• Strategy21
• /
• 통권33호
• /
• pp.37-64
• /
• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• East Asian Economic Review
• /
• 제26권1호
• /
• pp.49-91
• /
• 2022

Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in Africa and public diplomacy has emerged as the vital tool being used to cultivate these relations. China has been leading in pursuing stronger economic partnership with Africa while middle powers such as Korea are also intensifying engagement with the continent. While previous studies have analyzed the implications of China's activities in Africa on advanced powers, none has examined them from the paradigm of middle powers. This study fills this gap by assessing China's activities in Africa, their economic engagement and implications for Korea's interest in Africa. The analysis is qualitative based on secondary data from various sources and literature. The study shows that China's public diplomacy strategy involves a high degree of innovation and has evolved to encompass new tools and audiences. China has institutionalized a cooperative model that permeates many aspects of governance institutions in Africa, enabling it to strengthen their relations. This could also be helping China to adjust faster leadership transitions in Africa. Whereas the US is still the most influential country in Africa, China is influential in economic policies and has outstripped the US in infrastructure diplomacy. This could be because African policy makers align more with China's economic model than the US' mainstream economics. Chinese aid to Africa has been diversified to social sectors that are more responsive to the needs of Africa. Trade and investment relations between China and Africa have deepened, but so does trade imbalance since 2010. China mainly imports natural resources and raw materials from Africa. But this product portfolio is not different from Korea and the US. China's energetic insertion in Africa using various strategies has significant implications for countries with ambitions in Africa. Korea can achieve its ambitions in Africa by focusing resources in areas it can leverage its core strengths-such as education and vocational training, environmental policy and development cooperation.

• 국제지역연구
• /
• 제13권1호
• /
• pp.107-133
• /
• 2009

에너지 자원 확보 경쟁은 21세기 국제관계의 핵심적 추세의 하나다. 중국 경제발전의 원동력은 성공적 자원외교의 성과라고 해도 과언이 아니다. 1990년대 이후 중국의 에너지 수입 외교는 두 가지 행위 패턴을 보여주고 있다. 중앙아시아에 대한 자원 외교가 공동개발을 중심으로 한 다자주의적 접근방식이라면, 아프리카 지역에 대해서는 국가별 경제지원을 통한 양자주의적 행위패턴이다. 이 글에서는 지역에 따라 다르게 전개되어 온 중국 자원외교의 특징을 지역적 안보 민감성, 지정학적 고려, 그리고 비동맹외교 이후 축적되어 왔던 중국의 외교적 유산 등의 세 가지 측면에서 설명하였다.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
• /
• 제20권7호
• /
• pp.169-184
• /
• 2020

본 논문은 중국 공공외교 전략 하에 추진되는 국제교육 프로그램의 분석을 통해, 중국 공공외교 수행방식 변화와 그 의미를 분석하였다. 시진핑 지도부는 중국은 지난 40여 년간의 경제적 성장으로 토대로, 이제는 G2에서 세계최강국으로 발돋움하기 위해 노력하고 있다. 또한 그에 대한 비전으로 '중화민족의 위대한 부흥'이라는 '중국의 꿈'을 제시하고 있다. 현재 중국의 공공외교 차원에서 추진되는 국제교육 프로그램은 기존의 수동적이고 대응적인 방식에서 벗어나 국가 전략 속에서 능동적이고, 중장기적으로 구체화되어 운영된다. 즉 과거의 중국의 국제교육 프로그램이 '중국위협론'을 불식시키기 위한 소극적 모델이었다면, 현재 중국의 국제교육 프로그램은 세계 속에 '중국식' 질서를 학습, 확산시킬 수 있는 능동적인 모델로 진화하고 있다.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
• /
• 제11권2호
• /
• pp.27-45
• /
• 2012

Among political scientists, Japan's free trade agreements (FTA) with member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been considered to be a political tool that can compete against China for regional leadership in East Asia. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's so-called FTA diplomacy towards ASEAN nations serves the broad interests of Japanese actors in both the political and economic sectors. Given the attention to Japanese domestic political issues, it is argued that diplomacy primarily facilitates a need for free trade with ASEAN and ASEAN markets for Japanese corporations to compete in the global economy and for the government to nurture Japan's stagnant economy by assisting these corporations. This work also contends that the unclear function of FTA as an economic good is due to the lack of the government capacity to effectively manage FTA diplomacy. This partly results from the conventional view with regard to Sino-Japanese rivalry.

• Journal of Korea Trade
• /
• 제26권8호
• /
• pp.37-57
• /
• 2022

Purpose -International diplomacy is key for the cohesive economic growth of countries around the world. This study aims to identify the major topics discussed and make sense of word pairs used in sentences by Chinese senior leaders during their diplomatic visits. It also compares the differences between key topics addressed during diplomatic visits to developed and developing countries. Design/methodology - We employed three methods: word frequency, co-word, and semantic network analysis. Text data are crawling state and official visit news released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China regarding diplomatic visits undertaken from 2015-2019. Findings - The results show economic and diplomatic relations most prominently during state and official visits. The discussion topics were classified according to nine centrality keywords most central to the structure and had the maximum influence in China. Moreover, the results showed that China's diplomatic issues and strategies differ between developed and developing countries. The topics mentioned in developing countries were more diverse. Originality/value - Our study proposes an effective approach to identify key topics in Chinese diplomatic talks with other countries. Moreover, it shows that discussion topics differ for developed and developing countries. The findings of this research can help researchers conduct empirical studies on diplomacy relationships and extend our method to other countries. Additionally, it can significantly help key policymakers gain insights into negotiations and establish a good diplomatic relationship with China.

• 동남아시아연구
• /
• 제27권3호
• /
• pp.93-135
• /
• 2017

동남아시아 국가들은 중국과의 지리적 인접성으로 인해 G-2 역학관계에 주의 깊게 대응하면서 각자의 국가이익을 위해 외교의 묘수(art of diplomacy)를 찾고 있다. 캄보디아는 친중 헤징 전략으로 G-2 체제에 대응해 오고 있다. 본 연구는 냉전종식 이후 친미 성향을 보였던 훈센의 정책이 친중으로 전환하게 된 이유를 G-2 체제의 부상, 아세안 지역주의, 국가이익, 훈센의 통치기반과 체제정당성 차원에서 분석해 본다. 이론적으로 본 연구는 현실구성주의 시각에서 힘의 정치와 규범적 요인들이 훈센의 정치적 입지와 대외정책에 어떠한 영향을 미쳤는가를 살펴본다. 중국과 캄보디아는 경제 상호의존성과 중국의 힘의 상승이라는 현실주의 요인과 규범적 차원에서 양국의 이해관계가 수렴되면서 관계가 긴밀해져왔다. 더구나 중국의 막대한 경제원조와 투자는 훈센의 통치기반과 체제정당성을 강화시키고 있다. 반면에 민주주의와 인권을 앞세운 미국의 가치외교는 훈센의 권력기반에 위협적인 존재가 되면서 양국은 긴장과 갈등의 관계를 가져오고 있다. 하지만 훈센의 친중전략은 미국의 가치외교에 대해 전략적으로 대응하면서 중국으로부터 경제이익을 극대화하려는 헤징전략으로 동남아시아에서 중국의 헤게모니를 인정하고 중국의 지배를 인정하는 미국에 대한 균형전략은 아니다. 아세안의 경우 강대국들의 힘의 정치의 충격을 완화시키는 역할을 하고 있으나, 미중간의 이해관계가 첨예하게 엇갈리고 있어 캄보디아는 국익에 따라 아세안의 조정역할 보다는 양자관계로 G-2 체제에 대응하고 있다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권33호
• /
• pp.5-36
• /
• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• 한국항만경제학회지
• /
• 제20권2호
• /
• pp.275-288
• /
• 2004

The rising of east-north economic bloc is notable in world economy due to the rapidly growth of china economy. The China's economic standing is gradually higher and higher because the joining of the WTO at 2001, development of the exterior open-door policy and the expansion of the trade between chain and several nations. Since Korea and China normalized diplomatic ties in 1992, the two have made remarkable progress in bilateral relations in the fields of economy and diplomacy in particular. The amount of Korea's trade with China has increased by over 20% a year on the average because of the development of the economic cooperation of Korea and China. That is to say, China was sixth trade partner by the end of 1993, based on the amount of trade. But China became third partner at 1993, second partner at 2003 and first partner at the first half of 2004, based on the amount of trade. Korea can not trade with China from the Korea's port opening period to Cold War period after second world war. But historically, the two countries have shared a active and long history of trade relations from the ancient times up to now. This is because two countries get near geographically and two countries have a implication of history and culture. Not only had Korea trade with China at prehistoric age, but also at BC 7. We knew that Korea had traded with China very actively at ancient times through the Paekje(Korea's ancient country) people's village at Santung province and Changbogo's trade works. Korea-china trade relation has played an important role for the development of world economy. Therefor, based on reviewing the korea-china trade, I study the historical meaning of the trade at the region of east-north asia.

• 분석과 대안
• /
• 제2권2호
• /
• pp.111-141
• /
• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.