• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.63-92
• /
• 2019

What motivates split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems, where voters choose one party in district races and another party on the party list ballot? While much of the literature assumes strategic intent, three aspects commonly are overlooked: the competitiveness of district races, the presence of a district candidate from one's preferred party, and whether voters know the electoral threshold for party list seats. Furthermore, few studies disaggregate types of split-ticket voting (e.g. not voting for one's preferred party in a district vs. party list). Taiwan provides an intriguing case study for analysis, not only as a relatively new adopter of a mixed system, but also the presence of additional conditions that would encourage at least the consideration of a split ticket. Using survey data from the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) after the Taiwan's 2016 Legislative Yuan election, this analysis finds that knowing the threshold, the winner's margin, and the placement of a district candidate from one's preferred party all influence split-ticket voting among those with a partisan preference. However, closer inspection identifies a distinction between defecting from the district versus the party list. Evidence shows that district competitiveness and candidate placement influences defection from the district candidate, while the electoral threshold influences defection from the party list. The results add to our understanding of strategic and non-strategic incentives in mixed systems.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.24 no.1
• /
• pp.203-239
• /
• 2018

Responsible government can be achieved when social cleavages are institutionalized via political competition and social interests are represented by responsible parties. This paper aims to investigate the factors that determine welfare expenditures in Korean local governments by analyzing partisanship and political competition factors simultaneously in the same model. This paper also argues that the relationship between the political factors and welfare expenditures in local governments is not linearly increasing as the previous studies claim. This paper examines the welfare expenditures in Korean municipality-level local governments in 2007, 2011, and 2015. The primary findings are: 1) the partisanship of the head of local government and the party distribution of local assembly members have meaningful effect on the welfare expenditures and the divided governments do not show significantly different effect on welfare expenditures from unified governments, which is contrary to the extant studies, 2) the partisan effects of the head and the local assembly vary according to the levels of municipalities (Gu, Gun, and city), mainly due to the difference in types of revenues and expenditures and 3) the relationship between seats shares of progressive parties in local assembly and the welfare expenditure is not linearly increasing one. The effect of seats shares of progressive parties dramatically begins to increase when the seats shares are in 40%-60%. With these findings, this paper highlights the conservative nature of head of local governments with Hannara party (or Saenuri Party), the conservative leaning of independent candidates, and the conservative orientation of local assemblies in the regions dominated by Democratic Party (and its equivalents).

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.472-485
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze debt zeroing policy process of Yong-in city based on the Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework in order to contribute to strengthening financial capacity and competitiveness of local governments. This study focused on the Yong-in case because the city had a local debt of about KRW 800 billion as of 2012, but it completed the debt repayment in early 2017. The results are as follows. First, policy problem streams are the perception of Yongin City's debt indicator, the failure of the LRT project, and the failure of sale of buildinglots of Yukbuk district. Second, in the political stream, there have been the election of new governors, cooperation of local administration and citizens like budget cut. Third, policy alternative streams are the reduction of large-scale investment projects, the expansion of revenues through the sale of idle shared properties, the increase of tax revenues, and the activation of light rail. As the each streams flowed independently, the window of policy change opened by the revitalization of the real estate market and the sale of buildinglots of Yukbuk distric and combined with other policy factors such as the activation of the light rail. In this process, the role of the policy entrepreneurs such as negotiation and persuasion of the related institutions influenced achieving tight fiscal policy. As a result of this policy output, Yongin City achieved zero debt. This study suggests that it is necessary not only the importance of the role of policy entrepreneurs but also of the administrative and citizen cooperation and the institutional complement such as a large scale of the investment review system.