• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

한국은 과거처럼 국제관계의 예속자가 아니라 명실상부한 중견국으로서, 북한의 핵과 재래전 도발위협을 극복하고 동북아지역의 평화를 유지하는 '균형자' 역할을 할 수 있도록 군사력을 건설해야 한다. 군사력 건설을 통해 다양한 안보위협에 대한 억제력 발휘가 가능하다. 군사적 억제력 발휘를 위해 첫 번째로 '선제적 억제'(deterrence by preemptive)와 '응징적 억제'(deterrence by punishment)는 현재와 미래의 위협에 대비하여 '감시정찰체계와 지휘통제체계'(C41SR)를 공통전력으로 공격무기체계를 결합한 '공격체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 두 번째로 '거부적 억제'(deterrence by denial)는 공통전력과 방어무기체계를 결합한 '방어체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 마지막으로 자주적으로 첨단전력을 개발하기 위해서는 기존의 방위산업과 연구개발 역량을 통합하여 '인프라 축'을 구축해야 한다. 우리는 미래 한국군의 군사력을 건설함에 있어서 정부의 균형자 역할에 대한 국가적 비젼, 이에 대한 국민적 합의를 토대로 본고에서 제시한 군사력 건설 모형에 따른 일관성 있는 정책적인 노력과 신념이 반드시 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• 해양안보
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.83-107
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• 2023

인도-태평양 국가인 대한민국에게 이 지역의 안정과 번영은 국가의 생존과 이익에 직결된다. 현재 인태지역은 미국과 중국의 전략적 경쟁으로 안보환경이 불안정하며, 초국가· 비전통적 위협도 상존하고 있어, 소자/다자 간 공동의 대응을 요구하고 있다. 이에 따라 미국, 일본, ASEAN 및 역외의 EU, NATO까지 자체 인태전략을 발표하며, 이 지역 현안에 개입하고자 노력 중이다. 한국도 2022년 12월 28일, 독자적인 인태전략을 공개하였는데, 이는 이전 신남방정책의 균형외교(전략적 모호성)를 벗어나, 광범위한 인태지역의 현안에 적극적으로 개입·기여하겠다는 의미로 받아들여진다. 이제 해군은 정부의 인태전략을 뒷받침하기 위해 준비해야 한다. 첫째, 역내 안보현안 관련 소자/다자 간 군사협력을 강화하고, 둘째, 이 협력의 메시지를 전파하기 위해 해군력 현시, 연합훈련 등 실제 전력을 운용하여 잠재적 위협에 대해 거부적 억제를 달성해야 한다. 셋째, 인태지역에 상존하는 초국가·비전통적 위협에 대응하는 한편, 선진국으로 발돋움한 한국의 해군으로서, 개발도상국의 해양력 증강을 지원하는 기여 외교도 실시해야 할 것이다. 이러한 역할을 수행함에 있어, 해군 고유의 작전특성(기동성, 융통성, 지속성, 현시성, 투사성)이 발휘될 것이며, 이를 구현하기 위해 해군 내·외부 작전환경(SWOT)을 분석하고, 발전방안을 제시하였다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

이 논문의 기본목표는 Bain 이래 논란의 대상이 되어 온 기존기업들에 의한 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)의 형성이 일반적으로 가능한가, 가능하다면 어떠한 메커니즘을 통해 형성되는 가를 밝히고, 진입제한가격이론(進入制限價格理論)이 한국경제에 갖는 의의를 찾아보는데 있다, 이 논문에서 밝혀질 주요결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 다수의 기존기업(旣存企業)이 각자의 이윤극대화(利潤極大化)를 추구하며 카르텔을 형성하지 않는 때에도 기존기업(旣存企業)과 잠재적(潛在的) 신규기업간(新規企業間)에 정보의 불균형이 존재하는 경우 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)이 채택될 가능성이 있다. 둘째, 이러한 과점기업(寡占企業)들에 의한 진입제한가격형성(進入制限價格形成)은 암묵적 담합의 새로운 형태로 해석할 수 있다. 셋째, 진입제한가격형성(進入制限價格形成)은 각종 회계자료(會計資料)가 공표되지 않을 경우에 가능하다. 넷째, 기존기업(旣存企業)의 수(數)가 증가하여 산업(産業)이 완전경쟁산업(完全競爭産業)에 접근해 감에 따라 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)이 형성될 가능성은 사라지게 된다.