• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.57-59
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• 2001

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model has been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than others. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector and a new method is presented to build bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information on their cost and price functions, but they don't know the strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price function into discrete step function. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using stochastic methods. For considering these conditions, we introduce the Bayesian rules and noncooperative game theory concepts. Also additional assumptions are included for simplification of solving process. Each utility builds the strategy to maximize his own expected profit function using noncooperative Bayesian game. A numerical example is given in case study to show essential features of this approach.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.38 no.6
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• pp.1021-1028
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• 2018

As entering the international construction market became more difficult than the past, ODA projects can be a breakthrough for domestic engineering companies to enter the international market. However, since many companies compete for limited projects, it is necessary to reinforce the competitiveness of bidding success. The competitiveness is the result of accumulating experience, reputation, and networking through partnering. Therefore, depending on which partnering strategy has been taken over a long period, the bidding success is decided. The objective of this study is to identify the effective partnering strategy for bidding success. For this, the World Bank bid results, focusing on consulting projects in Vietnam, are collected. Using the bid results, inter-firm network representing the partnering relationship is constructed and the Social Network Analysis is conducted. After then, by conducting the Logistic Regression Analysis, effective partnering strategies are suggested. The result shows that the diversification strategy is advantageous for transportation and city development projects and the concentration strategy is advantageous for water projects. The partnering strategy for the consulting project proposed in this study will be used as a reference for the domestic engineering companies to enter the Vietnam construction market in the future.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society for Energy Engineering kosee Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.331-336
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• 2003

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.122-133
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• 2019

In the construction industry, bidding competitiveness is the most basic and important competence of the company. Bidding competitiveness comes from competitive advantage, but the strategy of the company to capture bidding competitiveness varies with the characteristics of the project. In particular, overseas construction is where uniqueness of the construction industry and the specificity of international business coexist. This study analyzes the bidding success ratio and the level of bidding difficulty by project characteristics with 12,952 overseas construction bidding cases. Consequently, it was found that the bidding success ratio of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and civil engineering was the lowest in each group of project characteristics, and therefore the level of bidding difficulty is high, respectively. In addition, it was confirmed that the bidding success ratio of small size or short duration project was relatively high, and the bidding success ratio of both the negotiated bidding in the bidding method group and the private sector in the client type group was respectively high. However, Kruskal-Wallis test in contract type and period shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the bidding success ratio by group.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.109-116
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• 2010

A construction project consists of many types of contracts. In the process of selecting the successful contractor after bidding, there will inevitably be fierce competition, which may lead to corruption or bribery. Even after signing the contract, during the period of settling the amount of the contract, bribery could occur. Such corruption could harm the development of the construction industry. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a strategy to prevent corruption by strengthening the transparency of the bidding process. In this study, to prevent corruption in the construction industry, a new service is proposed in which the successful bidder is selected by a professional third party, and the introduction of diverse delivery systems for construction projects and the invigoration of alternative methods of settling disputes are also proposed in this study.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.87-96
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• 2009

Grid computing is a new technology which involves efforts to create a huge source of processing power by connecting computational resources throughout the world. The key issue of such environments is their resource allocation and the appropriate job scheduling strategy. Several approaches to scheduling in these environments have been proposed to date. Market driven scheduling as a decentralized solution for such complicated environments has introduced new challenges. In this paper the bidding problem with regard to resources in the reverse auction resource allocation model has been investigated and the new bidding strategies have been proposed and investigated.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.48 no.4
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• pp.41-54
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• 2020

This study was conducted to provide basic data for a transparent and fair bidding system by identifying problems and suggesting improvement measures through an analysis of the bidding status for construction projects and service-related landscaping of multi-family housing. To this end, we used the data from the "Multi-Family Housing Management Information System (K-apt)" that provides the history of apartment maintenance, bidding information, and the electronic bidding system to examine the winning bid status and amount, along with the size and trends of the winning bids by year, and the results of the selection of operators by construction type. As a result, it was found that out of the total number of successful bids (36,831), 4.4% (16,631) were in the landscaping business, and the average winning bid value was found to be about 24 million won. According to the data, 73% of the landscaping cases were valued between 3 million won and 30 million won, and 58.6% of the cases were in the field of "pest prevention and maintenance". 36% of the total number of bids were awarded from February to April, with "general competitive bidding" accounting for 59.8% of the bidding methods. As for the method of selecting the winning bidder, 55% adopted the "lowest bid" and "electronic bidding method," and 45% adopted the "qualification screening system" and "direct bidding method." As an improvement to the problems derived from the bidding status data, the following are recommended: First, the exception clause to the current 'electronic bidding method' application regulations must be minimized to activate the electronic bidding method so that a fair bidding system can be operated. Second, landscaping management standards for green area environmental quality of multi-family housing must be prepared. Third, the provisions for preparing design books, such as detailed statements and drawings before the bidding announcement, and calculating the basic amount shall be prepared so that fair bidding can be made by specifying the details of the project concretely and objectively must be made. Fourth, for various bidding conditions in the 'business operator selection guidelines', detailed guidelines for each condition, not the selection, need to be prepared to maintain fairness and consistency. These measures are believed to beuseful in the fair selection of landscaping operators for multi-family housing projects and to prepare objective and reasonable standards for the maintenance of landscaping facilities and a green environment.