• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.104-112
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• 2019

This study has empirically analyzed how far corporate governance and CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility) fit are related based on prior research indicating that corporate governance is one of the primary factors. Previous research suggested that there may be different types of CSR fit, but there have been only limited number of empirical studies. This study filled this gap by categorizing CSR fit into three types (functional fit, target fit, and size fit) and investigating whether different types have different effects. We used data from the Corporate Social Responsibility White Paper for the 2009-2012 period, as well as the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS) index. As a result, we found that there is a negative (-) relationship between corporate governance and CSR fit(${\beta}=-.023$, p<.05). This can be interpreted that companies with weak corporate governance are attempting to increase the trust level of stakeholders and to reduce the uncertainty of CSR through high-CSR-fitted programs. The test results showed that functional fit and target fit both had negative (-) relationships with corporate governance (${\beta}=-.021$, p<.05; ${\beta}=-.016$, p<.1), while size fit did not have a significant correlation with corporate governance (${\beta}=-.005$, p=.511). The results of this study supported the previous studies' suggestions that CSR fit has different effects on each type, indicating a need for further reflection on the relationship between corporate governance and CSR fit. Also, the results of this study showed that corporations should take a strategic approach to operating CSR fit.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.53-61
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• 2018

Corporate governance has received massive attention in academic research nowadays due to several recent corporate failures. Inefficiency of corporate governance mechanisms have driven the minds of the researchers and the policy makers to look with more insights into this area. Board composition, as part of corporate governance mechanism, plays a significant role to achieve company's goals or objectives and ensure transparency and accountability. The objective of this study is to find out the efficiency of board composition through board size, independent directors and female directors on firm performance in the listed manufacturing firms of Bangladesh. In this study, a sample of 162 firm years are considered as the sample during the period of 2011 to 2016. This study finds that large board is the significant explanatory variable in improving firm performance. This study also shows that board independence and female directors have no significant association with firm performance which implies that instrument of corporate governance mechanism particularly board composition is very weak. This study recommends that code of corporate governance, specially the role of independent directors and female directors, should be reformed in the light of cultural and institutional context along with the effective enforcement.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.41
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• pp.293-319
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• 2009

This paper aims to find the differences between the trading company of Korea and Japan, by analyzing the development history of Corporate Governance and Internal Control System in Korea and Japan. And this paper studies about that on the legal site. A corporate governance has the tremendous influence on the value of the company, and a company's system of internal control has a key role in the management of risks that are significant to the fulfillment of its business objectives. On the other hand, many companies in the every industry have suffered several times from fatal loss or damage resulted from miss or malfeasance late in the 20th century. And the result of that, starting the Sarbanese-Oxley Act in America, a government established the financial laws and corporate laws in the a lot of countries including Korea and Japan. Japanese trading companies tend to be taking a serious view of internal control more than corporate governance against Korean trading companies. But this not means that Japanese are superior to Korean. The most important thing is the fact that Korean trading companies have to spend enough time finding suitable system of corporate governance and internal control as Japanese trading companies did.

• Journal of Korean Society of societal Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.69-79
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• 2008

Operational continuity is not a simple issue that can be solved by a Back-Up center or an alternate site. Strategic issues including law, standards, etc demand a new approach in terms of the operational continuity management (OCM). Also, it is necessary to develop a new framework of OCM governance as a part of the corporate governance. Experts from corporate governance insist that OCM can be included in the corporate operational control and so it is important to set up a strategy for OCM in the organization. This paper describes how OCM governance suggests two aspects of effectively controlling corporate risks in the viewpoint of corporate governance. First of all, the top corporate management develops the strategy of operational continuity with regard to the corporate governance. Secondly, there is the aspect of how to build up and manage the strategy of operational continuity in the corporations.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.127-137
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• 2022

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the quality of integrated reporting. Corporate governance includes internal (board size, board independence, and board diversity) and external (audit quality and enforcement) governance factors. This paper develops an index to capture the quality of integrated reporting by employing the completeness of information required by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). For an international sample, the paper manually collects 160 integrated reports along with internal and external governance factors and employs multivariate analyses to examine the association between these governance factors and the quality of integrated reporting. The empirical results suggest that firms with a larger board of directors, a larger proportion of female members on board, and located in countries with enforcement for integrated reporting requirements have a higher quality of integrated reporting. Our conclusions still hold after accounting for several conditions, including the industry-fixed and year-fixed effects. Together, these results suggest that both internal and external governance factors are important determinants for the quality of integrating reporting. These results have several theoretical and practical implications as they fulfill the absence of relevant studies on addressing the impact of internal and external corporate governance factors on the quality of integrated reporting.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.11 no.11
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• pp.5-11
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• 2013

Purpose - Considering corporate companies that are continually growing and bearing in mind the theory of agency, how confident can stakeholders be about their benefits in relation to managers' decisions? Previous research has indicated that the type of corporate governance can have an effective impact on companies' performance. The current study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Research Design, Data, and Methodology - Through use of the correlation coefficient, the results indicate a positive correlation among the percentage of common stock held by board members, the percentage of non-executive board members, and separation of the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and managing director. Results - Based on the return on assets index, only the correlation between the proportion of ownership of the managing director and financial investment company ownership is significant. Conclusion -Managers can potentially make decisions that benefit themselves but are detrimental to shareholders' interests. Corporate governance is a factor that can mitigate agency costs. Corporate governance comprises the laws, regulations, structures, processes, cultures, and systems that lead to the achievement of objectives such as accountability, transparency, justice, and stakeholders' rights.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.853-866
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• 2020

The purposes of this research were: 1) to investigate the effect of participatory management on financial information asymmetry, 2) to investigate the effect of corporate governance on financial information asymmetry, 3) to examine the influences of benefits incentives on financial information asymmetry, and 4) to test the mediating effects of benefits incentive that influences the relationship between participatory management, corporate governance, and financial information asymmetry. The research sample consisted of 388 Thai-listed firms. Data were collected through a survey questionnaire. Descriptive analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis, and Structural Equation Modeling were used for the data analysis. The results revealed: 1) participatory management and participation in evaluation had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 2) Corporate governance and the rights of shareholders had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 3) Benefits incentive was negatively associated with financial information asymmetry. 4) The model's influences of participatory management, corporate governance on the reduction of financial information asymmetry through benefits incentive as mediator fit the empirical data (Chi-square = 104.459, df = 84, p = 0.065, GFI = 0.967, RMSEA = 0.025). The variables in the model explained 78.00% and 4.70 % of the variance of benefits incentive and financial information asymmetry, respectively.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.893-902
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• 2021

The paper examines the impact of corporate governance (CG), on dividend policy (DP) of enterprises in Vietnam. The paper studies the impact of CG on DP of businesses listed on Vietnam's stock exchange in the period 2008-2018 with 2,937 observations. The data of these companies is collected from the financial statements of businesses and Vietstock data sets, as well as aggregated from the data published on some reputable securities websites. The study used GLS regression method for data collected at listed companies in Vietnam in the period of 2008-2018. The research results have found that CG, the chairman of the board of directors (BOD), and the managing director have a negative effect on the DP. Specifically, companies with strong BODs tend to pay low dividends. At the same time, research shows that factors such as profitability, financial leverage, firm size, and investment opportunities affect DP. This result underscores the importance of corporate governance (both internal and external) to the income distribution decision and provides policy implications for investors and company executives. The study finds solid evidence that alternative theory explains better the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy. Accordingly, companies with weak corporate governance will pay more dividends.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.325-332
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• 2022

This research aims to examine and assess how management methods, financial conditions, and corporate governance strategies affect stock returns. This study employs a quantitative approach with a population of 1968 firms with stock returns (return) and a sample of 225 companies with corporate governance practices in the manufacturing industry in Indonesia from 2013 to 2018. The findings of this study show that strategic management has a significant impact on stock return, financial condition, and corporate governance strategy. The findings of this study on debt strategy as a proxy for management strategy, debt default as a proxy for economic conditions, corporate governance strategy as a proxy for centralized ownership, and independent commissioners function as a mechanism of internal and external control in increasing stock return for investors all support increasing stock return for investors. The cost reduction strategy includes reducing operating costs unless the audit committee has not yet functioned as an internal control or requirement for a company to be listed with the Financial Services Authority on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.213-228
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• 2022

This paper investigates the association between key corporate governance characteristics and the performance of general insurance businesses listed on the Saudi stock exchange (TADAWUL). The methodology for the study is based on a pooled data collection for 11 Saudi general insurance companies from 2011 to 20. The linear regression model and the logarithm regression model are suggested to assess the relationship between performance and corporate governance characteristics. The dependent variable is firm performance measured using ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q. The independent variables are corporate governance variables consisting of a complete set of board and audit committee characteristics. Insurer-specific control variables are introduced. The empirical results reveal that the characteristics of corporate governance influence the performance of insurance companies. In particular, the board size, board's tenure, the proportion of independent directors in the board, audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency, and proportion of health insurance premiums have a positive impact. However, audit committee independence, size of the company, and proportion of reinsurance premiums have a negative impact on the performance of the Saudi general insurance companies. Finally, the empirical results indicated also that there is an unclear relationship between the performance and board meeting frequency, compensations of the Board, and the average age of the Board.