• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.113-140
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• 2016

Achieving the two goals of providing stable remuneration and promoting market based incentive for generation capacity with only one kind of capacity price is a difficult proposition. This paper suggests a market design in which two different kinds of capacity prices are used to achieve these goals. It maintains the current capacity price that is determined administratively based on the fixed cost of the gas-turbine generator. A second capacity price is added that covers generators with higher fixed costs and lower fuel costs such as combined-cycle gas turbine, coal-powered, and nuclear generators. This second capacity price is conditional on a lower energy price ceiling and determined by the interaction of the market supply and a demand schedule derived from the optimal fuel mixed principle.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.7
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• pp.1199-1204
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• 2007

In a cost based pool market, the generation capacity can be used as strategic bids by generation companies (Gencos) with the cost functions open to the market. Competition using strategic capacities is modeled by Cournot and Perfect Competiton (PC) model, and transformed into two by two payoff matrix game with Gencos' decision variables of Cournot and PC model. The payoff matrices vary when capacity payments are given to Gencos in accordance with their capacity bids. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the matrices also moves with capacity price changes. In order to maximize social welfare of the market, NE should locate in a certain position of the payoff matrices, which corresponds to a PC NE. A concept of a critical capacity price is proposed and calculated in this paper that is defined as a minimum capacity price leading to PC NE. The critical capacity price is verified to work as a tool for suppressing a strategic capacity withholding in simulations of a test system.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.93-124
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• 2011

The introduction of competition in the generation of electricity has raised the fundamental question of whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the capacity needed to maintain system reliability. Capacity mechanisms are adopted around the world to guarantee appropriate level of investment in electricity generation capacity. In this study, we discuss these approaches and analyze the capacity pricing mechanisms from the adequacy perspective. We conclude that the design of capacity mechanism is very important to decrease electricity spot price and increase total electric capacity. Specifically, the constant of capacity pricing mechanism made a difference to the performance of electricity market. However, the slope of capacity price mechanism is better than the constant of that in improving performance of electricity market.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.2203-2211
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• 2018

Capacity payment mechanism has been adopted as the incentive scheme to achieve resource adequacy in Korean electricity market, however, the level of capacity price has been controversial due to its insufficient extent to incur financial loss for certain generators. Therefore, a new method is proposed to estimate the proper level of capacity price incorporating profitability of market participants and resource adequacy in this paper. The proposed method is successfully applied to test system based on Korean power system.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.6
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• pp.269-275
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• 2002

Recently, Korea's electric industry has experienced substantial changes in its structure and function including the introduction of competition in the generation sector. Korea is in the early stages of market competition where the market price is determined by generation costs. In the future, the market Price will be determined by generators'bids. Therefore, the generators'profit is determined by market pool price, the prospects of pool price are very important for new capacity investment decision made by generators and IPPS. This study analyzes hourly marginal costs and LOLP considering basic generation mix and characteristics develops the relationship of pool price and Profit by generation-type using the change in reserve margin, and proposes basic direction for profits variation and supply-demand analysis in the electricity market in future.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.207-223
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• 2013

Revenue management (RM) has been widely used to model products characterized as perishable. Classical RM model assumed that price is the sole factor in the model. Thus price adjustment becomes a crucial and costly factor in business. In this paper, an optimal pricing model is developed based on minimization of soft customer cost, one kind of price adjustment cost and is solved by Lagrange multiplier method. It is formed by expected discounted revenue/bid price integrating quantity-based RM and pricing-based RM. Quantity-based RM consists of two capacity models, namely, booking limit and overbooking. Booking limit, built by assuming uncertain customer arrival, decides the optimal capacity allocation for two market segments. Overbooking determines the level of accepted order exceeding capacity to anticipate probability of cancellation. Furthermore, pricing-based RM models occupancy/demand rate influenced by internal and competitor price changes. In this paper, a mathematical model based on game theoretic approach is developed for two conditions of deterministic and stochastic demand. Based on the equilibrium point, the best strategy for both hotels can be determined.

• Korean Journal of Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Engineering
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.321-326
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• 2008

This paper presents and analyzes the effects of on-grid electricity cost, fuel price and initial capital cost of a CHP system, on the optimum DG and AC capacity and NPV, by using the ORNL CHP Capacity Optimizer, which was applied to a library in a university. By considering the current domestic energy cost and initial capital cost, it is shown that the installation and operation of the CHP system is not economical. However, with the current domestic CHP installation cost and fuel price, the NPV achieved by the installation of CHP system is greater when the on-grid electricity price is a factor of ${\times}1.5$ the present value. Regarding the initial capital cost of the CHP system, the reduction of the DG cost is much more economical than that of the AC cost, with respect to NPV. Electricity cost and fuel price have opposite effects on NPV, and NPV is more sensitive to an increase of the electricity cost than an increase of the fuel price.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.753-773
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• 2005

This paper is a study of the investment dynamics focusing on crude oil supply by OPEC and non-OPEC. Oil supply capacity is first determined by a leader, OPEC, and by an aggregate that represents non-OPEC producers. OPEC wants to increase a gain from oil price increase while keeping its market share relative to non-OPEC's share. An investment rule model is developed for OPEC crude oil supply capacity in response to non-OPEC's decision. In presence of oil price uncertainty, oil price threshold is derived above which it is optimal for OPEC to expand oil supply capacity since otherwise the increased supply of non-OPEC results in weakening of OPEC market share in the world oil market. In addition, a lower threshold price is derived below which OPEC triggers a capacity reduction to regain its otherwise forgone profits. A simulation is provided for calculating the capacity expansion and reduction thresholds.

• Proceedings of the Korean Association of Geographic Inforamtion Studies Conference
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• 1999.12a
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• pp.21-25
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• 1999

Planning support systems(PSS) add more advanced spatial analysis functions than Geographic information systems(GIS) and intertemporal functions to the functions of spatial decision support systems(SDSS). This paper reports the continuing development of a PSS providing a framework that facilitates urban planners and civil engineers in conducting coherent deliberations about planning, design and operation & maintenance(O&M) of water-distribution networks for urban growth management. The PSS using dynamic optimization model, modeling-to-generate-alternatives, value engineering(VE) and life-cycle cost(LCC) can generate network alternatives in consideration of initial cost and O&H cost. Users can define alternatives by the direct manipulation of networks or by the manipulation of parameters in the models. The water-distribution network analysis model evaluates the performance of the user-defined alternatives. The PSS can be extended to include the functions of generating sewer network alternatives, combining water-distribution and sewer networks, eventually the function of planning, design and O&H of housing sites. Capacity expansion by the dynamic water-distribution network optimization model using MINLP includes three advantages over capacity expansion using optimal control theory(Kim and Hopkins 1996): 1) finds expansion alternatives including future capacity expansion times, sizes, locations, and pipe types of a water-distribution network provided, 2) has the capabilities to do the capacity expansion of each link spatially and intertemporally, and 3) requires less interaction between models. The modeling using MINLP is limited in addressing the relationship between cost, price, and demand, which the optimal control approach can consider. Strictly speaking, the construction and O&M costs of water-distribution networks influence the price charged for the served water, which in turn influence the. This limitation can be justified in rather small area because price per unit water in the area must be same as that of neighboring area, i.e., the price is determined administratively. Planners and engineers can put emphasis on capacity expansion without consideration of the relationship between cost, price, and demand.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.20 no.3_spc
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.