blasting efficiency of the general design in the field, the suggestion designI, which added two columns to production blasting, and the suggestion design II, which added one column to create asymmetry, is compared. Advance rate and fragmentation were selected as the evaluation index of the blasting efficiency. In the case of advance rate, compared to the normal, the suggestionI improved by 6.07% and the suggestionII improved by 4.65%. In the case of fragmentation, based on P80, compared to the normal, the suggestionI reduced about 58% and the suggestionII was about 47%. Accoording to the evaluation index, the suggestion designI shows better blasting efficiency than the suggestion designII. But considering the additional work time and cost required for the suggestion designI due to the insignificant difference in the evaluation index results, the asymmetry V-cut, the suggestion designII, is judged to be a more suitable blasting design for the site.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.95-120
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• 1990

The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-20
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• 2008

How health care providers compete and how competition among them affects their behavior are crucial questions in theory and health policy. In ordinary markets, competition improves social welfare, However in health care markets facing uncertainty and information asymmetry, competition can take the form of wasteful quality competition and result in cost increase. The purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of hospital service markets and examine the impact of hospital competition on hospital behavior, more specifically hospital cost and the size of personnel. Based on patient discharge data of 2002 by the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and health insurance EDI claims data of 2002, this study measures the degree of competition in the inpatient service market of hospitals, using variable radius method and Herfindahl index. The result of the study shows that the hospital service market consists of on average 3.13 government administrative units(shi, gun, or gu). Compared with hospitals, general or general specialized hospitals cover larger markets and operate in more competitive markets. Nearly 60% of patients use hospitals, which are not located in their government administrative units, meaning that market definition based on variable radius is better than the conventional method of market definition based on government administrative units. The results of multivariate analysis show that competition is not associated with high cost index of hospitals. But hospitals in more competitive markets employ larger(more intensive) input of personnel per 100 beds, implying that hospital competition in Korea can have the form of quality and cost-increasing competition.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.181-190
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• 2012

Cost of capital is one of the key factors of accounting regulation policy for telecommunication market. This paper aims at investigating efficient policy improvements concerning accounting regulation for telecommunication market focused on cost of capital calculation methods and its application. At First, cost of capital estimating method should be improved. In estimating the cost of equity capital, it is necessary to use benchmark method for Equity risk premium. It will reduce analytical errors caused by a rapid economic change and inflation. It is also more desirable to use debt premium adding method for the cost of debt capital. Optimal capital structure method may be considered a better way to estimates capital structure. Secondly, cost of capital estimating process also has to be reformed. Telecommunication industry changes rapidly so it does not reflect fast environmental changes. Therefore, cost of capital should be calculated every year. Cost of capital should be calculated by individual companies. There is information asymmetry between regulators and regulatees. Because of that cost of capital calculating process takes long time and cost a lot. To solve this problem, regulator should legislate on cost of capital calculation and then regulating companies report the calculating result. Lastly, major telecommunication companies are all listed now and it is possible to calculating it separately. We must continuously improve the estimating method and application of cost of capital and due to the fast growing of telecommunication industry. The process of determining the calculating method must be discussed and best method chosen.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.215-224
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• 2022

This study tried to examine the effect of cost asymmetry on food service companies and what characteristics affect such cost behavior. This study analyses cost behavior for cost of good sold, selling, general and administrative cost over the 2019-2020 period. Also, the rate of change in activity level was measured using change in sales. This study measures the behavior of cost using the research model of [1]. As a result of the analysis, it was found that food service companies exhibited cost asymmetric behavior as their sales level decreased. In addition, the cost asymmetric behavior has been strengthened since the corona virus, and the shorter the operating cycle. Lastly, the shorter the inventory holding period and the collection period of accounts receivable, which are components of the operating cycle, more strengthen asymmetric behavior of costs. These results seem to be meaningful in examining the cost structure and factors that may affect the structure for food service industry. This has approached the cost aspect of the situation faced by service food companies due to COVID-19, and it can be suggested that this pandemic can lead to cost reduction due to a decrease in corporate sales.