• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.25-42
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• 2011

• 수완나부미
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.93-116
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• 2018

Under feudalism, besides imploring investiture, tribute is said to be one of the two most typical activities at the core of diplomatic relations between China and the region, in particular, Vietnam and Japan. By using the comparative method and interdisciplinary approach, the author shows that there are many differences between Vietnam and Japan with regards to tribute activity with China during the feudal period. For example, the start and end of China's tributary activities with Vietnam and Japan are not the same. The period of Japanese tributary activity was much more loosened than Vietnam. Vietnamese tributary relation was political, while Japan placed economic benefits as the main priority. In particular, the author also proved that although Japan and China had differences in behavior and level of dependence on the tributary activity of Vietnam, both Vietnam and Japan maintained independence and autonomy. Based on the historical, cultural, and geographical characteristics, as well as the position and force correlation of each country in relation to China, this article also explains the causes of these similarities and differences.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.5-26
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• 2018

Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the power of attraction to affect the behavior of other states through the use of non-coercive instruments including culture, political values and foreign policy. Over the last two decades, environmental issues have grown in importance on the international agenda and become critical components of states' foreign policy-making. This paper aims to analyze environmental foreign policy as a soft power instrument focusing on two major rising powers: China and India. Traditionally, China and India had been reluctant to make any commitments in the field. However, they have shown greater willingness to act in global environmental governance in the past decade. They started playing more active roles in global climate change negotiations and supported a number of initiatives. Their current rise in global environmental governance has even been praised by the international community as the Paris agreement case demonstrated. This study evaluates China's and India's recent efforts in global environmental governance with a focus on climate change negotiations linking their constructive position to their soft power potential. It is argued that environmental issues are used by these two states as foreign policy strategy to gain more influence in international politics. This study finds out that China's climate-related environmental diplomacy has been more ambitious than that of India and thus has been closer to fulfill its potential as a soft power asset.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.154-195
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• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.215-240
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• 2015

Jeong YagYong, who are the SilHak Scholar during 18^th to 19^th century, wrote the Sadaegore with his pupil Lee Cheong. This work is the guide of diplomacy, which are asked to write from King Jeongjo. Although this book was completed after King Jeongjo's death, it harbors the King's thoughts about diplomacy or the relationship with China. Haebanggo, one chapter of the book, is about marine policy and how to treat the castaways. In this chapter, Jeong YagYong provides various ways to deal with these problems in marine area and sea refugee I will examine the Jeong YagYong's thought about the problems and ways to address these problems. Futhermore, I will inquire Jeong's opinion on the boundary in marine area. He recognized that many border transgressions happened in marine area at that time and considered that as urgent political affairs. Haebanggo consists of two parts. First part of the book is about protect own island from other countries. The rest part is about cases of dealing with castaways and their transgression. I argue that Jeong YagYong intended to make distinct borderlines in marine area and empathized the necessity of protecting Joseon's islands from other countries.

• 한국경제지리학회지
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.312-333
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• 2020

아프리카의 독립국가 출현과 함께 한국과 아프리카의 관계는 시작되었지만 외교적 교류는 완성된 모습보다는 불규칙적이며 비정규적 교류가 이어지는 듯한 모습을 보여왔다. 최근 들어 한국정부는 아프리카와의 관계 개선을 위하여 새로운 접근을 시도하고 있다. 본 연구는 한국의 대 아프리카 공공 외교의 여러 전략과 방안들을 살펴보면서 어떻게 한국과 아프리카간의 상호이익에 부합하는지를 분석한다. 한국의 아프리카에 대한 관심은 북한의 안보위협과 시장다변화 그리고 미국과 중국 등 강대국과 마찬가지로 아프리카 대륙 차원의 에너지 자원에 대한 관심이라고 볼 수 있다. 그리고 한국이 아프리카에 적용하는 혼합적 공공외교 전략과 방안은 다양한 형태의 결과물을 통해 나타나고 있다. 그 결과2000년대 말부터 한국과 아프리카의 경제적 연계는 한층 강화되고 있다. 미래에도 지속적인 관계를 유지하기 위하여 본 연구는 한국의 대 아프리카 공공 외교의 활성화를 위하여 연구결과를 바탕으로 여러 방안을 제안하고 있다.

• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제20권2호
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• pp.275-288
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• 2004

The rising of east-north economic bloc is notable in world economy due to the rapidly growth of china economy. The China's economic standing is gradually higher and higher because the joining of the WTO at 2001, development of the exterior open-door policy and the expansion of the trade between chain and several nations. Since Korea and China normalized diplomatic ties in 1992, the two have made remarkable progress in bilateral relations in the fields of economy and diplomacy in particular. The amount of Korea's trade with China has increased by over 20% a year on the average because of the development of the economic cooperation of Korea and China. That is to say, China was sixth trade partner by the end of 1993, based on the amount of trade. But China became third partner at 1993, second partner at 2003 and first partner at the first half of 2004, based on the amount of trade. Korea can not trade with China from the Korea's port opening period to Cold War period after second world war. But historically, the two countries have shared a active and long history of trade relations from the ancient times up to now. This is because two countries get near geographically and two countries have a implication of history and culture. Not only had Korea trade with China at prehistoric age, but also at BC 7. We knew that Korea had traded with China very actively at ancient times through the Paekje(Korea's ancient country) people's village at Santung province and Changbogo's trade works. Korea-china trade relation has played an important role for the development of world economy. Therefor, based on reviewing the korea-china trade, I study the historical meaning of the trade at the region of east-north asia.

• 수완나부미
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• 제15권2호
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• pp.57-90
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• 2023

China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as part of the existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its influence in digital and technological development across Asia, Europe, and Africa. Southeast Asia is one of the key targets of the Digital Silk Road due to its geographical proximity to China and the rapid growth of the digital sphere. Although the DSR opens several potential opportunities for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to foster the digitalization process in the region, how each country reacts to projects under the DSR is varied. Secondly, Vietnam is the only ASEAN member state that has not signed any official agreement under the BRI framework, and thirdly, Vietnam opted out of Huawei technology. This paper aims to understand the perspective of Vietnam and how Vietnam has responded to the growing technological presence of China in Southeast Asia until 2021. By using qualitative methods, the author argues that the DSR has allowed Beijing to overcome the limitations of the original strategy, BRI, and strengthen its influence in the field of information and communication technologies, particularly fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications. Furthermore, the paper examines Vietnam's digital development and digital diplomacy and how the Vietnamese government has responded to DSR projects. In light of both the potential threats and economic benefits that the DSR has brought to Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries, in the last section, the policy implications for cooperation are discussed.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.47-60
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• 2012

Sino-Japanese relations suffered a great setback during the premiership of Koizumi $Jun'ichir{\bar{o}}$ (2001-2006). Although many factors, such as dispute over the resources of the East China Sea or Japan's anxiety about China's growing military expenditures, are accountable for this situation, it was Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that became a symbol of the controversies between the two countries. The Yasukuni issue triggered a real eruption of profound anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese people. While commentators in China accused Koizumi of glorifying militarism and whitewashing the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War, the Japanese public started perceiving China's "exaggerated" reaction as a convenient diplomatic tool used by China to apply pressure on Japan in other bilateral disputes. On the one hand, spontaneous protests against Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine constituted a great constraint in China's diplomacy towards Japan, but on the other, they also became an ideal pretext for adopting a tougher stance in Chinese foreign policy. In this paper, I examine different points of view on the Yasukuni issue. After describing the Japanese background of the visits to the controversial shrine, I analyze various interpretations of China's reaction to the problem. Although emotions dominated discourse on the Yasukuni issue both in Japan and China, some pragmatic attempts to use this problem can still be seen. Besides being a side-effect of Koizumi's strong personality, the Yasukuni issue could be used either as a tool of factional struggle in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy towards Japan.