• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.63-91
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• 2009

This paper tests the validity of pecking order theory by Myers(1977) and Myers and Majluf(1984) on Korean manufacturing firms listed in the KRX for the years of 1994 to 2003. We also want to see if there is any difference in financing behavior between chaebol affiliated firms and non-chaebol affiliated firms. We develop testable hypotheses from the idea that established relationship between bank and firm mitigates the problem of information asymmetry (Kang and Lim, 2001), and thus makes it easier for firms to raise funds through banks. The test result of the first stage shows that firms prefer cash reserves to debt financing, and prefer debt to equity. Chaebol affiliated firms are found to behave as if they already exploit internal capital markets. The second stage of the test carried out by dividing debt capital into bank loans and corporate bonds also shows a consistent pattern of financing behavior. Firms are testified to prefer cash to bank loans, bank loans to corporate bonds, and corporate bonds to equity. In this case chaebol affiliation seems to make firms behave as if they already establish internal capital markets. Further analysis shows that some, though not in every case, difference of ordering around the occasion of Korean financial crisis exists. It may be from the change of attitude of Korean firms to risk, or from weakened influence of internal capital market along with strengthened market power in the post-crisis period.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.5-15
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• 2016

This study examines whether Korean rating agencies such as Korea Investors Service (KIS), National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), and Korea Ratings Corporation (KR), incorporate corporate governance into their corporate bond ratings in Korea. We find that the Korean rating agencies assign higher ratings to the bonds issued by Chaebol (Korean business group) affiliated firms. Our results also indicate that those rating agencies give higher ratings to the bonds with greater foreign investor share ownership. Moreover, if the rating agencies value corporate governance, higher rated firms should issue bonds at lower yield to maturity. We discover that Chaebol affiliation is counted favorably by the rating agencies. We find that investors are willing to pay lower risk premium for bonds with higher institutional ownership, but higher risk premium to bonds with greater equity ownership in the form of depository receipts. Therefore, even if the rating agencies and investors in Korea consider corporate governance (Chaebol affiliation and ownership structure) an important determinant in bond ratings and the yields to maturity, they have opposite views on institutional ownership and share ownership in the form of depository receipts.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.87-93
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• 2017

Purpose - This paper investigates whether managerial overconfidence is associated with firm-specific crash risk. Overconfidence leads managers to overestimate the returns of their investment projects, and misperceive negative net present value projects as value creating. They even use voluntary disclosures to convey their optimistic beliefs about the firms' long-term prospects to the stock market. Thus, the overconfidence bias can lead to managerial bad news hoarding behavior. When bad news accumulates and crosses some tipping point, it will come out all at once, resulting in a stock price crash. Research design, data and methodology - 7,385 firm-years used for the main analysis are from the KIS Value database between 2006 and 2013. This database covers KOSPI-listed and KOSDAQ-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for overconfidence is based on excess investment in assets. A residual from the regression of total asset growth on sales growth run by industry-year is used as an independent variable. If a firm has at least one crash week during a year, it is referred to as a high crash risk firm. The dependant variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a high crash risk firm, and zero otherwise. After explaining the relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk, the total sample was divided into two sub-samples; chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. The relation between how I overconfidence and crash risk varies with business group affiliation was investigated. Results - The results showed that managerial overconfidence is positively related to crash risk. Specifically, the coefficient of OVERC is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. The results are strong and robust in non-chaebol firms. Conclusions - The results show that firms with overconfident managers are likely to experience stock price crashes. This study is related to past literature that examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on the stock market. This study contributes to the literature by examining whether overconfidence can explain a firm's future crashes.