• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제20권2호
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• pp.210-236
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• 2021

China's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure connectivity and other projects are presented in much of the discourse as a grand strategy to trap developing nations in debt, to exert asymmetric power and construct a new world economic order. The asymmetric relationship between China and Myanmar might therefore be expected to generate a range of political risks for stakeholders. Myanmar itself presents a "perfect storm" of problems, with dysfunctional governance, civil conflict, under-development and growing economic dependence on China. The Kyaukphyu port project and associated Special Economic Zone in Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state is investigated as a case study of risks on the Belt and Road. While worst case fears China might seize military control of the port appear unlikely, at least in current conditions, empirical observation indicates the complexity on the ground generates an array of other risks - as well as opportunities, should conditions allow. Further, despite challenges and constrained capacity, Myanmar governments have demonstrated agency, including by re-negotiating control and costs of the Kyaukphyu project. The case underlines that conditions are more complicated than simply China's asymmetric power. A sceptical approach is taken to normative discourses in order to build inductive understanding of how stakeholders and local experts perceive dynamics underway. A political risk approach is deployed to develop a framework to identify, analyse and assess risks for actors in relation to the Kyaukphyu project. The research findings are presented on an interim basis, given current constraints on field interviews due to the current crisis.

• 해양안보
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.1-35
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• 2023

본 연구는 중국해군이 진행 중인 공세적 서해 진출 전략을 목표, 방법, 수단 차원에서 분석하여 우리해군의 대응전략 발전방향을 제시하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 분석결과 중국해군의 공세적 서해 진출전략은 목표 차원에서 미-중 경쟁 간 해양권익 수호 및 해양강국을 달성하기 위한 대전략과 연계하여 진행 중 있으며, 방법 차원에서 평상시 '진입 일상화'와 '관할권 행사'를 통해 국제사회가 서해를 중국의 내해(內海)로 인식하는 기반을 조성하며, 유사시는 항모전단의 압도적 선제공격 능력을 바탕으로 우리나라의 해양교통로를 차단하여 단시간 내 서해 해양통제권 확보를 시도할 것이라 예측된다. 수단 차원에서 항모전단 건설 가속화 및 원거리 미사일 교전능력을 향상시키고 있다. 이에 대응하는 한국해군 대응전략 발전방향으로 첫째 한국형 인도-태평양 전략과 연계한 국가 해양안보전략 수립 및 발전, 둘째 서해 중간선 이동(以東) 해역에 대한 효과적이 경비작전 개념 발전, 셋째 생존성과 치명성 강화를 위한 전투 수행개념 발전 및 능력 구축을 제시한다.

• 무역학회지
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• 제41권3호
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• pp.109-133
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• 2016

유라시아의 지역적 중요성으로 인하여 주요 국가들이 유라시아와 관련된 국가대전략을 수립하고 있는데 그 대표적인 것이 중국의 일대일로전략과 한국의 유라시아 이니셔티브라고 할 수 있다. 한국의 유라시아 이니셔티브는 동북아 물류중심지화 전략이후에 수립된 박근혜정부의 창조경제기반 국가대전략으로서 유라시아의 미래를 위하여 역내국가들과 함께 하나의 대륙, 창조의 대륙, 평화의 대륙을 만드는 것을 목표로 하고 있다. 이러한 유라시아 이니셔티브에서 중요한 사업의 하나가 물류운송 네트워크 구축사업인데 물류운송 네트워크 구축사업은 유라시아 친선특급, 나진-하산 물류사업, 북극항로개척, 철도운송 네트워크로 살펴볼 수 있다. 본 논문은 유라시아 이니셔티브상의 철도운송네트워크 구축사업을 포함하여 유라시아 익스프레스 사업의 현황을 살펴보고 효율화방안을 모색함으로써 유라시아 물류 네트워크의 조기 구축에 기여함을 그 연구목적으로 한다.

• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.29-59
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• 2001

This paper aims to describe port competition in East Asia and the Korean government's port strategy. In doing so, the paper provides an overview of global changes in international trade, the shipping industry and the port business. It also delineates the status of port competition in the region. Particular examples are taken from the competition among the ports of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, as well as those of Pusan and Kwangyang, Kaohsiung, Kobe, and Shanghai and Yantian. The port competition in East Asia is reviewed and classified in two groups: north-tier competition among traditional major players, such as Kobe and Pusan, and dark horses such as Shanghai, Kwangyang and perhaps Yokohama; and south-tier competition among the three traditionally big players Kaohsiung, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the relative newcomers of Yantian in China, and Tanjung Pelepas In Malaysia. Due to the enlarging of ships and expansion of port activities, the boundary between the two tier frontiers breakdown, or they may even merge, into one grand frontier, in the foreseeable future. Although it appears that Asian ports are not being very aggressive in preparing for the future of mega-carrier in their plans, it is true that China, Korea and Taiwan are moving full steam ahead in comprehensively developing their container ports on a large scale. It therefore seems to be the perfect time for rival ports to explore a port alliance strategy to fight against the trend toward alliances between of many shipping lines.

• 자원환경지질
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• 제53권1호
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• pp.111-120
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• 2020

괄목할만한 과학기술성과는 이종분야간 초융합 또는 융합의 융합에서 주로 나타나고 있으며, 기술경쟁국들은 고위험 고수익 연구생태계를 추진하고 있다. 구글은 실패를 두려워하지 않는 관점에서 수많은 새로운 도전을 수행하고 있고, 미국 고등연구계획국(DARPA)의 혁신적인 연구추진은 지금까지 인터넷, GPS, 반도체, 마우스, 자율주행차, 드론 등과 같은 획기적인 성과물을 만들었다. 중국은 달기지 개척, 세계 최대 규모의 핵융합 에너지와 초대형 입자가속기 프로젝트를 추진 중이며, 일본도 '문샷형 기술개발연구제도'를 착수하여 파괴적 혁신창출을 추진하려 한다. 우리나라도 글로벌 과학난제의 도전과 해결을 위해 신규 연구프로그램을 준비하고 있다. 따라서 지질자원기술 연구자가 중심이 되어 도전하고 해결하며 공감할 수 있는 과학난제의 주제 발굴과 이들 주제에 관한 사전연구 등이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 신진연구자 중심의 장기 창의연구사업, 우수한 과제책임자 선정, 선행연구나 참고문헌도 없는 획기적 주제 도출, 과제제안절차 간소화, 아이디어 중점 선정시스템 혁신, 컨퍼런스 형태의 집단지성에 의한 결과평가 등이 필요하다고 사료된다.