• Title/Summary/Keyword: Cold War era

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The Path Formation of Thailand's Electricity/Energy Regime and Sustainability Assessment (태국 전력/에너지 체제의 경로 형성과 지속가능성 평가)

  • EOM, Eun Hui;SHIN, Dong Hyuk
    • The Southeast Asian review
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    • v.27 no.4
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    • pp.1-40
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    • 2017
  • This study aims to examine the electricity/energy regime of Thailand, the largest energy-hungry country in the Mekong region. This study examined how the electricity/energy regime of Thailand has been shaped and changed up to the present, not only at the national level but also at the sub-regional level covering the Mekong region. Meanwhile, according to the Paris Agreement in 2015, which will get in to effect from 2020, developing countries as well as developed countries have been given voluntary responsibilities and reduction obligations in response to global climate change. Under the post 2020 Climate Change Regime, Thailand also needs to revise its existing electricity/energy policy. We reviewed the recent energy policy of Thailand and evaluated the possibility of transition to a sustainable energy system based on Energy Trilemma's analysis framework. And we examined the roles and impacts of the Thai civil society on the national power and energy planning as well as in the future climate change policy. As a result of the analysis, it can be seen that Thailand's electricity/energy regime has grown rapidly through the support of the West countries under the Cold War era. In particular, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand(EGAT) played the key role in Thailand's energy policy. In addition, Thailand's geopolitical location and relatively high economic level compared to neighboring countries will continue to be of importance in the future construction of power grids in the region. Meanwhile, in the frame of Energy Trilemma, Thailand has still been vulnerable to environmental sustainability. Thai NGOs have resisted to as well as collaborated with the government to influence the existing electricity/energy policy in the various dimensions but their influence has weakened considerably since the coup in 2014. In conclusion, this study suggests to cooperate with government as well as civil society for sustainable energy transformation of Thailand and Mekong region.

The Genealogy of Forbidden Sound -Political Aesthetics of Ambiguity in the Criticism of Japanese Style in Korean Society of the 1960s (일본적인 것, 혹은 금지된 '소리'의 계보 -한일국교정상화 성립기 '왜색(倭色)' 비판담론과 양의성의 정치미학)

  • Jeong, Chang-Hoon
    • Journal of Popular Narrative
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.349-392
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    • 2019
  • In the 1960s of Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan led to a sense of a vigorous anxiety and fear that "Japan will once again come to the Korean peninsula". As a reaction to this, the discourse on the criticism of 'Japanese Style' strongly emerged. If the prior discourse of criticism was to express the national antipathy toward the colonial remnants that had not yet been disposed of, the critical discourse of the 1960s was the wariness of the newly created 'Japanese Style' in popular culture, and to grasp it as a symptomatic phenomenon that 'evil-minded Japan' was revealed. Thus, this new logic of criticism of the 'Japanese Style' had a qualitative difference from the existing ones. It was accompanied by a willingness to inspect and censor the 'masses' that grew up as consumers of transnational 'mass culture' that flowed and chained in the geopolitical order under the Cold War system. Therefore, the topology of 'popular things=Japanese things=consuming things' reveals the paradox of moral demands that existed within Korean society in the 1960s. This was to solidify the divisive circulation structure that caused them to avoid direct contact with the other called 'Japan', but at the same time, get as close to it as ever. It is a repetitive obsession that pushes the other to another side through the moral segregation that strictly draws a line of demarcation between oneself and the other, but on the other hand is attracted to the object and pulls it back to its side. This paper intends to listen to the different voices that have arisen in the repetitive obsession to understand the significance of the dissonance that has been repeated in the contemporary era. This will be an examination of the paradoxical object of Japan that has been repeatedly asked to build the internal control principle of Korean society, or to hide the oppressive and violent side of the power, and that can neither be accepted nor destroyed completely as part of oneself.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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