• 제목/요약/키워드: Cooperative game

검색결과 191건 처리시간 0.026초

고스트들의 협력전술에 의한 팩맨게임 난이도 제고 (Making Levels More Challenging with a Cooperative Strategy of Ghosts in Pac-Man)

  • 최태영;나현숙
    • 한국게임학회 논문지
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    • 제15권5호
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    • pp.89-98
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    • 2015
  • NPC, 특히 적 캐릭터들의 인공지능은 게임의 설계 단계에 있어 난이도를 조절하기 위해 핵심적인 요소이다. 지능적인 적들은 게임을 보다 도전적으로 만들 뿐 아니라, 동일한 게임 환경에서도 유저들에게 다양한 경험을 제공할 수 있다. 오늘날 대부분의 게임 유저들은 다수의 적들과 상호작용을 하기 때문에, 적 캐릭터들의 협업을 제어하는 것은 이전 어느 때보다 그 중요성이 크다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 팩맨 게임의 적 인공지능에 구현될 수 있는 A* 알고리즘 기반의 협력전술을 제안한다. 17명의 피실험자로부터 얻은 설문 결과는 제안된 협력전술을 따르는 적으로 구성된 레벨이, 기존 팩맨게임에서의 적들 또는 비협력적인 적들로 구성된 레벨들보다 더 어렵고 흥미로웠음을 보여준다.

Resource Allocation in Multiuser Multi-Carrier Cognitive Radio Network via Game and Supermarket Game Theory: Survey, Tutorial, and Open Research Directions

  • Abdul-Ghafoor, Omar B.;Ismail, Mahamod;Nordin, Rosdiadee;Shaat, Musbah M.R.
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제8권11호
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    • pp.3674-3710
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    • 2014
  • In this tutorial, we integrate the concept of cognitive radio technology into game theory and supermarket game theory to address the problem of resource allocation in multiuser multicarrier cognitive radio networks. In addition, multiuser multicarrier transmission technique is chosen as a candidate to study the resource allocation problem via game and supermarket game theory. This tutorial also includes various definitions, scenarios and examples related to (i) game theory (including both non-cooperative and cooperative games), (ii) supermarket game theory (including pricing, auction theory and oligopoly markets), and (iii) resource allocation in multicarrier techniques. Thus, interested readers can better understand the main tools that allow them to model the resource allocation problem in multicarrier networks via game and supermarket game theory. In this tutorial article, we first review the most fundamental concepts and architectures of CRNs and subsequently introduce the concepts of game theory, supermarket game theory and common solution to game models such as the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, a list of related studies is highlighted and compared in this tutorial.

중국의 1인 게임 방송의 선호 유형 분석 - 배틀그라운드 1인 게임 방송을 중심으로 (An Analysis of the Preference Type of Internet Personal Game Broadcasting in China - focused on Player-Unknown's Battlegrounds Streaming)

  • 서령;길태숙
    • 한국컴퓨터게임학회논문지
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    • 제31권4호
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    • pp.81-89
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    • 2018
  • 본 논문에서는 중국의 인터넷 1인 게임 방송의 유형을 분류하고, 중국 시청자의 1인 게임 방송에 대한 선호 유형을 살펴보았다. 팔로워 수를 기준으로, 팔로우 10만 명을 돌파한 상위권 100명의 크리에이터의 배틀그라운드 1인 게임방송을 대상으로 게임방송의 목적과 특징 요소인 게임플레이, 오락성, 시청자 참여정도를 기준으로 유형을 분류하였다. 그 결과 중국의 인터넷 1인 게임 방송의 유형은 프로게이머형(Progamer Type), 협동플레이형(Cooperative Playing Type), 스토리텔링형(Storytelling Type), 상호오락형(Reciprocal Entertainment Type)으로 분류되었다. 분석 대상인 배틀그라운드 1인 게임 방송에서 가장 높은 비율을 차지하고 있는 방송 유형은 38%의 비율을 나타낸 프로게이머형이다. 다음은 스토리텔링형이 25%를, 협동플레이형과 상호오락형이 각각 19%와 18%의 비율을 나타내었다. 상대적으로 실시간 시청자와의 소통이 낮은 유형인 프로게이머형과 스토리텔링형이 63%로 높은 비율을 차지하였는데, 이러한 결과가 의미하는 바는 보여주기 중심의 방송 매체의 특징이 1인 게임 방송의 제작과 기획에 영향을 주었기 때문이라고 해석된다. 그러나 게임과 1인 게임방송의 플랫폼이 갖는 상호소통적 특징은 점차 기존의 게임 방송 매체의 제작 관습에 변화를 줄 것으로 예측할 수 있다.

Differential Game Theoretic Approach for Distributed Dynamic Cooperative Power Control in Cognitive Radio Ad Hoc Networks

  • Zhang, Long;Huang, Wei;Wu, Qiwu;Cao, Wenjing
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제9권10호
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    • pp.3810-3830
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    • 2015
  • In this paper, we investigate the differential game theoretic approach for distributed dynamic cooperative power control in cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRANETs). First, a payoff function is defined by taking into consideration the tradeoff between the stock of accumulated power interference to the primary networks and the dynamic regulation of the transmit power of secondary users (SUs). Specifically, the payoff function not only reflects the tradeoff between the requirement for quickly finding the stable available spectrum opportunities and the need for better channel conditions, but also reveals the impact of the differentiated types of data traffic on the demand of transmission quality. Then the dynamic power control problem is modeled as a differential game model. Moreover, we convert the differential game model into a dynamic programming problem to obtain a set of optimal strategies of SUs under the condition of the grand coalition. A distributed dynamic cooperative power control algorithm is developed to dynamically adjust the transmit power of SUs under grand coalition. Finally, numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm for efficient power control in CRANETs.

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

  • Liao, Jianxin;Gong, Jun;Jiang, Shan;Li, Tonghong;Wang, Jingyu
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제10권5호
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    • pp.2286-2309
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    • 2016
  • Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

BCI 리듬게임을 위한 시청각 피드백 생성에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Generation Method of Visual-Auditory Feedback for BCI Rhythm Game)

  • 김철민;강경헌;김은석
    • 한국게임학회 논문지
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    • 제13권6호
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    • pp.15-26
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    • 2013
  • 최근 BCI(Brain Computer Interface) 기술의 발전과 함께 보급형 BCI 장치를 활용한 게임연구가 활발히 진행되고 있다. BCI 게임은 대부분 연구를 위한 실험적인 체험용 콘텐츠 형태로 개발되어 왔으며, 명령 패러다임에 있어서 BCI 게임 명령에 적합한 뇌파를 유도하는 방법에 대한 연구는 미흡하다. 본 연구에서는 음악의 리듬을 시청각적으로 표현하는 새로운 플레이 요소를 제공하는 BCI 리듬게임과 음악의 템포와 뇌파를 동기화 시켜 다양한 형태의 시청각 피드백을 생성하는 방법을 제안한다. 제안방법은 실험을 통해 게임조작에 필요로 하는 뇌파를 유도하여 게임점수를 향상시킬 수 있음을 확인하였다.

재고비용할당을 위한 비례적 접근법 (The Proportional Method for Inventory Cost Allocation)

  • 이동주
    • 산업경영시스템학회지
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    • 제41권4호
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    • pp.220-227
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    • 2018
  • The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.

SINR Pricing in Non Cooperative Power Control Game for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

  • Suman, Sanjay Kumar;Kumar, Dhananjay;Bhagyalakshmi, L.
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제8권7호
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    • pp.2281-2301
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    • 2014
  • In wireless ad hoc networks the nodes focus on achieving the maximum SINR for efficient data transmission. In order to achieve maximum SINR the nodes culminate in exhausting the battery power for successful transmissions. This in turn affects the successful transmission of the other nodes as the maximum transmission power opted by each node serves as a source of interference for the other nodes in the network. This paper models the choice of power for each node as a non cooperative game where the throughput of the network with respect to the consumption of power is formulated as a utility function. We propose an adaptive pricing scheme that encourages the nodes to use minimum transmission power to achieve target SINR at the Nash equilibrium and improve their net utility in multiuser scenario.

An Adaptive Smart Grid Management Scheme Based on the Coopetition Game Model

  • Kim, Sungwook
    • ETRI Journal
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    • 제36권1호
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    • pp.80-88
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    • 2014
  • Recently, the idea of the smart grid has been gaining significant attention and has become a hot research topic. The purpose of this paper is to present a novel smart grid management scheme that uses game theory principles. In our proposed scheme, power appliances in the smart grid adaptively form groups according to the non-cooperative hedonic game model. By exploiting multi-appliance diversity, appliances in each group are dynamically scheduled in a cooperative manner. For efficient smart grid management, the proposed coopetition game approach is dynamic and flexible to adaptively respond to current system conditions. The main feature is to maximize the overall system performance while satisfying the requirements of individual appliances. Simulation results indicate that our proposed scheme achieves higher energy efficiency and better system performance than other existing schemes.

A Bankruptcy Game for Optimize Caching Resource Allocation in Small Cell Networks

  • Zhang, Liying;Wang, Gang;Wang, Fuxiang
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제13권5호
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    • pp.2319-2337
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    • 2019
  • In this paper, we study the distributed cooperative caching for Internet content providers in a small cell of heterogeneous network (HetNet). A general framework based on bankruptcy game model is put forth for finding the optimal caching policy. In this framework, the small cell and different content providers are modeled as bankrupt company and players, respectively. By introducing strategic decisions into the bankruptcy game, we propose a caching value assessment algorithm based on analytic hierarchy process in the framework of bankruptcy game theory to optimize the caching strategy and increase cache hit ratio. Our analysis shows that resource utilization can be improved through cooperative sharing while considering content providers' satisfaction. When the cache value is measured by multiple factors, not just popularity, the cache hit rate for user access is also increased. Simulation results show that our approach can improve the cache hit rate while ensuring the fairness of the distribution.