• Title/Summary/Keyword: Competitively

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A feasibility of coagulation as post-treatment of the anaerobic fluidized bed reactor (AFBR) treating domestic wastewater (도시하수 처리 혐기성 유동상 반응조의 후속공정으로서 화학응집의 가능성 평가)

  • Yang, Seung Yong;Bae, Jae Ho
    • Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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    • v.28 no.6
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    • pp.623-634
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    • 2014
  • This study examined a feasibility of coagulation as post-treatment to remove sulfide and phosphorus for the effluent of anaerobic fluidized bed reactor (AFBR) treating domestic wastewater. Removal efficiencies of sulfide, phosphorus and COD by coagulation were not affected by pH in the range of 5.9 to 7.2. Alkalinity requirement could be estimated by the amount of $Fe^{3+}$ to form $Fe(OH)_{3(S)}$ and to remove sulfide and phosphorus. At coagulant aid dosage of 2 mg/L, anionic polymer showed best results regarding size and settleability of flocs. Sulfide removal for the AFBR effluent at the $Fe^{3+}/S^{2-}$ ratio of 0.64, close to the theoretical value of 0.67 found with a synthetic wastewater, was only 75.2%. One of the reasons for this high $Fe^{3+}/S^{2-}$ ratio requirement is that the AFBR effluent contains sulfide, phosphorus, hydroxide and bicarbonate which can react with $Fe^{3+}$ competitively. Concentrations of sulfide and phosphorous reduced to below 0.1 and 0.5 mg/L, respectively, at the $Fe^{3+}/S^{2-}$ ratio of 2.0. Average effluent COD of 80 mg/L, mostly soluble COD, was obtained at the dosage 50 mg $Fe^{3+}/L$ ($Fe^{3+}/S^{2-}$ ratio of 2.0) with corresponding COD removal of 55%. For better removal of COD, soluble COD removal at the AFBR should be enhanced. Coagulation with $Fe^{3+}$ removed sulfide, phosphorus and COD simultaneously in the AFBR effluent, and thus could be an alternative process for the conventional wastewater treatment processes where relatively high quality effluent is not required.

A Study on the Hongch'ŏn Poetry Society : Focused on the Linked Verses of the Hongch'ŏn Poetry Society (홍천사(紅泉社)의 결성과 시세계 - 연구시(聯句詩)를 중심으로 -)

  • Oh, Bo-ra
    • (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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    • no.66
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    • pp.35-73
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    • 2017
  • The aim of this article is to analyze the feature of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society(紅泉社). The leader of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society was Yi Mansu(李晩秀), and the members of that were Yi Naksu(李洛秀), Sin Chin(申縉) Sin Chak(申綽) Sin $Hy{\breve{o}}n$(申絢) Pak Chongu(朴宗羽) $Ch{\breve{o}}ng$ Sukwi(鄭遂龜) $Kw{\breve{o}}n$ Sik(權?) Kim Kyeon(金啓溫). They organized the poetry society at Gi-dae(企臺) of Seoul. The poems of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society were included in "$K{\breve{u}}gw{\breve{o}}n$ yugo(?園遺稿)", a collection of Yi Mansu's works. The $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society was maintained for three years, from 1817 to 1820. The members of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society gathered at Kidae(企臺) and wrote poems together, such as the linked verses(聯句), divisions of rime(分 韻), replying rhyming verses(次韻) and so on. This article especially analyzed the linked verses of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society. The following is a summary of characteristics in the linked verses of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society. First, the members of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society showed their poetic genius by writing the linked verses. They competitively designed unique words and techniques to exhibit their poetic genius. Especially, their poetic genius were exposed in $y{\breve{o}}n^{\prime}gu$(放雲樓聯句)>, modeling <$S{\breve{o}}ngnam$ $y{\breve{o}}n^{\prime}gu$(城南聯句)>'s style. The members of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society had remarkable literary attainments. Second, the members of the $Hongch^{\prime}{\breve{o}}n$ poetry society promoted friendship by writing the linked verses. They expressed the pleasure of having a poetry party in the linked verses. Their linked verses are elegance. In addition, their poems are full of the pride as officials. And they were glad that they lived in the happy era. So they extoled the king's virtue in their linked verses.

Interleukin 1 Receptor Antagonist(IL-1ra) Gene Polymorphism in Children with Henoch-$Sch{\ddot{o}}nlein$ Purpura Nephritis (Henoch-$Sch{\ddot{o}}nlein$ Purpura 신염에서 Interleukin 1 Receptor Antagonist(IL-1ra) 유전자 다형성)

  • Hwang, Phil-Kyung;Lee, Jeong-Nye;Chung, Woo-Yeong
    • Childhood Kidney Diseases
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    • v.9 no.2
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    • pp.175-182
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    • 2005
  • Purpose : Interleukin 1 receptor antagonist(IL-1ra) is an endogenous antiinflammatory agent that binds to IL-1 receptor and thus competitively inhibits the binding of IL-1$\alpha$ and IL-1$\beta$. Allele 2 in association with various autoimmune diseases has been reported. In order to evaluate the influence of IL-1ra gene VNTR polymorphism on the susceptibility to HSP and its possible association with disease severity, manifested by severe renal involvement and renal sequelae, we studied the incidence of carriage rate and allele frequency of the 2 repeats of IL-1ra allele 2($IL1RN^{*}2$) of the IL-1ra gene in children with HSP with and without renal involvement. Methods : The IL-1ra gene polymorphisms were determined in children with HSP with(n=40) or without nephritis(n=34) who had been diagnosed at Busan Paik Hospital and the control groups(n=163). Gene polymorphism was identified by PCR amplification of the genomic DNA. Results : The allelic frequency and carriage rate of $IL1RN^{*}1$ were found most frequently in patients with HSP and in controls. The allelic frequency of $IL1RN^{*}2$ was higher in patients with HSP compared to that of controls($4.7\%\;vs.\;2.5\%$, P=0.794). The carriage rate of $IL1RN^{*}2$ was higher In patients with HSP compared to that of controls($8.1\%\;vs.\;6.8\%$, P=0.916). The allelic frequency of $IL1RN^{*}2$ was higher in patients with HSP nephritis compared to that of HSP($5.3\%\;vs.\;2.9\%$, P=0.356). The carriage rate of $IL1RN^{*}2$ was higher in Patients with HSP nephritis compared to that of HSP($10.0\%\;vs.\;5.9\%$, P=0.523). Among 13 patients with heavy proteinuria(>1.0 g), 11 had $IL1RN^{*}1$, 1 had $IL1RN^{*}2$ and the others had $IL1RN^{*}4$. At the time of last follow up 4 patients had sustained proteinuria and their genotype was $IL1RN^{*}1$. Conclusion : The allelic frequency and carriage rate of $IL1RN^{*}1$ were found most frequently in patients with HSP and in controls. Our study suggests that the carriage rate and allele frequency of the 2-repeats of IL-1lra allele 2($IL1RN^{*}2$) of the IL-1ra gene may not be associated with susceptibility and severity of renal involvement in children with HSP (J Korean Soc Pediatr Nephrol 2005;9:175-182)

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The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea (경제력집중(經濟力集中) : 기본시각(基本視角)과 정책방향(政策方向))

  • Lee, Kyu-uck
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.31-68
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    • 1990
  • The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

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