• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.108-152
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• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.8
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• pp.403-408
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• 2002

As the electricity industry undergoes a process of fundamental restructuring, horizontal market power appears as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels. In models for imperfect competition under the consideration of the transmission constraints, the Nash equilibrium has the form of a mixed strategy. In this paper, the models for analyzing imperfect competition are compared using the solution of pure and mixed equilibria. The relation between market power and the capacity of a transmission line is investigated by imperfect competition analysis methods: Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Curve model.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.132
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• pp.29-39
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• 2007

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.133-151
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• 2005

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the international competition power between Korean ports and Chinese ports according to the port efficiency scores of DEA(Data Envelopment Analysis) by newly introducing the priority vector of AHP(Analytic Hierarchy Process) to the DEA method. Empirical analysis shows the followings: First, there was not big changes of DEA rankings when we use the input-oriented CCR and BCC models after introducing the AHP priority vectors to the input variables. Yantian Port's competition power was declined, but that of Busan Port was up in the BCC model. Second, there was some changes of DEA rankings when we use the output-oriented CCR and BCC models after introducing the AHP priority vectors to the output variables. Rankings of Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai Ports were up. But Shekou, Yantian Ports showed the declined ranking position in the CCR model. In the BBC model, rankings of Shanghai and Busan Ports were up. But those of Shekou and Yantian Ports were declined. The main policy implication based on the findings of this study is that The Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries in Korea and China should introduce AHP and DEA approaches when they measure the international competition power by using the porrt efficiency scores of DEA.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.127-145
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• 2022

Vaccine diplomacy is a manifestation of competition for political influence among great powers amidst the Covid-19 pandemic's blatant illustration of ineluctable interdependency across the global community. The reinforcement of trends bolstering global polity construction intensify concomitantly with nationalist populist value and attitude expressions increasing political polarization. The interdependency graphically illustrated in the Cold War-era's mutual assured destruction incentivized competition into indirect competitive intervention in the internal politics of third actors. Indirect international influence contestations included extended, de facto challenge competitions to generate soft power on behalf of the victor, e.g., the space race. The Covid-19 pandemic has intensified this competition to offer alternative development models while intense domestic political polarization undermines the mobilizational capacities for achieving sustainable development. In contrast to multinational and multiethnic states, nation states have an inherent mobilizational advantage because of the enhanced control capabilities available to the authorities without emphasizing coercion. Control through Gramscian hegemonic mechanisms is more readily feasible in nation states through the greater feasibility of commodification of social relations by states authorities regulating and channeling social competition to encourage social mobility and creativity. The regulation of the so-called private sector serves to manage and contain social competition while channeling it to develop the institutional capacities for control and allocation of developing societal human resources. It enhances developed state control mechanisms and international influence capacities. The appeal of offers of aid and assistance to the so-called developing world becomes ever more urgent amidst Anthropocene crises including its most recent, current Covid-19 pandemic disaster.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• Journal of Power Electronics
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.1139-1146
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• 2014

Digital signal processor (DSP) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) based concentrated control systems are designed for implementing CPS-SPWM strategies. The self-defined universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) protocol is used for communication between a master controller and an individual module controller via high speed links. Aimed at undesired pulse competition, this paper analyzes its generation mechanism and presents a new method for eliminating competition pulses with no time delay. Finally, the proposed concentrated controller is applied to a 10kV/10MVar distribution static synchronous compensator (DSTATCOM) industrial prototype. Experimental results show the accuracy and reliability of the concentrated controller, and verify the superiority of the proposed elimination method for competition pulses.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.128
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• pp.66-69
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• 2006

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.35-52
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• 2004

The purpose of this paper is to measure the competition power of administration service in Korean Seaports by using the scores of customer satisfaction for administration service investigated yearly from 2000 to 2003 by Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries. And also, this paper shows the competition power of Korean seaports in terms of efficiency by using DEA(data envelopment analysis) method after measuring the change of productive efficiency scores subject to including and excluding the scores of customer satisfaction for administration service as output variable. The empirical main results of this paper are as follows: First, the efficiency scores of the Ports of Donghae, Gunsan, Jeju, Yeosu, Masan, and Pohang have worsened if the customer satisfaction score is excluded as output variable. Therefore these ports have been influenced by the score of customer satisfaction more positively. Second, the changes of the ranking order by measuring the average efficiency scores of each ports subject to including and excluding the scores of customer satisfaction for administration service as output variable are as follows: Busan(9-->7), Incheon(6-->6), Yeosu(1-->4), Gwangyang(4-->3), Masan (10-->9), Ulsan(5-->5), Donghae(8-->11), Gusan(12-->12), Mogpo(3-->2), Pohang(11-->10), Jeju(7-->8), Daesan(2-->1).

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.3-21
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• 2010

By the significant structural change in 1999, a partial privatization has occurred in Korean fossil-fuel power generation sector. Under the current price scheme wholesale electricity price is dependent on output size, and hence, may not satisfy the assumption of price-taking producers. The purpose of our study is constructing the productivity change measurements of Korean power generation sector taking into account possibly imperfect competition and variable returns to scale. Our approach based on Harrison (1994) and Levinsohn (1993) derives the plant-level productivity measurements of the period between 2001 and 2007, as well as the measurements of mark-ups and returns to scale. It is shown that the mark-up size is dependent on the plants' fuel type and is decreasing over time. Allowing for imperfect competition and variable returns to scale adjusts the productivity measurements substantially.