• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.87-109
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• 2020

Currently, thanks to the major stride made in developing wired and wireless communication technology, a variety of IT services are available on land. This trend is leading to an increasing demand for IT services to vessels on the water as well. And it is expected that the request for various IT services such as two-way digital data transmission, Web, APP, etc. is on the rise to the extent that they are available on land. However, while a high-speed information communication network is easily accessible on land because it is based upon a fixed infrastructure like an AP and a base station, it is not the case on the water. As a result, a radio communication network-based voice communication service is usually used at sea. To solve this problem, an additional frequency for digital data exchange was allocated, and a ship ad-hoc network (SANET) was proposed that can be utilized by using this frequency. Instead of satellite communication that costs a lot in installation and usage, SANET was developed to provide various IT services to ships based on IP in the sea. Connectivity between land base stations and ships is important in the SANET. To have this connection, a ship must be a member of the network with its IP address assigned. This paper proposes a SANET-CC protocol that allows ships to be assigned their own IP address. SANET-CC propagates several non-overlapping IP addresses through the entire network from land base stations to ships in the form of the tree. Ships allocate their own IP addresses through the exchange of simple requests and response messages with land base stations or M-ships that can allocate IP addresses. Therefore, SANET-CC can eliminate the IP collision prevention (Duplicate Address Detection) process and the process of network separation or integration caused by the movement of the ship. Various simulations were performed to verify the applicability of this protocol to SANET. The outcome of such simulations shows us the following. First, using SANET-CC, about 91% of the ships in the network were able to receive IP addresses under any circumstances. It is 6% higher than the existing studies. And it suggests that if variables are adjusted to each port's environment, it may show further improved results. Second, this work shows us that it takes all vessels an average of 10 seconds to receive IP addresses regardless of conditions. It represents a 50% decrease in time compared to the average of 20 seconds in the previous study. Also Besides, taking it into account that when existing studies were on 50 to 200 vessels, this study on 100 to 400 vessels, the efficiency can be much higher. Third, existing studies have not been able to derive optimal values according to variables. This is because it does not have a consistent pattern depending on the variable. This means that optimal variables values cannot be set for each port under diverse environments. This paper, however, shows us that the result values from the variables exhibit a consistent pattern. This is significant in that it can be applied to each port by adjusting the variable values. It was also confirmed that regardless of the number of ships, the IP allocation ratio was the most efficient at about 96 percent if the waiting time after the IP request was 75ms, and that the tree structure could maintain a stable network configuration when the number of IPs was over 30000. Fourth, this study can be used to design a network for supporting intelligent maritime control systems and services offshore, instead of satellite communication. And if LTE-M is set up, it is possible to use it for various intelligent services.