• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.109-113
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• 2007

This paper introduces a system, Simulation based Stochastic Markup Estimation System (S2ME), for estimating optimum markup for a project. The system was designed and implemented to better represent the real world system involved in construction bidding. The findings obtained from the analysis of existing assumptions used in the previous quantitative markup estimation methods were incorporated to improve the accuracy and predictability of the S2ME. The existing methods has four categories of assumption as follows; (1) The number of competitors and who is the competitors are known, (2) A typical competitor, who is fictitious, is assumed for easy computation, (3) the ratio of bid price against cost estimate (B/C) is assumed to follow normal distribution, (4) The deterministic output obtained from the probabilistic equation of existing models is assumed to be acceptable. However, these assumptions compromise the accuracy of prediction. In practice, the bidding patterns of the bidders are randomized in competitive bidding. To complement the lack of accuracy contributed by these assumptions, bidding project was randomly selected from the pool of bidding database in the simulation experiment. The probability to win the bid in the competitive bidding was computed using the profile of the competitors appeared in the selected bidding project record. The expected profit and probability to win the bid was calculated by selecting a bidding record randomly in an iteration of the simulation experiment under the assumption that the bidding pattern retained in historical bidding DB manifest revival. The existing computation, which is handled by means of deterministic procedure, were converted into stochastic model using simulation modeling and analysis technique as follows; (1) estimating the probability distribution functions of competitors' B/C which were obtained from historical bidding DB, (2) analyzing the sensitivity against the increment of markup using normal distribution and actual probability distribution estimated by distribution fitting, (3) estimating the maximum expected profit and optimum markup range. In the case study, the best fitted probability distribution function was estimated using the historical bidding DB retaining the competitors' bidding behavior so that the reliability was improved by estimating the output obtained from simulation experiment.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.209-255
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• 1991

This paper develops a simple model to explain the reasons why foreign acquirers pay significantly higher premiums for U.S. target firms than do U.S. buyers. We also provide empirical work on the valuation effect of foreign takeovers and the determinants of the wealth gains of U.S. target shareholders involved in foreign takeovers. The results indicate that target wealth gains are significantly higher in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers, after controlling for the wealth effects of payment method, acquisition type, tax status, size and time period of bids. This confirms the valuation effect of foreign takeovers. Furthermore, the results of cross-sectional regression analysis show that the variation in U.S. target wealth gains is explained by extra tax benefits stemming from double tax deductions for acquisition-related interest expenses incurred by foreign acquirers. These findings imply that differential taxation across tax jurisdictions is the main source of the valuation effect of foreign takeovers. In addition, we find that there exists a valuation effect of the nationality of the foreign acquirers. Japanese companies pay significantly higher premiums than do non-Japanese acquirers. The finding also indicates that competition among bidders increases the abnormal returns to U.S. target shareholders in foreign takeovers.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.24 no.5
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• pp.44-51
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• 2023

Selecting appropriate bidding system in construction projects considering the characteristic of project can be a make-or-break element, so the understanding for bidding system of public construction projects is ever more important from the perspective of both the owner and the contractor. The design-build bidding is commonly referred to as turnkey in Korea, and is a bidding method that is often applied to large public construction projects because it allows new technologies to be applied to the design and facilitates risk management for the owner. In this bidding method, there are only two factors (design score and price score) that affect the selection of the winning bidder, so it is important to understand the influence of each factor, but there is little research on the subject. This study aims to provide a basis for establishing bidding strategies for understanding the influence between design score and price score by analyzing various design-build bidding data of public construction projects. The results of the study show that design score is the factor that has more influence on the ranking of bidders in all three weighted evaluation methods: design-emphasized, price-emphasized, and equalized evaluation. In addition, we found that the correlation between design and price scores was not significant due to the unique bid evaluation structure in Korea.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.28 no.12
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• pp.239-248
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• 2023

The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors for service contracts that affect the successful bid price rate, focusing on the case of the country market. In the study, ordering organizations and bidders differentiated themselves from existing studies by analyzing service contracts that affect the successful bid price rate in a wide range of country markets. Comparative analysis of the awarding price ratio for services, this work provides a comparable result to the existing results in the previous literature. The analytical model used five independent variables such as budget, contract method, the days of the public notice, the awarding method, and the lowest awarding ratio. In the survey and analysis, big data was collected using text mining for service bids for Nara Market over the past 18 years and data was analyzed in a multi-dimensional way. The results of the analysis are as follows, (1) if budget does not determine the awarding price ratio. This is not the case in small amounts. (2) The contract method affects the awarding price ratio. (3) The days of the public notice increase, the awarding price ratio decrease. (4) the awarding method affects the awarding price ratio. (5) The lowest awarding ratio determines the awarding price ratio. Based on the results of empirical analysis, policy implications were sought.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.55 no.1
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• pp.111-132
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• 2022

The comprehensive examination on tendering system has been introduced to the Cultural Heritage repair and restoration field since 2016 to remedy the repair issues of South Gate in 2014. The Cultural Heritage Administration tried to attain the high performance of the cultural heritage repair and restoration works securing the proper payment for the repair and restoration works. It is high time to review the operating performance of the comprehensive examination on tendering system (hereinafter referred to as the "CEOTS"), as the system has been run for over 5 years to correspond with its original goal, i.e., "The Proper Payment in return for the High Performance of Repair and Restoration works." This study intends to analyze 114 tenders of CEOTS from 2016 to 2020. As a result of the analysis of 114 tenders, firstly, more than half of bid winners were in the top 20% of repair & restoration capacity disclosure amount list, which mostly fulfilled the goal of 'attaining high performance.' Secondly, as the winning bid rate is decreasing from 86.847% in 2017 to 85.488% in 2020, the goal of 'guarantee of a proper payment' is not achieved yet. Thirdly, the influence of Economic Evaluation section in CEOTS has been grown since the change of scoring system in CEOTS in 2019. This study identifies two reasons why the winning bid rate of CEOTS has decreased. Firstly, it is caused by the fact that 'the group that got more than 1st place' and 'the first place group' that are more than half of the total bidders have the decreasing bidding rate trend as the years go by. Secondly, the exclusion rate of 'the group that got more than 1st place' is higher than the exclusion rate of 'the group that got less than 1st place', which means the expected winning rate would be lowered. It is proposed that the revision of CEOTS code is needed, i.e. easing the strict rule concerning the exclusion rate as well as setting up the lower bidding limit to prevent the excessive decreasing winning bid rate.