• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.167-198
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• 2011

The Korean government recently announced greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions reduction target as 30% of 2020 business as usual (BAU) emission projection. As carbon emissions trading is widely used to achieve reductions in the emissions of pollutants, this study deals with the sectoral allocation of initial carbon emission permits in Korea. This research tests the effectiveness of a variety of allocation rules based on the bankruptcy problem in cooperative game theory and hybrid input-output tables which combines environmental statistics with input-output tables. The impact of initial emission permits allocation on economic growth is also analyzed through green growth accounting. According to the analysis result, annual GDP growth rate of Korea is expected to be 4.03%, 4.23%, and 3.67% under Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, and Constrained Equal Losses rules, respectively. These rates are approximately from 0.69% points to 0.13% points lower than the growth rate of 4.36% without compulsory $CO_2$ reduction. Thus, CEA rule is the most favorable in terms of GDP growth. This study confirms the importance of industry level study on the carbon reduction plan and initial carbon emission permits should reflect the characteristic of each industry.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.3-19
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• 2010

Anyang-cheon(stream) runs through southern metropolitan area of Seoul to Han-river in Korea. Due to fast growth of Seoul, the water quality and quantity problems in Anyang-cheon have occurred. To cope with the problems, the Integrated Watershed Management program for Anyang-cheon was adopted and a KRW 26.1 billion (USD 21.8 million) pilot project (construction of 4 facilities such as reservoir) is suggested for 4 sub-watersheds of Anyang-cheon, which cost will be shared by the 12 local governments (LG). Three cost division schemes are compared. By Scheme 1, if the cost is borne by the LG in a watershed where the facilities are constructed (no cost division scheme), the LG in I is to bear 0.58% of the total construction cost, LG in watershed II 29.54%, LG in IV 0%, LG in V 69.88%. In particular, LG in IV in this scheme bears no cost because no facility is constructed, even though watershed IV is the major beneficiary of the facility construction. Scheme 2 is to share the cost by length of streams in each sub-watershed and the suggested cost share for each sub-watershed is 13.76% by I, 7.34% by II, 45.87% by IV, and 33.03% by V. However, this cost division scheme is fair only under the false assumption that the bargaining powers of group of LGs are identical. To suggest a better and fair division rule, Shapley Value, a cooperative game solution, is used to suggest Scheme 3. In Scheme 3, Shapley Value measures the summation of average marginal contribution of each player in all possible coalitions as cost division scheme and is known to provide a fair division considering bargaining power. In the context of Anyang-cheon, LGs in upper stream have superior bargaining position. The result suggests the cost division is fair under Scheme 3, when the cost shares are 0.29% by I, 14.77% by II, 50% by IV, and 34.94% by V, respectively.