• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.24
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• pp.1-24
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• 2008

This paper examines the direct effects of board independence and also its interaction effects with CEO's firm specific experience on firm performance. The findings in an hierarchial regression analysis of multiyear sample of computer hardware companies indicate that independent, outsider directors are beneficial to firms' performance when CEO has high-level of firm specific experience whereas it is harmful when CEO has low-level of firm specific experience. However, separating the positions of board chair and chief executive officer that has been used as another means for increasing board independence does not influence to firms' performance. These findings imply that researchers in corporate governance should reconsider the relative weight placed on directors' monitoring and assistance role. Rather than focusing predominantly on directors' willingness or ability to control executives, in future research scholars should yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance directors provide in bringing valued resources to the CEOs and in serving as a source of advice and counsel especially for CEO's improvement of management technique. In addition, they should pay more attention on identifying intervening processes between board and firm performance in order to provide optimal governance mechanisms and configurations to practitioners.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.1-19
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• 2016

The researchers in strategic management have focused on identifying the effects of CEO's demographic characteristics and experience on the strategic choices and performance of firms. On the other hand, they have failed to identifying the effects of CEO's psychological characteristics on them because of the difficulties over data collection and measurement for variables. To overcome this limitation of prior researches, this study is designed to achieve two specific objectives. The first is to examine the effect of CEO narcissism on diversification strategy and performance of listed corporations on Korean securities market in an economic downturn. The other is to examine the moderating effects of various corporate governance systems that are related to board and/or ownership structures on those relationships. The empirical setting for this study was drawn from a multi-year(2011~2014) sample of large listed corporations in Korean securities market. To achieve the objectives, the hypotheses of research are analyzed by implementing multiple regression analyses in two separate models. The results of these analyses show that CEO narcissism is positively related to the diversification of listed large corporations in Korean securities market. Regrading the moderating effects, the stake of institutional investors weakens the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and firm's diversification. The findings of this research imply that CEO narcissism can intensify the tendency of Korean corporations to adopt high-risk and high return strategy in an economic downturn. Thus, firms might be able to use CEO narcissism to drastically restructure the business portfolio in an economic downturn. However, Korean corporations should be very cautions to maximize the positive effect of CEO narcissism. They might be use the institutional investors as their corporate governance system to monitor and control the opportunism of CEO in the decision for diversification in an economic downturn.