• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.65-75
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• 2016

We study limit pricing in a price-based duopoly market under asymmetric information on the demand state. An incumbent, who is a monopolist in the initial period, has complete information on the size of a market, while a potential entrant only knows it partially. After observing the sales price of the incumbent in the first period, the entrant decides whether to enter a duopoly market and the sales price if she chooses to. We present a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which indicates that limit pricing can deter the entry of a potential entrant under price competition when there is information asymmetry about the demand state.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.157-164
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• 2015

An efficient retrieval of useful information is a prerequisite of an optimal decision making system. Hence, A research of data mining techniques finding useful patterns from the various forms of data has been progressed with the increase of the application of Big Data for convergence and integration with other industries. Each technique is more likely to have its drawback so that the generalization of retrieving useful information is weak. Another integrated technique is essential for retrieving useful information. In this paper, a uncertainty measure of information is calculated such that algebraic probability is measured by Bayesian theory and then information entropy of the probability is measured. The proposed measure generates the effective reduct set (i.e., reduced set of necessary attributes) and formulating the core of the attribute set. Hence, the optimal decision rules are induced. Through simulation deciding contact lenses, the proposed approach is compared with the equivalence and value-reduct theories. As the result, the proposed is more general than the previous theories in useful decision-making.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.47-89
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• 2020

We introduce a simple theoretical model to analyze the welfare impact of a competition policy in the natural gas market in South Korea. An incumbent monopolistic firm currently owns essential facilities, but the competition policy mandates that the firm provide open access to any entrant firm, charging an access fee. When no regulation is imposed on the fee pricing, this policy increases social welfare as well as the profit of the incumbent firm. When the pricing is regulated, however, social welfare depends on whether there is information asymmetry between the government and the firm regarding the operating cost of the facilities. If the government has complete information, social welfare can be maximized by choosing the optimal prices. Otherwise, the government has to set the prices based on the information that the firm delivers. We formulate a Bayesian game to analyze this case and identify a set of perfect Bayesian equilibria to compare social welfare.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.

• Parasites, Hosts and Diseases
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• v.59 no.2
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• pp.139-148
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• 2021

This study was carried out to provide information on the taxonomic classification and analysis of mitochondrial genomes of Spirometra theileri. One strobila of S. theileri was collected from the intestine of an African leopard (Panthera pardus) in the Maswa Game Reserve, Tanzania. The complete mtDNA sequence of S. theileri was 13,685 bp encoding 36 genes including 12 protein genes, 22 tRNAs and 2 rRNAs with absence of atp8. Divergences of 12 protein-coding genes were as follow: 14.9% between S. theileri and S. erinaceieuropaei, 14.7% between S. theileri and S. decipiens, and 14.5% between S. theileri with S. ranarum. Divergences of 12 proteins of S. theileri and S. erinaceieuropaei ranged from 2.3% in cox1 to 15.7% in nad5, while S. theileri varied from S. decipiens and S. ranarum by 1.3% in cox1 to 15.7% in nad3. Phylogenetic relationship of S. theileri with eucestodes inferred using the maximum likelihood and Bayesian inferences exhibited identical tree topologies. A clade composed of S. decipiens and S. ranarum formed a sister species to S. erinaceieuropaei, and S. theileri formed a sister species to all species in this clade. Within the diphyllobothridean clade, Dibothriocephalus, Diphyllobothrium and Spirometra formed a monophyletic group, and sister genera were well supported.